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CHANGING ROLE OF CITY MANAGER:

ELECTORAL SYSTEMS, POLITICAL LINKAGES, AND ROLE LEGITIMACY

by

John Y. Cleveland

A Dissertation Presented in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Doctor of Public Administration

ARIZONA STATE UNIVERSITY

May 2000

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May 2000

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

, Chair

Supervisory Committee

ACCEPTED:

Director, Executive Committee

Dean, Graduate College

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ABSTRACT

A growing body of literature records the manager's increasing role as a political leader. This role challenges the normative assumption upon which the council-manager plan is based and creates a crisis in legitimacy for the role of the city manager, an appointed official.

Role dichotomy between manager and council produces role conflict, bringing significant pressures on the tenure and organizational integrity of the manager. The city manager uses political rationality to neutralize these pressures, but the increasing use of political rationality places the manager in the role of political leader, creating the crisis in managerial role legitimacy.

A new electoral context is suggested as a solution to this problem. This new context is the interaction of the city manager with a council elected by district as opposed to at-large electoral systems. A council elected by district results in new political linkages that change roles and relationships between the manager and elected officials. The result is that role dichotomy and role conflict is reduced ultimately diminishing the manager's independent political role.

A research model was developed that tested the effect of electoral systems on the role of the city manager and council. Three hypotheses were developed to evaluate the relationship between electoral systems and role dichotomy between council and manager. They also evaluated the effects of districting on specific managerial roles. The data were tested using multivariate regression analysis. Questionnaires were sent to managers, mayors, and council members in 105 cities across the nation.

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The results support the hypothesis that as districting increases in a city, the level of role dichotomy between manager and council decreases. This decrease in role dichotomy is significant since data also reflect a stronger role involvement by district (as opposed to at-large) managers in policy and community leadership. These results point to a role leveling or role duality in district cities between council and manager. The implications of districting reducing role conflict between council and manager are significant for the future of the council-manager form of government in terms of democratic governance and managerial role legitimacy.

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To my Mother Walden A. Cleveland

and

In loving memory of my Father William V. Cleveland

These wonderful parents gave me everything to have the best start on life. My Mother taught me independence, patience, and how to give from the heart to others. My Father set an example of high achievement and tenacity that has guided me throughout life. A man of great humor, deep capacity for love, integrity, and iron strength; he is missed every day.

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I am grateful for the many key contributions people have made to this study over the years. I owe much to Dr. Louis Weschler, Committee Chair, whose great gifts of conceptual thinking, exact precision in the construction of theoretical models, and clear concise writing have been paramount in my growth from student to scholar. His instruction has been absolutely critical in keeping my research on the correct path. As my committee chair, he has been a mentor, role model, and a personal friend. It has been an honor to study under his guidance.

The committee members each contributed their talents to this study and have been instrumental in the dissertation development. Dr. N. Joseph Cayer is the finest academic writer I have known. His editing of my dissertation proposal and the completed dissertation was essential to the clarity of the finished product. Dr. Nicholas Alozie spent many hours guiding me through the analysis and testing of my data providing me with many creative ideas regarding the presentation of the statistical results. Dr. Martin Vanacour, City Manager of Glendale, Arizona served as technical advisor to my committee. He was instrumental in opening doors to field test my questionnaire among city officials in Glendale, and made significant contributions to the wording of the survey instrument.

Many other government and university officials offered their experience and insights. Marvin Andrews, former city manager of Phoenix and Frank Fairbanks, the current city manager, gave of their precious time to answer my questions in an interview setting. Their contributions were core components in the development of the hypotheses

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for this study. John Miller, the information systems manager for the National League of Cities provided demographic data on the 105 cities used in this study and essential identification data for the survey respondents. Dr. James H. Svara at the University of North Carolina granted permission to use a research survey from one of his research projects to assist me in my questionnaire development.

Friends and family provided encouragement and support during this long journey. Members of my study cohort provided advice, encouragement, and humor along the way. Dr. Walter "Skip" Brown, Dr. Ramona Ortega Liston, and Dan Schaffer provided critical assistance along with other friends in preparing two large survey mailings. In particular, I owe much to my good friend, Skip Brown, whose positive attitude and good sense of humor kept me going through the tough times. He is an extraordinary friend and academic associate who spent countless hours encouraging and assisting me in this endeavor. My brother, William Cleveland, Jr. was always there for moral support.

Without the sacrifice of time and selfless offers of assistance from all of the wonderful people mentioned above and many other friends and associates, I could not have completed this study. I will always be grateful.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

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Page

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LIST OF TABLES

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Table | Page

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LIST OF FIGURES

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

This dissertation examines the relationship between the electoral system used by a city to elect the city council and the role of the city manager. Three types of electoral systems were studied: at-large, pure district and mixed (combination of at-large and district). The effects of the electoral system on the role of the city manager were studied in terms of three related separate research areas: (a) the roles and relationships between city manager, council and mayor; (b) the role of the city manager as policy initiator and community broker; and (c) the specific relationship between city manager and mayor on strategic issues.

Statement of Problem

The increasing shift of political leadership from the city council to the manager has created a crisis in role legitimacy for managers in council-manager city governments. The council-manager form of government was originally intended to have distinct lines of accountability between the manager and elected officials. The manager, a politically neutral administrative expert, was accountable to the governing body which in turn was responsible to the people. In upholding democratic values and accountability, the governing body was to make policy, and the manager, appointed by the governing body, was to simply implement that policy (Nalbandian, 1991).

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As power in communities has dispersed and citizens demand more access to governmental decision making, managers have become active in policy making processes and the negotiating and brokering of community interests. Professional managers find that their traditional role in giving an account to the governing body is insufficient to legitimize their new visible and powerful role as a broker of community interests (Nalbandian, 1991).

To provide this legitimacy for their expanding role, managers develop community constituencies either incidentally or purposely. The manager articulates the values of the community to the council which then provides legislative oversight over the initiatives presented by the manager. If the manager does not articulate citizen values to the council or misrepresents community values in some fashion, the citizens can object to the council, questioning the role of the manager. This process ensures that democratic values and the accountability of the manager are maintained (Nalbandian, 1991).

A fundamental question is how to maintain accountability of the city manager to elected officials and democratic values when political community leadership is increasingly shared between the governing body and the city manager. Nalbandian (1991) provides one answer:

> The local government professional is formally accountable to the governing body. But as the manager's role extends into policy making and the negotiating and brokering of community interests and power, more than council approval for the role is required. The more political the responsibility the governing body shares with the manager, the greater the need to extend the city manager's traditional

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commitment to accountability into a framework at city hall that engages professionalism with value diversity in the community (p. 70).

Nalbandian (1991) suggests that as city managers become more politically visible, the legitimacy of their role depends upon managers anchoring their actions in fundamental community values.

Role conflict between council and manager abound in the council-manager form of government, bringing pressures on the manager's tenure and organizational integrity. The manager assimilates these pressures by supplanting technical rationality with political rationality. Political rationality is an approach to problem solving based on who offers a solution and the level of support that solution can achieve. It is a process of compromise with decisions being made based on what proposals can win the most political support among all participants. Technical rationality bases decisions on which proposals are most effective in solving the problem.

The increasing use of political rationality by the manager successfully counters pressures placed on the manager by the role conflict, but creates a problem with legitimacy in terms of the manager's accountability to the elected body and to the citizenry. Nalbandian (1991) has presented a model to resolve this problem with legitimacy. It centers on the manager extending his or her concept of professionalism beyond efficiency to embrace community values. If the manager listens to, correctly interprets, and correctly includes the values of the community in policy initiatives to the council, then political anchors are created in the community that provide legitimacy to the system.

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But what Nalbandian has presented is still a model, an ideal, not a tested mechanism of change. If councils share their policy making role with the manager on an increasing scale, fail to exercise legislative oversight, and if managers increasingly assume the policy making and community broker role, are there mechanisms for change in the organization? Are there mechanisms that can both restore role legitimacy for the manager, and ensure that the council exercises its proper role of legislative oversight?

Beer, Eisenstat and Spector (1990) in emphasizing the power of organizational roles on individual behavior observe the following:

> Individual behavior is powerfully shaped by the organizational roles that people play. The most effective way to change behavior, therefore, is to put people into a new organizational context, which imposes new roles, responsibilities and relationships on them. This creates a situation that, in a sense forces new attitudes and behaviors on people (p. 159).

This dissertation examines the electoral context for the council-manager form of government and evaluates how this electoral environment can change roles, responsibilities and relationships between council, the manager and mayor. This new electoral context for cities is the combination of the city manager with a council elected by district versus at-large electoral systems.

The urban political machine of the late 19th and early 20th century was characterized by functional centralization and geographical decentralization: functional centralization in the form of the Strong Party Organization (SPO) that controlled the allocation of separable goals to constituents; and geographical decentralization in the

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form of district ward politics organized along community boundary lines (Miranda, 1994). Reformers geographically centralized the focus of city government through the replacement of the SPO ward based system with at-large nonpartisan elections. At the same time, the reform movement, in attempting to centralize the power of the city government in the city managers' office, actually created functional decentralization with city agencies elevated to positions of nearly independent power (Kleinburg, 1995).

Lowi (1967) concluded that new urban machines were constructed around functional not geographic areas. Political influence in reform cities moved to those interests defined by functional as opposed to community boundaries. These new functional urban machines resembled the old because they became "relatively irresponsible structures of political power" answerable to no one. Like the old urban machine, the new functional agency machines practiced client based politics. But their autonomy resulted in formal horizontal decentralization and created an administratively fragmented urban environment. The new functional urban machines responded to a plurality of interest groups equally fragmented. Without the presence of integrative mechanisms, a condition resulted where our cities, as Lowi (1967) has said, are "indeed well run...but the cities are ungoverned."

Banfield (1963) has observed that large-city mayors can only overcome the formal decentralization created by the reform movement through informal centralization. Other studies have concluded that an important aspect of city governance is the presence of integrative institutions and that innovation is greatest in cities where the number of centers of community power is high and the organizational linkages between these power

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centers are extensive and sophisticated. Political parties are integrative institutions that can foster linkages but SPOs seem to be on the demise (Wolfinger, 1965).

Cities need to establish real governance through informal centralization in the form of interorganizational linkages connecting significantly higher number of community power centers than exists at present. Without the presence of the SPO, this dissertation examines the question as to whether new roles created by the combination of the council-manager form of government with district electoral systems can create informal centralization through new interorganizational linkages that can increase community outputs. Community outputs are defined as the actual results, the specific goals that some communities are successful in achieving and others fail to achieve (Clark, 1968). Community outputs can be viewed as an expression of community values and whether or not those values can be actualized into concrete results.

Description of the Study

Overview of the Study

The foundation of the study will be a test of the Svara (1985) dichotomy/duality model that examines the contrasting roles of the manager and council. Svara defines four separate roles: (a) mission describes the overall vision for the future of the city and broad based directional goals for achieving that vision. Mission is the primary responsibility of the council; (b) policy describes the position on issues that the city needs to take to meet the directional goals developed in the mission area. Again this is the realm of the council; (c) administration describes the legal process whereby the manager staffs and submits city ordinances and administrative regulations for approval by the council; (d) management

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falls squarely in the manager's realm and involves all the processes to implement policy and legal decisions made by the council. Svara's research concludes that there is a dichotomy of roles and responsibilities with mission and management because mission rests almost exclusively with the council and management with the manager. However, he finds a duality of roles and responsibilities in policy and administration with both manager and council significantly involved in these areas.

Research Questions

This dissertation uses the following research questions as a basis for the study. The first research question will use the Svara dichotomy/duality model to evaluate the effects of electoral systems on roles and relationships. All questions are based on the council-manager form of government.

1. How are the roles, responsibilities, and relationships between the city manager and city council in the areas of mission, policy, administration, and management affected by the electoral method used to elect the city council?

2. How does the use of district systems affect the relationship between the city manager and mayor in terms of roles and responsibilities in the government realm of mission planning?

3. How does the use of district systems affect the specific role of the city manager as policy initiator, community leader, and informational broker?

The research universe for the dissertation will be council-manager cities in the United States. This is a national study using data from council-manager cities in excess of 100,000 population in all 50 states. The source of data for the cities meeting the research

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criteria is the National League of Cities. The cities total 105 in number meeting the criteria of the study.

Approach to Analysis

The units of analysis in this research model can be defined a number of ways. They are first the people in each city that comprise the leadership (council, mayor and city manager). However, as Babbie (1990) emphasizes, the unit of analysis typically for a survey is a person, but in some surveys the unit analysis can go beyond the person to descriptive aspects of the people being studied. In this regard, the units of analysis in this research model are defined as follows: (a) actual roles of the city manager and city council measured in terms of mission, policy, administration, and management using the Svara dichotomy/duality model; (b) actual and perceived role of city manager as policy leader; (c) actual and perceived role of city manager as community leader; (d) actual and perceived role of city manager as information broker; and (e) the relationship between the mayor and city manager on strategic mission issues.

This research model uses the following dependent and independent variables to measure the units of analysis as described above. Six control independent variables are used to account for external validity problems.

Independent variables.

1. Type of electoral system used to elect the city council.
2. Population size (control variable).
3. Amount of time since the transition from at-large to a mixed or pure district system electoral method (control variable).

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4. Ethnic/racial diversity (control variable).

5. Amount of time in position (control variable).

6. Partisan vs. non-partisan elections (control variable)

7. National geographic region (control variable)

Dependent variables.

1. Degree of difference or dichotomy in role involvement when comparing the roles of the city manager, mayor, and council in mission and policy as opposed to administration and management.

2. The frequency with which the city manager works with the mayor on strategic city mission issues

3. The actual and perceived role of the city manager (by council and mayor) in policy formulation

4. The actual and perceived role of the city manager (by council and mayor) in community leadership

5. The actual and perceived role of the city manager (by council and mayor) in informational brokering.

This research used a questionnaire to collect data. The questionnaire was sent to the city manager, mayor and the city council in each city. A pilot study of the questionnaire was conducted in the City of Glendale by administering the questionnaire through personal interviews.

The National League of Cities (NLC) provided population size and an index for each city's population ethnic and racial diversity. The NLC also provided information on

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whether the city conducted partisan or non-partisan elections and geographic region data. This is the source for four of the six control variables. The amount of time since the transition from an at-large to a mixed or pure district system and total time in current position was provided by the respondent on each questionnaire (third and fifth control variables).

Significance of the Study

The results of the data analysis presented in this dissertation will test the following generalizations: In cities where the council is elected by district or a mixed system, the roles of policy leader, community leader and informational broker for the city manager should be more predominant that in cities where the council is elected at-large. The council's role as policy initiator should also be stronger in cities using the district or mixed electoral system. The duality of roles between council and manager should be stronger in mission and policy for cities using the district or mixed systems as opposed to cities using at-large systems.

The data reveal less certain conclusions concerning the relationship between the mayor and city manager on strategic mission oriented issues. This uncertainty is based on the scarcity of existing literature concerning changes in the relationship between city manager and mayor when a city adopts district electoral methods. However, this dissertation makes a significant contribution toward a better understanding of the mayoral/manager relationship as it is affected by district electoral systems.

The combination of the city manager with a council elected by district creates a redefinition of roles in a number of ways: (a) the city council exercises greater political

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and policy leadership through constituency representation and greater legislative oversight over both the manager's administrative apparatus, and policy initiatives; (b) the city managers' role as policy initiator and informational broker with the council and mayor is increased creating interorganizational linkages; and (c) neighborhood interest groups gain greater access to the government through these interorganizational linkages. Most importantly, this new electoral context increases the role legitimacy of the city manager because interorganizational linkages connect the manager in a tighter fashion to both the council and community values. The political role of the manager becomes a response to council demands for information generated by constituency concerns. The council is restored to its proper role of legislative oversight and political leadership.

Organization of the Study

The dissertation has five chapters. This first chapter is an introduction to the dissertation topic, project outline and a presentation of the research questions for the study. The second chapter is a comprehensive review of the existing literature on the roles of the city manager, mayor and council. This literature review centers on three areas: (a) role conflict between manager and council; (b) the increasing use of political rationality by the city manager in a response to this role conflict; and (c) the crisis of role legitimacy for the city manager created by the use of political rationality. The review also includes a comprehensive discussion of the value of interorganizational or political linkages to a municipal organization and the community as a whole. The three hypotheses in the dissertation will be presented in this chapter.

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The third chapter is the methodology chapter. This chapter will include the rationale for using a questionnaire, the pilot testing of the questionnaire with the City of Glendale, the approach to addressing validity problems in the research, and the statistical methods used to analyze the data. The chapter will also present methods used to ensure that the questionnaires returned represent a balance among regions, type of electoral system used, and the respondents themselves (council, mayor, city manager).

The fourth chapter describes the results of the data analysis and how well the results fit the hypotheses presented in the dissertation. The final chapter will conclude the findings of this study and will discuss the implications of their support or lack of support in relationship to the three hypotheses.

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CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

Historical Role Definition of City Manager

The 1915 Model City Charter contained three basic features which formed the council-manager plan and have characterized council-manager government to this day: (a) nonpartisan, at-large election of the council on a short ballot, (b) unification of power in the council, and (c) concentration of administration authority within the office of city manager. Under this idealized version, elected officials (mayor and council) were to be the primary center of power with managers responsible for the day-to-day administrative business. Research in the past years has refuted this politics-administration dichotomy and demonstrates that the city manager is a principal policy actor, continuously feeding information and initiatives to elected officials (Ammons & Newell, 1989; Nalbandian, 1989).

As an outgrowth of the reform movement in the Progressive era, the council-manager plan promised greater administrative efficiency free from political corruption. The city council was to be preeminent in power, with the mayor as a figurehead and the manager never straying from the administrative role. Council-manager government blended two streams of progressive thought. First, reducing the number of elected officials and focusing political power in the hands of a small governing body

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elected at-large would strengthen democracy and weaken machine politics. Second, the focusing of administrative authority in the hands of the city manager would enhance centralized planning and rational approaches to public problems (Nalbandian, 1991).

Despite the research evidence pointing to the city manager as a policy activist and at times, political leader, the wide disparity between the reality of council-manager leadership roles and the official job descriptions remains to this day. For example, the International City Management Association (ICMA) Handbook for Councilmen offers the following description of the duties of the council and manager:

> The most important aspect of local government is policy making and this duty rests exclusively with the council when it operates under the council-manager plan. On the other hand, the chief duty of the city manager is the administration of policy (p. 1).

The ICMA Handbook goes on to describe the proper relationship between councils and managers as follows:

> The manager is responsible to the council for proper conduct of all city activities under his direction. He provides the council with information and advice and makes recommendations. He is the council's technical advisor and consultant, but only the council can make laws and establish policies. Thus the burden for political leadership falls squarely on the council while the manager is primarily concerned with administrative leadership (p. 28).

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Role Theory

One approach for the study of local government has been through the use of role theory. Neal Gross, Ward Mason, and Alexander McEachern state that, "A role is a set of expectations...a set of evaluative standards applied to an incumbent of a particular position" (p. 60). The value of role theory is that it does much to explain why the city manager has deviated from the council-manager official job description pronounced in 1915. Role theory would suggest that role definitions are developed from a combination of personality types and the perceived expectations of others. If city managers have drifted into the policy/political arenas, then role theory would explain the drift as resulting from the perceived expectations of councils, department heads and professional staff, peers and citizens as opposed to a strategic choice process on the part of the manager (Katz & Kahn, 1978).

Role theory and the abundant research refuting the politics/administration dichotomy are grounded in the realities of city managerial behavior as opposed to the idealism of the original council-manager government charter. Both bodies of literature see efficiency as only one but not the paramount value of council-manager government. Many studies using role theory, place special emphasis on the policy and policy/political behavior of city managers (Ammons & Newell, 1989).

City Manager's Perceptions of Role

Policy vs. Management Role

A consensus among different research projects exists that city managers perceive their predominant role as the chief policy activist in city government. Ammons and

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Newell (1989), in their study of city managers, state that the issue is no longer whether the manager does engage in policy and political activities but whether the manager should be a major political leader in the community. In a sampling of over 500 city managers, Ammons and Newell found that the greatest majority of city managers perceived their role to be that of policy maker (55.8%). Thirty-eight percent saw the role of manager as most important and only 5.8% selected the political role. The city managers included council relations along with policy in their definition of perceived role. In the same study managers were asked which role dominated most of their time. Clearly the management role was the predominant time consumer with 50.8% of the city managers choosing the management role, 32.2% the policy role, and 17% the political role. Therefore, managers perceived the policy role as most important for job success, but spent most of their time in the managerial or administrative role. But the study clearly shows that city managers spend significantly more of their time on the policy role than do mayors.

Deil S. Wright (1969), in a much smaller study completed 20 years earlier in 1965, arrived at a much different conclusion for the perceived role of the city manager. A greater proportion of city managers (60%) said that their time was consumed most significantly in the managerial area. Forty-six percent expressed a personal preference for the managerial role, and a greater majority (37%) believed that the managerial role contributed the most to job success.

Another study conducted roughly in the same time frame as that of Wright's is a doctoral dissertation completed by George A. James (1970). His study evaluates city managers in five Southeastern states. He found, as did Wright, that managers perceived

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their roles to be that of strong administrators. Generally, they also saw a role for themselves as community and professional leaders but not as strongly as the administrative role. James also tested an hypothesis as to the perceived role of political and policy leader. It is unfortunate that James combined policy and political into one role, for many managers see their role as policy maker and only a minority declare their roles to be political activist. By combining the two, James has hidden the true role orientation managers may have as policy maker. Nonetheless, managers' consensus on statements relating to the managers' policy activity was greater than that for political activity. It is interesting to note that both the Wright and James studies, conducted approximately in the same time period, differ markedly from the other studies referenced in this section that were completed much later. These two studies are the only ones that have the managers perceiving their roles to be administrative in nature. As the rest of the section will demonstrate, most evidence points to the manager's role as policy maker. The time difference in the conduct of the studies will be discussed later in this chapter.

Nalbandian (1991) references several studies that demonstrate not only the city manager's perception of the role as policy leader, but that in practice the city manager is indeed the policy broker. An ICMA 1984 survey assessed three policy activities of city managers. Responses were "almost always" in the three areas of policy participation, policy leader and policy initiator. Nalbandian points out that managers in research segments in both Ohio and North Carolina indicated that their desired level of involvement for council members in policy making fell short of the managers' actual policy making involvement. In both cases managers were expressing a desire for greater

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policy involvement on the part of elected officials but apparently did not want that level to match their own. This opinion expresses both a managerial role perception as policy leader as well as a distrust of the councils' ability to effectively lead in the policy arena. Nalbandian references a 1980 survey of managers, where 30% rated their councils as poor in policy making as compared to 20% who rated them high. Only half of the managers surveyed indicated the council is "very or usually effective" when setting long term goals.

Edward B. Lewis (1982) offers an interesting departure from the often standard role treatment of the city manager as administrative expert, policy leader, and political leader. He categorizes the city manager into seven distinct roles escalating from the administrative expert role to political leader. His seven categories are: (a) textbook traditional administrator; (b) submissive yes/man; (c) traditional/cooperative (beginning to dip into policy making); (d) team/trustee (engaged in the administrative arena and political arena, but no policy making); (e) team/moderate (substantial policy making role); (f) team/boss (governing team with council); and (g) near boss (politician manipulating the council). The sample size of his study was large, with 1,616 responses from across the country. Although Lewis offers no data on city managers' perceptions of their proper role, and presents a neutral picture of council perceptions of managerial role, his analysis clearly demonstrates that managers are involved heavily in policy making. Fifty-nine percent of the sample was significantly involved in policy making as opposed to 34% focused in administrative management and 7% in political leadership. An interesting point Lewis makes is that with the 7% sample size heavily involved in political leadership, the council's perception of the proper managerial role was politically

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oriented. This suggests a strong connection between council expectations of the manager and actual behavior, at least with the role of political leader.

Ronald O. Loveridge (1971) conducted a study of 40 Bay Area city managers that is probably the most comprehensive study using role theory. He too categorizes city managers departing from the traditional role division of administrative expert, policy leader and political leader. His findings indicate that most city managers perceived themselves as active participants in the policy process. His composite self-image of the city manager is that of a strong political executive, expected to exert policy leadership on most issues before the city agenda. So strong is this policy orientation, that Loveridge develops four role orientations, but all within the arena of policy making. His four role types are Political Leader, Political Executive, Administrative Director, and Administrative Technician. Political Leaders give enthusiastic endorsement to managers as idea men and agents of change. The Political Executive is less willing to take risks, and takes a more pragmatic and less moralistic view of the political role of the manager. Administrative Directors are ambivalent in their approach. They are active in the policy process but are reluctant to be novel innovators or open leaders. Administrative Technicians define the policy role narrowly and come as close as any of the city managers to the classic politics/administration dichotomy. Their focus is on housekeeping functions. Loveridge found that about half of the managers fell into the political policy orientation and half into the administrative policy orientation. Only 20% were classified as Administrative Technician types.

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Role Perception vs. Participation

Loveridge also offers data that demonstrate that city managers' policy participation matches their role perception. In his study, city managers frequently participated as policy initiators, advisors, leaders and spokesmen. Loveridge offers some explanations as to why the city manager has eased into a preeminent policy leadership role. First, the city manager runs city hall and has a near monopoly on information and cannot avoid close involvement in the policy-making process. Second, as a trained practitioner, the city manager is in a position to develop a grasp of city problems that councilmen cannot rival. Third, changes in technology, population, ecology and race relations present policy issues that the city manager must confront. But Loveridge is careful to point out that no study has ever shown the city manager to be a political city boss. Not one study of role perceptions has either the city manager or council concluding that the city manager's preeminent role is that of political leader. Loveridge points out that without the command of dramatic political symbols, the manager cannot challenge old values, target uncomfortable problems or marshal strong public support. The city manager is often a weak political executive.

John C. Buechner (1965) conducted a study of Colorado city managers. He found that 66.6% of the city managers felt that they should be playing a leading role in policy-making. However, he did find that city managers were not unified in their role perception as policy leader vs-a-vs council members or as a community leader. In other words, city managers were unified in a role as a policy leader but not necessarily as policy leaders out in front of the council, dictating policy to the council.

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David R. Morgan and Sheilah Watson (1992), in one of the largest studies, sampled 1,585 city managers in council-manager cities nation wide. The results offered no analysis of perceived roles on the part of the city manager or council but did analyze the role chosen by city managers that most characterized their present job. Fifty-six percent of managers in all cities characterized one of their top three roles as policy facilitator, 55%, policy coordinator, and 52% as policy director. Over half of all city managers listed policy director, the strongest policy-making position, as one of their top 3 roles. When cities with over 250,000 in population were isolated, the policy director role was chosen by 57%. Such statistics are significant in demonstrating the city manager's role as policy leader.

In another large sample size (1,717), Robert J. Huntley and Robert J. Macdonald (1975) arrive at the same conclusion as Morgan and Watson. In their study, city managers are significant policy leaders. Nearly 90% of all city managers characterized their managerial style as a policy formulator. Sixty-four percent reported that they were always or nearly always involved in policy initiation. Over 60% of the respondents felt that they always or nearly always played a leading role in policy-making. When asked how they perceived what the council expected of them, the responses from city managers were as follows: over four-fifths (83%) felt that the council expected city managers to exercise administrative leadership as opposed to political or policy leadership. As will be discussed later, council expectations of city managers consistently run counter to what city managers perceive their proper role to be and what managers actually do.

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B. Jones Kweder (1965) offers another regional study of city managers in 21 North Carolina cities. Kweder's conclusion is that the manager is not only the chief administrator but the chief policy maker as well. Kweder found that the mayor's role varied from being a symbolic leader to being a major force in shaping policy, and that most councilmen tended to be passive participants in the policy-making process. He offered no data as to what North Carolina city managers perceived their role to be, but did present findings on council expectations. These findings will be presented later in this literature review.

Finally, William P. Browne (1985) offers a study of 114 city managers in Michigan. He found that 74% of the city managers felt that their policy leadership was very necessary. Thirty three percent of the respondents felt that they took the leadership position on nearly every single issue. All the remaining managers (60%) perceived most policy questions to be originating in managerial offices rather than from council sources.

To conclude this section, of the six studies that measured managerial self role perceptions, four found that managers perceived their role to be a policy leader, while two indicated the role to be an administrative expert. The studies ranged from the 1960s to 1980s in time period. Studies in the 60s as well as the 80s found that city managers felt their role to be policy makers. However, if three of the six studies that are inter-state or national in nature are isolated, there seems to be an interesting trend. Wright's 1965 study and James' 1970 study are the only two that reflect the managerial role perceptions as administrative expert. Ammons' 1985 study clearly shows the managerial role perception as policy leader. This may indicate a shift over a 20 year period in role perception on the

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part of city managers (if looking at national samples). Ammons (1989) theorizes that this shift may be due in part to the trend in the 1970s for cities to amend their charters to allow for council election by district. Since council members elected by district would present a bigger challenge to the city manager in gaining policy consensus, the city managers attitude toward the importance of the policy role may have changed.

Another conclusion offered is that five of seven studies addressing what the manager actually does as opposed to perceived proper role, demonstrate that the manager is spending most time in policy leadership. Therefore, most studies conclude that the manager perceives the role to be a policy leader and that this matches the area that occupies the most time.

Council Perceptions of City Manager's Role

After reviewing how city managers perceive their proper role and how that perception matches what they actually do, it is important now to review the same studies to see how the council perceives the proper role for city managers. This is critical, since much of the definition of role comprises expected behavior. In many cases, a person's role will be drawn to match a set of expectations (Katz & Kahn, 1978). Since in most cases the city manager is appointed by the council, the council's expectations should have a great influence on the city manager. Six of the ten studies presented in this paper provide data on council expectations. Additionally Nalbandian (1991), although not an independent study, presents a literature review of other authors on council expectations of the city manager. His assessment will be presented first.

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Perception of Manager as Administrative Leader

Nalbandian compares the Huntley/Macdonald (1975) study (showing a preponderance of council members in cities nationwide expecting the city manager role to be that of administrative leadership) to a more current one conducted by R. E. Green (1987). Green's data show that the council's primary expectation of administrative leadership dropped from 85% in 1973 to 61% in 1984. The role expectation expressed by councilmen for city managers to be participating in issue formulation jumped from 8% to 25%. Taking these statistics and comparing them to the city managers' role self perception shift in the Ammons (1989) study reveals a significant trend in role perception. Ammons found that in 20 years city managers nationwide moved from seeing their role as administrative expert to policy leader. It appears that a corresponding shift is occurring with council expectations of city managers. The primary council expectation is administrative leadership but fewer and fewer council members are seeing that as the proper role. More and more council members are seeing policy formulation as a proper role.

Loveridge (1971), in his study of Bay Area managers, found that councilors favor the policy style for city managers that matches the official *ICMA Handbook* rhetoric, that of staff administrator. City councilors define the role of the city manager according to the official job description. The manager is to be a staff officer hired to give advice and to implement council policy, period. When councilors did acknowledge the importance of a city manager who possessed political skills, it was only in terms of a manager who could protect the council, make them look good, and champion their policy priorities. Only 14%

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of the councilors felt that the city manager should be a policy leader. Councilors consistently limited the proper policy activities of the city manager to those of staff administrator and council advisor. Taking Loveridge's four city manager roles of Administrative Director/Technician and Political Leader/Executive, and measuring council expectations along these four role models produced the following: 82% of the councilors chose the Administrative Director/Technician roles. The belief that the city manager should follow policy set by the council dominated virtually every response.

James (1970) in his study of five Southeastern states found somewhat different results than to Loveridge. He found high consensus among council members that the city manager should be a strong professional administrator, and less consensus that the manager should be a community and professional leader. However, James did uncover an interesting fact when councilors were asked about the city manager's role of political and policy leader. The elected officials generally agreed that the manager should be a policy leader but not a partisan leader. They perceived a dynamic strong policy leadership role for the manager. In fact, his findings support the conclusion that elected officials may perceive more strongly a political and policy leadership role for managers than do managers themselves. James offers an interesting explanation. Elected officials may perceive that managers are more policy and politically oriented than do managers themselves because elected officials can be directly affected politically by managerial action. The elected official may tend to perceive the manager as a political/policy actor because managerial actors influence the political destiny of the councilors. James points out that councilors feel strongest about a managerial role as policy-maker when policy

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leadership is lacking in the council. So council members in his study still are protective of their official charter as policy leaders.

John C. Buechner (1965) in his study of Colorado city managers found that 45.2% of the councilors felt that the city manager should not play a leading role in policy-making. Thirty-nine percent felt the city manager should be a policy leader. Buechner's hypothesis is that there are systematic differences in the way city managers and city councilors perceive the city manager's role. The city manager occupies a position which links the municipal organization to national, state and local professional organizations. Managerial obligations are to the profession. The city council serves as a link between the municipal government and the community. Its obligations are to the community. Because of these systemic linkages, the city manager and the city council will naturally have different expectations of the manager's role. Buechner believes that the nature of the council-manager system precludes significant agreement about the proper role of the city manager. In other words role conflict is inevitable in the manager-council relationship.

Perception of Manager as Policy Leader

William P. Browne (1985), in his study of Michigan city managers, presents a strikingly different picture of council expectations of managers. Sixty percent of managers felt that council relations were excellent and 39% felt they were good. Only 2% saw the relationship as neutral or negative. For all issues, 66% of the managers believed that their proposals carried at least 90% of the time. Fewer than 5% saw their success rate as less than 70%. When issues were defined as "major" issues, 78% of all managers

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reported a 90% success rate. These statistics reflect an unusually strong policy dependency on Michigan managers by their elected councils. In Browne's study there is a definite link between managers who perceived their role as policy leader and the managerial perception that councils were welcoming that type of behavior. All but three of the respondents indicating a strong policy orientation reported excellent council relations. Thus, he concludes, a strong relationship exists between environments where managers can anticipate council acceptance of their policy initiatives and the predisposition of those managers to be policy leaders. Browne's conclusions support one of the major tenants of role theory. Occupants of positions in society will tend to exhibit behavior that is in conformity with expectations of others surrounding that position (Loveridge, 1971).

Kweder (1965) found similar results in his North Carolina city manager study. He found that councilors in North Carolina were not anxious to take leadership away from the manager. In fact councilors criticized any manager that was not aggressive enough to chart the policy path to the council. In his study Kweder found that elected officials for the most part were not choosing to exert policy leadership and were not uncomfortable in deferring to the manager as the policy leader.

Svara (1990) in his study of city manager cities in North Carolina, observes that the council members overwhelmingly agree that the manager should assume leadership in shaping policies, advocate major changes in policy, advocate new services to promote equity and foster citizen participation. Council members were also more tolerant of city managers working through powerful members of the community.

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Svara (1991) finds in a 1989 survey that council perceptions of the city manager as a strong policy leader go beyond North Carolina to nationwide. More than 70% of the council members surveyed consider the city manager to be a very important contributor to the policy process. Despite the traditional view that the manager is simply an administrative agent of the council, Svara concludes that the manager is perceived to be a major policy initiator by council members. In fact, 44% of those surveyed ranked the manager and his staff as the most important policy initiator among city government administrative and elected officials.

City managers perceive their proper role to be that of policy leader. City managers in action are policy leaders. Councilors' expectations are different because they perceive the city manager to be an administrative expert. Managers feel they should be policy leaders, they act as policy leaders but councilors expect them to be administrative experts leaving policy to the elected officials. None of the studies have either manager or councilors believing the role to be that of a political leader. No study concludes that a majority of city managers actually perform as political leaders. This conclusion leads to the next section: policy role conflict.

Policy Role Conflict: Manager vs Council

Role Theory and Expectations

Before entering into a discussion of role conflict, it is appropriate to review some concepts of role theory. Society is conceived as a system of positions. With each position comes an associated set of expectations concerning appropriate behavior. These expectations form a behavioral model providing the occupant of the position a value

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system to adjust and direct their own behavior. If occupants conform to expectations, they allow others to anticipate their behavior and enable interacting individuals to function in a collective manner (Loveridge, 1971).

The three central concepts of role theory are position, role and expectation. They are defined as follows. A position is a location of an actor or class of actors in a system of social relations. A role is a subset of expectations that can be distinguished from other sets of expectations applied to the same position. An expectation is an evaluation standard applied to how the occupant of a position should behave in a given role (Loveridge, 1971).

For the city manager, there is evidence that he or she does not occupy a position characterized by a clear and uncontested set of expectations. The policy role is subject to differing definitions and interpretations. The situation as reviewed in this chapter is one where players in municipal government cannot agree on the dominant role of the city manager. This disagreement is described by John Buechner (1965) who concludes that the very nature of the council-manager system precludes agreement about the proper role of the city manager because of the positions and obligations which incumbents possess.

Role Conflict

Ronald O. Loveridge (1971) presents some explanation as to why conflict exists between manager and councilors and provides ideas for conflict resolution. As seen in this paper, managers and councilors often subscribe to two nearly mutually exclusive conceptions of the policy role. Loveridge wonders if, in the process of aggregating the data in a large survey, could the results be misleading since policy roles are not being

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measured between a city manager and that manager's corresponding council. So Loveridge examines the policy views of the city councilors in terms of the policy orientations of their own city managers. He matches the Administrative Technician/ Director managers with the councilors who hold Administrative/Technician policy orientations. And he matches Political Leader/Executive managers with councilors who hold politico policy orientations. The results show no significant match statistically between the policy orientations of city managers and the policy views of city councilors. Therefore, the role disparity between councilors and manager is still valid.

Loveridge offers several explanations for the role conflict. He believes this conflict is rooted in personal and positional differences. First, recruitment and socialization patterns are markedly dissimilar. City managers are self-recruited in college for a career in public service. Many are formally educated in public administration and almost all spend some years as an apprentice in city management. The result is a commitment to the public interest and to a self-image as a policy maker. Councilors follow no common formal patterns of socialization or recruitment. Many are businessmen, elected at-large with no political affiliation or identity. The policy values that result are often oriented to the status quo with few councilors taking a strong stand on any issue. Second, differences in frames of reference also cause role conflict. City managers are professionals, bound by common norms and a code of ethics. Managers share an outlook focused on a set of professional standards. Councilors by contrast are amateurs. Their policy interests are parochial and particularistic in orientation. The manager is viewed as an expert intended to serve the council in pushing local interests. The council sees the managers role as

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serving the council. Managers see their role as serving the public interest. Third, the differences in tasks for which managers and councilors are held accountable causes conflict. Managers are expected to recognize and tackle the problems of the city. In reality, city managers have most of the responsibilities of an elected chief executive. City councilors are formally given the symbols and prerogatives of policy making. They are the official policy makers, sanctioned by law. But in reality, the city manager is thrust into the policy leadership role because of his expertise, information, and access to city issues. However, the manager is not the people's legal representative formally bestowed with policy power by law. The council sees the manager as a servant to the council to protect council members from policy failure. The manager, well aware of the real role as policy leader, becomes thrust in the forefront of issue resolution for the city. Policy role conflicts in this context become unavoidable.

Loveridge continues with an analysis of conflict and possible methods for resolution. He cites Jepha Carrell (1962) and his six categories of conflict between managers and councilors: power prerogatives, personality clashes, political setting, policy expediency differences, manager's inflexibility and rectitude, and communication and cognition difficulties. With the possible exception of political setting, all conflict centers on how managers and councilors define and accept the policy definitions of the other. Role analysis would indicate that the city council exerts powerful pressures on the city manager. Councilors can increase legitimate and coercive powers as well as provide rewards to secure role compliance. City managers in Loveridge's study were asked to rank six groups (administrative staff, fellow city managers, public-at-large, community

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groups, professional management groups and the city council) according to their importance to the manager's performance and reputation. Seventy-three percent ranked the council first and 23% ranked the council second.

In this study the council would be considered "role senders." Robert Kahn, Donald Wolfe, Robert Quinn, and J. Diedrick Snock (1964) state that "when role senders are both dependent and powerful, the situation has about it the pall of hopelessness. The emotional reactions of focal persons to such binding situations reflect this hopelessness" (p. 218). This statement comes true in the frustrations of the city managers in relation to the council. Loveridge's study reveals that over 60% of the managers identified conflict with the city council as one of their two most important problems. The frustrations centered on the unwillingness of the council to accept the policy proposals or leadership of the city manager.

Loveridge points out another factor reflecting the conflict between manager and council. Seventy-five percent of the managers said that they try and educate the councilors by redefining values, interests and expectations of city councilors. Managers admitted to using an indirect approach in reeducating the council.

Role Conflict Resolution

Loveridge concludes by detailing the choices available to the city manager to resolve conflict. The manager has three choices: (a) follow his or her own policy definition; (b) accept the role definition of the council; or (c) engage in compromise behavior. Loveridge concludes that the third choice is the only real choice for most managers. The manager is in a tough situation. In reality he or she possesses the

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responsibilities and power of an elected chief executive. But managers cannot act as chief executives to resolve policy role clashes with the council because they are not sanctioned by law to do so. Publicly and to the council, they must present themselves as professional administrators. City managers are challenged to indirectly, or behind the scenes, build, utilize and husband their personal and political resources to influence public policy decisions. To be successful and to remain in office, they must literally become the best politicians in town.

The question is posed at this point as to how city managers have clung to their distinct role perception so tenaciously when role theory asserts that incumbents will adapt their behavior to the expectations of others surrounding them. City managers maintain their role perception as policy leader and act that role out successfully.

Loveridge (1971) provides one explanation alone: the skillful, indirect, behind the scenes manipulation of councilors and events. Another explanation is provided by Neal Gross, Alexander W. McEachern and Ward S. Mason (1958). Their approach is strictly from a role theory structure but it roughly matches the real world choices in Loveridge's study. First Gross and his associates point out that the position incumbent may consider the expectations by others to be either legitimate on illegitimate. A legitimate expectation is one which the incumbent feels others have a right to hold. An illegitimate expectation is one which the incumbent does not feel others have a right to hold. A sanction is either a reward or a punishment, conditional on how an individual behaves. Gross et al. (1958) develop a theory to demonstrate how incumbents resolve role conflict when the expectations of their roles do not match their own self perception. Individuals may be

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separated into three types according to whether they are primarily oriented toward legitimacy or sanctions in making decisions. The first category are those individuals who give the most weight to the legitimacy of expectations. In a role conflict situation, they will fulfill legitimate expectations and reject illegitimate ones. The second type of orientation to expectations is the "expedient." An individual in this category gives priority to the sanctions others will bring to bear if the incumbent does not conform to expectations. The incumbent will conform to any alternative that has the strongest sanction for nonconformance. The third type of orientation is the moral expedient. A person with this orientation does not give primacy to either the legitimacy or sanctions dimension but takes both equally into account and behaves according to the best net balance. For example if faced with two alternatives where one action is illegitimate with heavy sanctions for nonconformity and another action that is legitimate with no sanctions, the moral expedient will try and do both actions or compromise. Comparing this theory of three orientations to the world of the city manager would lead to the conclusion that most city managers are in the moral expedient category. The moral category is inappropriate since it leaves little room for compromise. The expedient category is unrealistic since city managers would then always conform to the expectations of the council. And, of course, all the studies in this dissertation demonstrate that such conformity is not the case.

The contrast in role perceptions between council and manager results in constant and continuous conflict. It is only the skillful and political manager who is able to compromise that survives. The high turnover in the city manager profession is indicative of this steady state of conflict. Whitaker and DeHoog (1991) report that sixty-one percent

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of all managers departing were forced from office. The turnover was particularly high in cities with unstable politics or stable cities where city councils disagreed with city managers on roles in policy making.

Svara Dichotomy/Duality Model

Svara (1985), in a study involving interviews with mayors, council members and managers from five North Carolina cities, found that a majority of the respondents perceived a separation or dichotomy in roles, yet 41% of the respondents saw a duality in roles, either staff involved in policy or councilors in administration. Svara builds a dichotomy/duality model involving the four areas of mission, policy, administration, and management. The four areas are defined as follows: (a) mission refers to the organization's philosophy, its direction and the broad goals it sets for itself; (b) policy refers to middle-range policy decisions, e.g., spending government revenues, initiating new programs and the distribution of services; (c) administration refers to the specific divisions, regulations and practices employed to achieve policy objectives; and (d) management refers to the implementation actions taken to support the policy and legal administrative functions. In his study, Svara developed patterns of involvement across all four zones for manager and council. He found that council dominates mission formulation although the manager plays an advisory role. In policy, the manager had slightly more involvement than the council because of the large amount of policy advice and interpretive policy setting by administrators. Managers had a much larger role in administration yet council is involved because of planning and zoning ordinances and constituency complaint handling. Management is the sphere of the manager with council

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contributions limited to suggestions and assessment through appraisal of the manager. Svara concludes that there is a dichotomy of mission and management but a duality in the areas of policy and administration.

Svara's model derived from his five city study presents an almost ideal degree of separation and sharing of activity on the part of council and manager. He does call on the council to have a larger role in mission and broad policy making to include a greater role in legislative oversight to ensure that goals of the organization are being advanced both throughout the city and in specific neighborhoods. Svara believes that role conflict can be reduced when the ideal division of responsibility is found and a cooperative model of urban governance can be achieved. To Svara, between mission and management, detailed policy making must be a joint concern and councilors should recognize and encourage the full contribution of the manager to policy making.

The model proposed by Svara (1985) is certainly an effective way to resolve the effects of role conflict. However, no concerted effort is being made in urban governments across the land to achieve this dichotomy/duality balance in areas of effort. Instead, a model similar to the "strong manager" version described by Svara, with the manager's increasing encroachment into mission and policy is becoming more of a reality.

City Manager as Political Broker

The pressures brought to bear on a city manager due to role conflict between city manager and the elected council have many manifestations. The city manager is concerned about the integrity and preservation of the organization because of the increasing ombudsman role for constituency concerns assumed by the council. There is

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concern for personal tenure and survival in an environment where 61% of all city managers are forced out of office (Whitaker & DeHoog, 1991). More significantly, the pressure and tension created by role conflict produces a situation where city managers are attempting to define their proper role as the role drifts further from the traditional administrative managerial role envisioned by the Model City Charter of 1915.

Role confusion and ambivalence abound. City managers see mayors who try to exert more leadership over councils while at the same time keeping a tighter reign on the manager's work. They see council members who invite managers to play a more active role in policy while becoming more aggressive in pushing their agendas and council intervention into administration. City managers see their own role increasingly as a policy leader and broker between elected officials and citizen. (Svara, 1989a).

Long frustrated with a leadership void on the part of the council in policy development, city managers find themselves playing an increasing political role in response to the abdication of political leadership by elected officials (Nalbandian, 1987). Yet their assumption of a political policy role leaves them uneasy, uncomfortable and ambivalent in defining what their role is and should be with elected officials. For example, Svara (1988) in his survey of 189 North Carolina city and county managers found that 80% of the respondents agreed that the manager should assume leadership in shaping municipal policies. But at the same time, 52% of the respondents agreed with the statement, "A manager should act as an administrator and leave policy matters to the council." In another study Svara (1989b) found that, although managers desire more involvement by elected officials in defining mission, the desired amount is less than the

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actual involvement in mission reported by the managers themselves. Managers will always reject a politics/administration dichotomy as a concept that has no foundation in reality. Yet most managers will define themselves as nonpolitical administrative experts (Nalbandian, 1989).

It appears that city managers today cling to the neutral professional technical role foundation while exerting more and more leadership in political power brokering and policy development. Stillman (1977) offers an interesting explanation of the role confusion on the part of city managers, when he concludes that:

> Managers cannot totally embrace either role of professional or politician. If managers became neutral experts without reference to the political facts of life, they would jeopardize their own survival, but if they became politicians without responsible knowledge or expertise in urban affairs, they jeopardize their credibility and worth to the public they serve. In short, managers cautiously and continuously tread a middle ground between the two poles of politics and expertise (p. 662).

Stillman (1974) observes that the key to survival for managers is their ability to grasp the complex political realities of the communities they serve. But managers would not survive if they publicly proclaimed their assumption of roles as politicians. Managers then lead double lives, forced to proclaim neutrality to survive, while fully aware that they must compete for their share of political influence to achieve personal and organizational success.

Role conflict produces tension and pressures for the manager in terms of personal tenure, the city government organization, and the programs initiated by the manager to the

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council. The gap between council expectations of the proper role of the city manager and the actual role of the manager is narrowing. But the role conflict is still there at significant levels. In addition to role perception differences between the manager and council are the pressures on the manager created by the balancing act the position requires between professional and politician.

The manager's response to increased pressure on job tenure and organizational integrity is the supplanting of technical rationality with political rationality as a means to maintain independence in the face of all pressures and as a means to keep pressures moderate and well balanced. A model for political rationality as an approach to decision making is discussed in the next section. Various studies on the role of the city manager are folded into that model to observe if the political rationality approach to decision making provides an effective explanation to the ways in which city managers react to increased pressures and conflict.

Political Rationality Model

This section develops a model for a decision making structure based on political rationality versus technical rationality. This model is tested against various studies conducted over time on the role of the city manager to examine its ability to explain the city manager's responses to role conflict.

First, it is helpful to examine the fundamental differences between political rationality and all other forms of reason. Paul Diesing (1962) provides one of the clearest explanations:

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> Non-political decisions are reached by considering a problem in its own terms, and by evaluating proposals according to how well they solve the problem. The best available proposal should be accepted regardless of who makes it or who opposes it, and a faulty proposal should be rejected or improved no matter who makes it. Compromise is always irrational; the rational procedure is to determine which proposal is the best and to accept it. In a political decision, on the other hand, action never is based on the merits of a proposal but always on who makes it and who opposes it. The best available proposal should never be accepted just because it is best; it should be deferred, objected to, discussed, until major opposition disappears. Compromise is always a rational procedure (p. 233).

Wildavsky (1984) adds to this explanation by observing that organizations do not necessarily set goals and objectives and then carry them out. It is the political process of determining what policies can be agreed upon by all participants that charts the direction. In a political situation, the need for support assumes supreme importance. The political costs and benefits become critical to any decision.

Political considerations have priority over every other consideration because political rationality is the fundamental kind of reason. This can be defended because political rationality operates to preserve and improve decision structures and all decisions emerge from sound decision structures. The more rational a decision structure, the more rational are the decisions it produces. Political rationality operating unobstructed enables other forms of rationality (technical, economic, etc.) to operate, but a serious political deficiency can block all other forms of problem solving (Diesing, 1962).

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The political rationality model presented here is based on Diesing's concepts of a group center, independence of that central authority, and management of pressure. Political decisions are made more frequently by those in central roles than by those who exist in the periphery of the organization, because the organizational condition affects the central role more directly than any other. According to Diesing, political decisions made by a person in a central role are based on three principles: (a) maintaining independence in the face of all pressures; (b) acting to structure the organization so that pressures are kept moderate and well balanced; and (c) preparing for future events with their inevitable new pressures. Each one of these principals requires further explanation as presented by Diesing (1962).

Maintaining Independence

The continuing task of the person taking a central role is to maintain independence when confronted with pressures coming from inside or outside the organization. Yielding to a pressure source, embracing a point of view of an advocate's position, results in identification with that parochial interest. The result is the center surrendering the position of spokesperson and leader of the entire group and becoming the spokesperson for a particular point of view. The organization loses confidence in the group center, and someone else assumes the role of spokesperson who can maintain independence. The center has to accept and be representative of all points of view within the organization since the center's role is that of spokesperson for the whole.

There are two ways the center can resist pressures and maintain independence. First, the pressures can be balanced against each other. Second, there can be a direct

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assertion of the central authority against the pressure source. To maintain optimum independence, the center must use both methods in combination. Balancing the sources of pressure against each other requires that the center act as a mediator, taking on the role of interpreter, moderator, and referee and avoiding a role of direct participant in the conflict. Pressures aimed at the center are passed on to other pressure sources with the center withdrawing from the conflict and standing above it. The second method requires the assertion of group values to effectively counter the pressure. If pressures sacrifice the values of the whole to private concerns, the center can assert the importance of shared group values and make a call for the subordination of private interests for the greater good of the whole. Here the center must be careful for in asserting shared group values the danger exists that the center will be accused of pushing a private interpretation of group values that is not held by the group.

Structural Changes to Keep Pressures Moderate And Well Balanced

If a particular pressure is too intense, no amount of assertion of shared group values will be able to resist it. If all the greatest pressure on the center is coming from one direction, the centers' mediation ability will not be able to effectively balance that pressure against weaker pressure sources. A second more long range action plan is necessary because the center must structure the decision making group so that the pressures on the center are moderate and well balanced.

Diesing suggests two ways of approaching this structuring process. First, the center can increase personal authority until it is strong enough to resist any pressure source. If shared group values are weak, then the central authority can take action to strengthen

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them through increased unity, shared experiences, greater mutual understanding and trust among all players in the decision making group. Linking parts of the decision making structure together through greater communication and mutual dependence and developing political support in a wider range of group players can ultimately strengthen the center's authority and increase independence. The second way to structure the group is to develop a wider and more equitable distribution of power among all parts of the decision making group. Effective mediation on the part of the center involves the ability to counter a strong pressure source with another part of the decision making group that can offer an effective alternative proposal. This fosters the foundation for compromise. If one pressure source is disproportionately powerful, the opportunities for mediating a compromise are diminished. The center, through the distribution of power, can build up weaker parts of the group to balance influence from different pressure sources. In this way, the center can use both mediation and direct assertion of authority to increase independence.

Preparing For Future Pressures

If the center has increased independence through building up the shared values of the group and thereby the authority of the center, and restructures the group so that power is evenly distributed, increasing the center's ability to mediate, certain advantages come from a position that is now stabilized. The center is able to either mediate, resist, or accept proposals at will without the danger of losing influence. The stabilization of the political decision making structure gives freedom to the center to look at intrinsic merits of a proposal and shift to some form of nonpolitical decision making.

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Diesing observes that the structuring of the decision making group so that the centers' authority is strengthened through increased group unity or increased central power and building up the weaker parts of the group creates two characteristics of a rational structure (unification and differentiation). When the center expands and strengthens group values and beliefs through greater communication linkages, building understanding among all players, increasing group activities, or bringing new members into group participation, the result is greater unification and greater political power to facilitate decision making. When the center distributes power to weaker parts of the group, the increased differentiation broadens and equalizes power and respect, increases participation, and a variety of points of view and action proposals results. In the process of securing and stabilizing the center's authority, the rationality of the decision making structure has been increased as well.

Diesing concludes that the security of the center is dependent on the rationality of the decision making structure. Any increase in rationality brings increased security. The center then has enough independence to look ahead and plan for future events with confidence. Irrational structures produce environments that immerse the center with immediate pressures and demands preventing any ability to look ahead and anticipate future pressures. The result is the pushing of the center out of the position of neutrality and ultimately the center loses the position of leadership.

Other studies of the role of the city manager in a political environment support Diesing (1962) in his development of the above political rationality model. Svara (1990) describes the pressures brought to bear on the governmental process by the political

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process. His description relates well to Diesing's (1962) discussion of pressures on the center and the threat to independence that results. First, to the extent that outside forces are represented and mobilized by city officials, Svara (1990) observes that dissension among these outside forces exerts pressure on the governmental process. Second, if official decisions are molded by external pressure, then conflicts in the political process are blended with conflicts in the governmental process. Third, if community group polarization intensifies, then officials can be placed into pluralistic roles, leading to government's inability to act and reactive crisis management. Within this context, government officials will need to gather allies and informal resources of political support to be effective.

Svara (1990) points to three conditions that must be present for cooperation to emerge so that government is not frozen by hyperpluralistic reactions to intense pressure. First, a central authority provides a structural basis for cooperation because a central authority with the power to mediate can contain conflict. Second, cooperation can emerge if the players know they will meet again. City managers have no fixed term of office. An environment of potentially endless encounters between the center and policy advocates can build a foundation for compromise. Third, if officials have the same values and goals, rewards may be shared to the extent that each player in the group receives distinct rewards of little or no value to the other players. This concept of collective rewards builds cooperation.

Svara's (1990) presentation of the need for central authority, potentially endless encounters and collective rewards to build cooperation relates well with Diesing's (1962)

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discussion of rational decision making structures possessing unification (central authority with shared goals and values) and differentiation (potentially endless encounters and collective rewards).

Political Rationality Model And Managerial Role Conflict

Before reviewing the fit between city managers' responses to role conflict and the political rationality model presented above, it is necessary to further define what Diesing (1962) calls the "group center" and what Svara (1990) refers to as the "central authority." For the purposes of this study, the relating of managerial roles to the political rationality model consider the city manager to be the group center or central authority within his or her organization. This study is not implying that the city manager is the group center of the entire city government to include major and city council. The city manager is often the central broker between major, council, department heads and interest groups establishing linkages among all participants. However, the city manager can never be termed the center in the council-manager government structure. As Svara (1990) points out, in terms of formal structure, council-manager governments have a central authority in the council and an appointed executive with integrated administrative authority over staff. By the strict definitions provided in the Federalist Papers, council-manager governments, unlike major-council cities have no formal separation of powers. The council and manager have distinct roles, but there are no checks and balances between council and manager. The council can choose, control and at any time remove the manager, unlike a major-council form of government where a political executive and legislative body are separately elected (Svara, 1990). Without separation of powers, and checks and balances, a central

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authority can exist in the form of the council. But in council-manager cities with a weak major and a council that delegates policy making to the manager, the city manager can be viewed as the central authority, not legally, but in practice, because the council has chosen to shift power and authority to the managers' office. Again, for the purposes of this study, relating the city manager role to the "group center" of the political rationality model is done within the context of the city manager's leadership of the administrative apparatus of city government and the central role played by the manager when the council chooses to delegate significant power and authority to the manager. This delegation of power can be done formally by the council or informally through the council's abdication of its policy leadership role.

In comparing city manager responses to role conflict, several studies are folded into the political rationality model. The comparisons are made against the model's two major principles: (a) maintaining independence in the face of all pressures by exercising a mediation role and asserting the validity of shared values; and (b) structuring the decision making group so that pressures are kept moderate and well balanced. This second principle includes the group center's methods of increasing the center's authority and distributing power to the weaker parts of the group.

Maintaining Independence: Balancing Pressures Against Each Other Through Mediation

The city manager possesses the ability to define and shape his or her role. This unique role is characterized by providing professional leadership without independent political power resources, on the one hand, or political dependency on all elected officials

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on the other. The city manager is not autonomous, but the role has to it sufficient independence to allow the manager a significant amount of discretion in shaping the role (Svara, 1989a). This independence has been challenged in recent years by a more active and heterogeneous council. There is a rise in political activism and an increased number of interest groups wanting their demands considered by council members. Under pressure from the courts, minority and neighborhood groups and advocates of a new post reform movement, a significant number of cities have abandoned at-large for district elections of council members for all or a portion of the council (Svara, 1989a). With the increased use of districts, more council members are choosing the ombudsman role as the predominant role over the detached universalist trustee role of the past (Svara, 1990). With greater neighborhood representation comes greater diversity among council members and a more activist orientation. The council now requires more active leadership from the mayor to create majorities and secure votes for major programs. Council members are less willing to take direction from either mayor or manager and managers are having to respond to greater demands on the part of the council for information (Svara, 1990).

There has been a dramatic increase—from 22% in 1965 to 56% in 1985—in the proportion of managers who report that the policy role is the role most important to job success (Ammons & Newell, 1989). But despite a larger role in policy, the manager's independence in administration and management is no longer universally accepted as absolute. Council members want to increase their contributions to the work of the administrative staff as the ombudsman role becomes more aggressive. Mayors now are required to exert more leadership over councils and because process are paying closer

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attention to the manager's work. The manager, whose policy role has been increasing over the past three decades, now is becoming an active participant in brokering agreements among elected officials and citizen groups (Svara, 1989a). Managers see pressures brought to bear on their independence because while more active in policy making, at the same time they are less insulated in their administrative performance (Svara, 1990).

The political rationality model presented in this chapter presents one method of preserving independence when the center is faced with increased pressure. This method is through the process of mediation and compromise and involves the passing on of pressure from one source to another source within the group that can present viable alternatives. If council intervention is encroaching on the manager's administrative role through increased ombudsman activity on the part of the council, the manager must find a way to shunt this pressure off to other sources.

Abney and Lauth (1986) present several examples of how the manager passes on the pressure to the department heads with alternatives passed back to the council. The amateurism of the city council contributes to a lack of understanding of administrative problems. Intervention on the part of the council creates an opportunity for the manager to educate and lobby the council on programs of importance and to build support on the council. The manager does this through the department heads. It is significant that in Abney and Lauth's study, only 32% of the department heads perceived council intervention to be a problem for department priorities. This reflects the advantages seen by the department heads in using council interaction to lobby support in the council for

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their programs. Department heads also see council intervention as a useful feedback tool through which management can learn about developing problems with their programs and personnel. In Abney and Lauth's study, 37% of the department heads indicated that quality of service had been improved through feedback obtained from the council. Seventy percent of the department heads reported that council intervention, had the advantage of reporting information to the council on what their departments do. The more information the council had on department strengths and achievements, the greater the likelihood that department programs would be supported. For example, Abney and Lauth report that 32% of the department heads said that council intervention had worked to their advantage in building support within the council for their programs, while only six percent indicated that these contacts hurt their programs.

So successful is the manager at using council intervention to build program support, that Abney and Lauth (1986) suggest that administrators in reform cities are able to lead the council. Only 11% of the respondents in the study from reformed cities indicated that council intervention made their administrative decisions correspond closer to council policies. Department heads in reform cities may have a greater ability than their counterparts in nonreform cities to maintain independence because of their ability to influence the council through responses to council intervention.

The brokering role of the manager in response to pressures from the council and other agencies is seen by many as one of the most important new skills to be exercised by the manager in the future. Svara (1989a) observes that brokering skills will become increasingly important as councils become more heterogenous in composition and

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constituency base and majority coalitions are harder to put together. Stillman (1974) believes that managers should focus less on efficient orderly routines of administration and more on continual bargaining with different groups inside and outside of government. Blubaugh (1987) observes that it is no longer adequate for the city manager to complete staff work, submit it and wait on the council. Seventy percent of the managers time is spent on policy development, encouraging cooperation among policymakers and bargaining with other governmental jurisdictions. Blubaugh sees the local manager as a facilitator and negotiator. Ehrenhalt (1990) in his study of the role of the Austin Texas City Manager, Camille Barnett, boldly states the following:

> The city manager of the 1990s is the broker-in chief among all the competing interests that maneuver for power in the modern city. Camille Barnett doesn't like to use that word; she would rather call herself a "negotiator" or a "facilitator." But the concept is the same. The city manager isn't there so much to make decisions as to make deals (p. 43).

Robert Cantine (1976) in his study of how urban administrators view their roles, cites the opinion of one city manager, that the urban administrator must be a buffer between the administrative staff and the council; a translator, a smoother. Cantine sees the most universal and time consuming role of the urban administrator as the task of building consensus. The administrator must be persuasive in obtaining agreement to proposals or finding acceptable substitutes agreeable to all parties.

James Banovetz (1990) describes the city manager's new job definition as team building. He sees the manager confronted with the job of building three separate teams:

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(a) councils and their committees; (b) his own personal managerial staff; and (c) department staff. Banovetz cites several examples. Managers are participating with increasing frequency in strategic planning, goal setting, and weekend retreats with council members. Managers are developing teamwork through personal staff enlargement by freeing up more time for meetings and other forms of personal interaction with council members. The higher levels of career professionalism and education among department staff have given city managers the ability to utilize them more effectively in direct interaction with council members. The successful manager, according to Banovetz is one who not only can build these three separate teams but can integrate them together into one team operation.

All of the above statements fit well with the political rationality model presented earlier regarding independence of the center. The center must balance the sources of pressure against each other and act as a mediator, interpreter, moderator and referee, and in the process, avoid the role of direct participant in the conflict.

Statistical research reinforces the view that a significant aspect of the manager's job involves coordinating/negotiating and brokering. Hinton and Kerrigan (1989) surveyed 478 city managers who had received a service award recognition from the ICMA. Managers were asked to rank order the most important skills necessary to do their job. The skills of bargaining, negotiating and other consensus seeking techniques were ranked as fourth most important.

Hale (1989) analyzed the role of the city manager through direct observation. The subject of her study was the work of five city managers in Los Angeles County (over 239

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hours of direct observation). The role of broker accounted for 37% of the time of the managers observed. Hale observed that as brokers, city managers spent most of their time educating, negotiating or brokering among various groups, and fostering communication by linking people.

Green (1989) studied over 2,000 respondents to a 1984 survey conducted by the ICMA. The results showed that the role of negotiator in working out problems, resolving conflicts and developing compromises was the second most time consuming task, occupying an average of 13% of the manager's time, just behind crisis management which occupied 14.6% of the total time.

Managing Independence: Assertion of Group Values

As stated in the political rationality model, the second way for the group center to maintain independence when confronted with pressures is to assert group values to counter the pressure. Here the group center can make a call for the subordination of parochial concerns for the sake of the greater good of the whole, effectively countering the private advocate with the support the center has generated in the name of common values and goals.

The clearest evidence of the use of group values by the city manager to counter pressure is the initiation of proposals to elected officials and other agencies that relate to social needs within the community. By establishing validity through an assertion of community needs, values, and social remedies, the city manager can seek support on a high plain of the greater public good.

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Robert Cantine (1976) uses three statements from urban administrators that demonstrate this assertion by the city manager of community needs.

- The responsibility of a city manager is to persuade the community to move in a certain direction.
- The urban administrator has a more active role to play in identifying programs needed by the community but not espoused by an articulate pressure group.
- I think the urban administrator has to be a sensor of the need for change. My life is devoted to being an architect of change. You try to change the government structure to meet the needs of the city (p. 32).

City managers are sensitive to social values and feel that government organizations need to adapt to the social needs of the city.

Bromage (1970) terms this aspect of the city manager's position "social engineering," in designing and communicating the goals of public service in the community. The manager can urge a community openly toward goals which are not being addressed by the mayor or council. The manager must be more than a neutralist in confronting emerging social problems within the community. Bromage cites the evolution of the ICMA Code of Ethics in terms of the social responsibilities of the city manager. In 1948, C.A. Harrell called for more imagination on the part of the manager in initiating policy for action by the council, and warned managers not to wait on council or citizens to propose goals in the public interest. In 1952, the Code was revised and termed the city manager as a "community leader" who submits policy proposals to the council to further community goals. The 1952 revision contained a reservation that city managers should

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avoid public conflict with the council on controversial issues. In 1969, the reservation was removed. Bromage concludes that the manager must take a position on a continuum between neutralism and social engineering. The trend has been toward a more positive role as community leader. Cohen (1995) believes that to achieve success, as managers develop social policies to further community goals, they should call upon community interest groups to provide important political support and lobbying assistance needed to obtain resources and put political authority behind their proposals. Interest groups have access to different sectors of the public that may be inaccessible to the manager. They can publicize existing managerial programs and services and assist in identifying community needs and values to the manager.

Stillman (1974) stated the same position in calling upon managers to better understand the complexities of community policies by seeking out the involvement of various dissenting groups who may not be represented on the city council. In this way, managers continually define community values and needs. Stillman goes a step further by recommending that managers pattern their role after the image of a professional diplomat. Since a diplomat's duty is not to solve problems through technical means, but to engage in continual negotiations to maintain peaceful relationships, the new role of the manager would be to define community values and goals and negotiate with various groups for the greater public interest. In this capacity, the manager would shift from a technical emphasis to a willingness to understand the complex interplay of psychological, social, political and economic forces at work in community life and develop the skill of being

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able to manipulate individuals to achieve peaceful accommodations as these complex forces interact.

Robert Paul Boynton and Deil S. Wright (1971) in their study of the role of mayor versus manager in council-manager governments agree with Stillman that the manager has the most opportunity for policy initiative in areas where the public interests are either not well represented on the council or well articulated within the community. Where political interest groups are not well defined, especially in the areas of economic development and social politics, there exists a higher degree of political ambiguity allowing the manager more freedom in policy leadership.

Managers apparently see their understanding of community political, psychological, social and economic forces as critical to job success and seem to be fulfilling Stillman's perception of the role of the manager as diplomat. In Hinton and Kerrigan's (1989) survey of 478 city managers, the respondents indicated that analyzing the community political, social and cultural environment and assessing community needs represented the number one and two most important skills for job success.

Svara (1989a) suggests that managers should develop direct ties with a wide range of groups and organizations in the community so that the manager can directly communicate his or her perspective on issues to the public at-large as the council is less able and inclined to do so. Svara observes that if the mayor is weak, and the council is exclusively elected from districts, thereby consumed with parochial concerns, the manager may be the only one in government perceived as articulating city-wide concerns.

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Restructuring to Keep Pressures Moderate and Well Balanced:Increasing the Center's Authority

Thus far, this chapter has evaluated the fit between the political rationality model developed by Diesing (1962) and the ways in which city managers react to pressure from role conflict. In the previous section, the methods of maintaining independence through balancing pressures against each other using mediation and the assertion of group values were reviewed. The manager's roles of broker and community leader articulating community values, goals and needs fit well with Diesing's model. In this section, the longer range strategies of restructuring the group to keep pressures moderate and well balanced are compared with the role conduct of the city manager. The two methods of increasing the center's authority and the group center's distribution of power to weaker parts of the decision making group are evaluated.

Diesing's political rationality model suggests that the center can build authority to the point that its strength can withstand any pressure brought to bear against the group center. But his method of doing this is related to group values. If group values are weak, the center strengthens them through linking parts of the decision making structure together through greater communication, mutual dependence and developing political support among a wider range of group players. The result is greater unification and greater political power to facilitate decision making. In the previous section the city manager as a community leader can call upon the greater public good to develop political power for social initiatives or to counter opposition from elected officials. But how do

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city managers strengthen group values and unification to ultimately strengthen their own political positions?

One of the best examples is provided by Alan Ehrenhalt (1990) in his study of Camille Barnett, city manager of Austin Texas. City politics in Austin is a complex and chaotic environment in which dozens of interest groups compete and no group dominates. Austin is awash with citizen activism. The parks system alone interfaces with 59 separate citizen boards created to advise and lobby local government. Camille Barnett manages this political environment by building a political constituency that makes it possible to negotiate and broker among all interest groups from a position of familiarity and strength. Ehrenhalt points out that Barnett builds this constituency by going everywhere and knowing everyone. After assuming the position of city manager, Barnett was touring all the neighborhoods, averaging six speeches a week, and doing a radio call-in show once a month. According to one Austin council member, survival as a city manager requires becoming a public figure. According to this council member "you have to be known in the community and have a reputation in the community. Unless the city manager has an independent constituency, the city manager gets nailed" (p. 43). Ehrenhalt goes on to provide an example of how Camille Barnett uses this public constituency to increase her political position in opposing the council on specific issues. Barnett was opposed to a council initiated tax cut that would require a reduction of six million in the city budget. Without openly confronting the council in public, Barnett provided information to the editorial board of the local newspaper on the consequences of a tax cut and subtly

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referenced her opposition to it in her public speeches around the community. According to Barnett:

> I think its abdicating for a manager not to tell people what she thinks. But you don't ever want to upstage your council members. You don't ever want to assume the role of a politician. I make a big point of not confronting the council in public. If I use my visibility to attack the council, I'm in deep trouble (p. 45).

Bosworth (1958) in his assertion that the manager is a politician, provides several examples of how the city manager can strengthen group values through expanding and integrating new players into the political decision making process. He points out that managers can serve effectively as community leaders without taking direct leadership in civic programs. A more effective technique is for the management to search out and discover the real community leaders, interest them in social improvement, keep them supplied with new ideas and encourage them to work together to initiate proposals. Managers are expected to know the informal power structures of their communities and to use the leaders to achieve the managers' goals. It is the manager's job to provide facts, offer counsel, encouragement and guidance to community interest groups. When the manager has acquired acceptance in the community power structure, he or she will be in a position where these groups regularly consult with the manager on their community initiatives. Bosworth concludes that managers should be thought of as officers of general administrative direction and political leadership.

If what Bosworth (1958) suggests is done effectively, the manager can cultivate the political community power structure, seed it with his or her own initiatives and through

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linking leaders together in mutual dependence and cooperation, see managerial initiatives grow from the community grass roots and directed toward the council as community not managerial proposals. The council is then hard pressed to not give such proposals serious consideration.

David N. Ammons and Charldean Newell (1988) see the manager's shift from technocrat to political community leader as essential to the manager's very survival. They point to the changes in the model charter that allow for district elections of council members and direct election of the mayor as having the effect of increasing the political environment of local government.

Restructuring to Keep Pressures Moderate and Well Balanced: Distribution of Power

This second long range method proposed by Diesing (1962) to keep pressures moderate and well balanced in relationship to the center involves the distribution of power from the center to weaker parts of the decision making group. Such distribution enables the center to maintain the mediation role by balancing pressures from one strong source to other players fostering alternatives that can respond to the pressure. When the center distributes power to weaker parts of the group, the increased differentiation increases participation, action proposals and points of view across the entire spectrum of the decision making group. There is evidence that the city manager uses this technique to counter pressures from various sources.

First, managers at an increasing rate are reshaping their internal bureaucracies to replace the traditional pyramidal organization structure with a participatory structure that

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allows decisions to be made at all levels by many different individuals and groups. Employees need to share in a piece of the action and feel that they are contributing to the overall direction of the organization (Blubaugh, 1987). Managers are spending a considerable amount of time attending annual department head retreats, encouraging staff retreats among the various departments, introducing the subject of quality circles to organizations and using task forces as a way to approach problems (Blubaugh, 1987).

Cantine's (1976) study of over 70 urban administrators contains several statements from the managers themselves regarding the concept of organizational maintenance through empowerment of staff. The following are examples:

- The future will place a high priority on organizational maintenance—finding and holding people long enough to get the job done.
- We are seeing more of the trend toward democratic styles of leadership in our organizations. The administrator of tomorrow has to be skillful in developing his people and including them in the decision making process - it will be a group decision (p. 28).

In redistributing authority and power to the lowest levels of the staff, the manager is creating an organization that can effectively counter inquiries and demands from elected officials by assimilating them and responding back not only with information but with an effort to lobby, educate and sometimes lead the elected official in policy development (Abney-Lauth, 1986). The city manager of Austin, Texas, Camille Barnett, understands the value of an empowered administrative staff in assimilating pressure from the city council. Prior to her appointment, council members funneled all requests through the managers office. One of Barnett's first moves was to tell the council members that

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they could talk to her staff any time they wanted. Not only did such a move distribute power to parts of her decision making group, but it bought her a political honeymoon with the council that allowed her to pursue her strategy of political usability without risking her tenure in the job (Ehrenhalt, 1990).

Outside of the manager's organization the manager responds to a proliferation of new interest groups in the community. Managers are reacting to this new citizen empowerment, not creating it. But in all aspects of political rationality—as broker, community leader—both asserting community values and strengthening them through unification and integration of new players—the city manager provides one more point of access to the political system for those demanding to be heard (Ehrenhalt, 1990). In this regard, the manager is distributing power to the weaker parts of the community by making the managers' office accessible and visible to the public. Cantine (1976) received the same feedback from city managers in his 1971 study. Managers felt that an important aspect of their role was to act as astute politicians providing channels for citizens to get into the system to negate the influence and effect of the elected officials.

Such redistribution of power to citizens who previously could not access the city manager goes back to Bosworth (1958), who emphasized that city managers need to be in positions where they can influence and mobilize community leaders to turn managerial ideas into interest group proposals.

Managerial Political Rationality—a Crisis in Legitimacy?

Diesing's (1962) political rationality model is effective in explaining how city managers react to role conflict with elected officials. In all four aspects of the model,

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there is a good fit with city manager role behaviors. The manager's increasing role as broker is effective in balancing sources of pressure against each other especially in using department heads to respond to pressure from the council with lobbying and educational efforts. As a community leader and articulator of community values, needs and goals, the city manager assumes an increasing social engineering role to push initiatives through in the name of the greater public interest. In a more strategic arena, the city manager increases his or her political authority through the development of an independent political constituency that unifies different community groups and integrates new groups into the process. This allows the manager to mobilize community values so that managerial initiatives are funneled through community groups to the council. And finally, the manager distributes power both internally to staff and externally to the citizenry to strengthen his or her mediation role in effectively balancing pressures against each other.

The comparison of managerial role behavior against the political rationality model presented by Diesing (1962) provides a good explanation as to why political rationality has replaced technical rationality in the city manager's environment of the 80s, 90s and beyond. But if the manager's amelioration of role conflict through the use of political rationality has been effective, other problems in role legitimacy have arisen for the manager in council-manager cities.

Council Abdication of Political Leadership

Nalbandian (1987) observes that elected officials are thrusting managers into active roles in developing policy either in response to council ineptness or by design. These trends are a threat to democracy. Nalbandian (1987) sees that managers now are playing

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an increasing political role in local government in response to the abdication or incompetence of political leadership by elected leaders. Again, democracy suffers as legislative oversight is weakened. Although the manager has assumed more political responsibilities, he or she does so without legitimacy. Even if the council endorses the role, if there is no legislative oversight, the executive does not have the legitimacy that the voters have placed in the council.

Others cite the abdication of political leadership on the part of the council and the manager's move into the political leadership void. Some councils encourage managers to take a strong independent role to free council time for more strategic issues (Saltztein, 1974). Bromage (1970) observes that councilors as a group do not lead in policy formulation. As a result, policy is often initiated by managers, occasionally by mayors, by individual council members, or by citizen groups. The tradition in the United States has been for council to review, edit, and pass or reject policy but not to initiate it. The manager at times moves into the gap by taking the leadership in shaping policy for council approval or rejection.

John Nalbandian remains the most articulate spokesperson for the legitimacy crises that he sees threatening the democratic structures of the council-manager system. Nalbandian's (1987) view is that an uneasiness exists in the council-manager system as managers shed the mantle of neutrality and have gradually turned from a supportive 75 year old philosophical and intellectual heritage.

Nalbandian (1988) sees the council's claim to legitimacy shifting to the community at-large and ad hoc interest groups. The role of the elected official in governing urban

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communities is diminishing. While the structure of representativeness is still with the council, the normative evaluation of public policy rests with the increasing political power in the community. The city managers, being encouraged by council to take a more active policy role, and finding themselves more and more assuming the role of community leaders, are now themselves searching for role legitimacy. If the city manager and the administrative apparatus he or she controls no longer is grounded in the democratic legitimacy of the council, Nalbandian observes that it is becoming rooted in the community as the direct source of legitimacy today.

Nalbandian (1987) recommends invigorating the structure of local government with the value of representativeness as one alternative to restoring legitimacy to governance. A return to district elections of council members coupled with a strong mayor centralizes political leadership and gives the citizenry a security that the government is so structured to provide representative leverage for their demands.

Managerial Role Legitimacy and Community Activism

The basic problem as Nalbandian (1987) sees it is the condition of a political manager exerting policy leadership without legislative oversight. He sees the emerging neighborhood associations as key players in restoring legitimacy to the political role of the manager. Citizen participation has focused on traditional services channeled through sophisticated neighborhood groups who have an understanding for the line services of administrative processes such as budgeting, purchasing and personnel management.

Citizens have found that working through these administrative processes provides them with more influence than working through the council. Nalbandian (1987) sees

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managerial policy initiatives directed from manager to council as legitimate if they are a response to the deliberations and expectations of neighborhood associations and other interest groups. As the council passes judgment on the manager's initiatives, it will be responding not to administrative staff ideas but to the manager's interpretation and response to community groups. This restores the council to its legislative oversight role. The channeling of ideas for legislative action then flows from citizenry through manager to council instead of from citizenry to council and then to manager for implementation. As managers encourage neighborhood participation, listen to it, and receive policy direction from it, they legitimize their own political role in the policy making process.

The council-manager form of government unlike the mayor-council form has no formal separation of powers between executive and legislative areas. The administrative executive in the form of the city manager is appointed and serves at the pleasure of the council which includes the mayor which may or may not be separately elected and may or may not be a strong political leader. This governmental structure inherently produces more consensus and less conflict than the mayor-council form but does create considerable independence and autonomy for the city manager if both council members and mayor are weak in their political leadership roles (Svara, 1990). While consensus may be greater in council-manager forms of government, as we have already seen in the first section, considerable role conflict abounds between manager and elected officials. The city manager responds to the stress and pressure of this role conflict by supplanting technical rationality with political rationality and, as this chapter has presented, the political rationality approaches used by the city manager work well in ameliorating

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pressure encroaching from elected officials that can be a threat to the manager's tenure and organizational integrity.

But the inherent independent role of the city manager in council-manager government combined with weak council leadership, and the growing grass roots neighborhood associations that are embracing the value debate role intended for the council, have created an increasing political leadership role for the city manager. It is difficult to analyze the current managerial approach to political rationality in any sequential step by step process. But the city manager of the 90s must respond to community interest groups that are growing at an unbelievable rate, and to councils that are either weak or councils that in sensing the growing community group interest in the nuts and bolts administrative processes, are encroaching even more into the manager's administrative domains. In the process, in their response to role conflict with the council, to policy abdication by the council, and to community group influence, the city manager uses political rationality as a way to survive in a role that is incredibly complex. If role conflict has been successfully neutralized as a problem, the crisis in legitimacy for council-manager government created by the manager's increasing political role and council's diminishing political influence has become a new problem.

The next section addresses the question posed by John Nalbandian—how is democratic legitimacy restored to council-manager governments? The section will discuss this issue in terms of creating informal centralization in reform governments that have been formally decentralized and will focus on the role of the city manager interacting

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with a council elected by districts as a means to create political linkages that restore legitimacy to the system.

Creating New Urban Leadership Roles Through Political Linkages

Terry N. Clark (1968) emphasizes the need for system linkages with the presence of structural differentiation and points to it as a general functional problem. All social systems beginning to differentiate either vertically or horizontally must adapt integrative systems or they will disintegrate. Clark discusses the importance of several integrative systems but isolates one as an extremely fundamental and powerful form of integration. This mechanism is the interchange between subsystems. The subsystems may not be organizationally connected, but through a process of communications or other contacts, can begin to develop common norms and values. The following discussion of political linkages will develop against the framework of the subsystem interchange mechanism of integration.

Clark presents a series of general formulations followed by propositions regarding the effects of community structure on the effectiveness of decision making and community outputs. His formulations and propositions offer interesting insights into the importance of political linkages within a community acting as a subsystem interchange mechanism. His first formulation is as follows:

> The greater the horizontal and vertical differentiation within a sector of a community, the greater the differentiation between potential elites within that sector, the more decentralized the decision-making structure, which without the

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establishment of integrative mechanisms leads to less coordination between elements within the sector and a lower level of outputs (p. 95).

Clark presents three possibilities for integrating subsections of the community: (a) the governmental bureaucracy (council, mayor, manager); (b) the political party; and (c) neighborhood voluntary organizations. It is true, Clark emphasizes, that the greater the structural differentiation, the greater the decentralization of decision-making and the lower the level of output. But the stronger the integrative mechanisms, the higher becomes the level of outputs. Clark also indicates that as city population increases, the greater becomes the structural differentiation problem, and the greater becomes the need for integrative mechanisms between community subsectors.

Clark's second major formulation is as follows: "The more centralized the decision-making structure within a sector of a community, the more predictable and the more reflective the community outputs of the values and interests of that sector of the community" (p. 95). This formulation speaks to the importance of integrative mechanisms that connect community subsectors, ultimately leading to a more centralized decision-making structure.

Cities should not look toward the reemergence of political party machines as the provider of informal centralization. Machines are not likely to return. The classic urban machine prospered in rapidly growing industrial cities. These cities required massive expenditures in infrastructure. Government contracts and franchises with the local business community were traded for the political support necessary to maintain party organization. Cities do not have the resources today to solidify machine power.

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Advances in transportation and communication have freed business from reliance on inner cities. Industry and the middle class have migrated to the suburbs depriving the cities of a tax base and borrowing power. Other factors blocking the use of the party machine include merit employment systems that prevent the delivery of patronage, and the reduction or elimination of Federal aid that allowed party machines to expand their resource base (Judd & Swanstrom, 1994).

In the absence of the political party machine, what alternatives exist for cities to create informal centralization through political linkages? Rogers (1971) asserts that the costs of differentiated structures without central coordination are higher. The costs include duplication and dissipation of scarce agency resources, with few of the benefits of a laterally integrated structure. These benefits include better planning and economies of scale. Rogers asks the policy question as to how one shifts the transactions to get more collaboration among participating agencies. The next section will attempt to answer that question through presenting a structural model that generates linkages, increases community power centers, creates informal centralization, and ultimately cosmopolitan attitudes on the part of all urban players giving modern cities the global urban view that the party machine bosses once had.

Managing Urban Conflict

This model is based on the concept of managing political conflict, through the creation of political linkages. Ironically, as will be presented, the political conflict interacting with a city council elected by district creates the political linkages. Clark (1968) indicates that community subsystem integration can be generated from three

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sources: the governmental bureaucracy (council, mayor, manager); the political party; and neighborhood voluntary organizations. With the unlikely involvement of SPOs to generate linkages, the model presented here uses the other actors presented by Clark—the council, city manager, and community organizations.

Clark (1994) provides an explanation as to why structural differentiation promotes organized groups. Structural hierarchy, social hierarchical differences, and race promote the increase of organized groups. The interaction of these groups with hierarchy sparks conflict and ideological differences among leaders. Clark's two concepts of hierarchy and class politics work together to generate conflict in the form of groups that are demanding government action to meet some perceived distributive or social inequality.

American cities after the reform movement are faced with the situation that there is no institutional entity that can adequately manage conflict. The political party in a democracy manages conflict, structures it and folds social cleavages into two or more broad social cleavages, the parties themselves. Since parties are the agencies of interest aggregation, their elimination as integrative mechanisms intensifies the impact of social changes on political decisions (Lineberry & Fowler, 1967). The bureaucratic agency machine fills the void left by the party machine and it alone is left to attempt to aggregate grass roots interests. But as Clark (1970) observes:

> The extreme fragmentation of New York City government and corresponding weakness of the mayor, the city council, the party structure, and the business community have created a vacuum which leaves each city bureaucracy to confront

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individual neighborhoods. No one group has control; consequently all battle for it (p. 511).

The reformers increased efficiency and decreased corruption but the cost was removing mechanisms for conflict resolution. The reformers saw the answer to community conflict in the form of improved organizational techniques rather than viewing conflict as a political problem requiring the balancing of competing interests. This flaw in not viewing community conflict as a political problem was not immediately apparent because of the homogeneity present in smaller cities. But the explosive growth of cities has produced greater pluralism with more factions demanding to be heard (Sparrow, 1984).

As community activists become more demanding and militant, government agencies, often with little understanding of how class politics and race define community needs, respond by defensively reinforcing bureaucratic norms of behavior. This in turn increases the alienation of community activists (Pecorella, 1994). In describing the postreform movement in New York, Pecorella (1994) sees its foundation as based on the principle that the public interest is best defined as aggregating particular interests that arise out of participative political conflict.

Council Involvement in District Cities

It is this post-reform definition of the public interest that forms the basis of the model presented here for managing conflict. Conflict from organized groups is managed through the involvement of council members elected by district with specific constituencies. Their involvement, as will be seen, generates a need for information from

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the city manager that creates political linkages throughout the entire urban environment. Two studies are presented that illustrate how community conflict coupled with district systems creates increased council involvement with community groups.

Clingermayer & Feiock (1993) compare the level of intervention on the part of at-large council members, district council members, and within those two groups, minority council members. Data were collected from a survey of 400 council members with a response rate of 59% (234 council members). The study predicted that minority representatives would do more casework with constituents than their Anglo counterparts, and that council members elected by ward or district would do more casework than those elected at-large. Neither prediction was supported in multivariate analysis. Ward representatives do more casework, but only because they receive more requests from constituents, not because they initiate casework on behalf of constituents any more than do at-large representatives.

However, what Clingermayer and Feiock (1993) did find in their study was that diverse campaign support, (based on race ethnicity), does encourage ward representatives to initiate casework, but has no correlation with casework for at-large representatives. Their explanation of this finding is related to community conflict. Ward representatives will seek and receive electoral support from diverse groups when their districts have become contentious or unsettled places. Constituency heterogeneity or the rise of divisive issues can be sources of the conflict. When contention appears, the ward representative is motivated to seek diverse support from many interests and to placate constituents in a

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focused and noncontroverisal way. Economic development casework provides opportunities to the ward representative to manage conflict.

Neighborhood empowerment.

Davidson (1979) in his Ann Arbor Michigan study on political partnerships demonstrates how district systems can better empower neighborhoods when operating in a city that has a strong partisan political organization. Davidson found that the organization of the Ann Arbor political system affects the foundation of political partnerships between council members and residents in two ways. First, the city is divided into city council safe districts and swing districts. The swing districts have a critical role in determining which party gains control of the council. Because victories in the swing wards are critical, candidates spend a great deal of time working with neighborhood leaders. Secondly, the council members have found that developing political partnerships with the neighborhoods produces grass-roots information about the effect of city politics that party organizations cannot supply.

Davidson describes the series of events that occurs in Ann Arbor for a solid political partnership to be built between neighborhood and council. If the district is a swing district, if voter participation is consistent, if neighborhood leaders have a clear sense of neighborhood boundary and identity, and if serious problems are voiced consistently between neighborhood and council, then a solid partnership develops. After repeated elevation of serious problem issues between neighborhood leaders and councils occur, the neighborhood is recognized by the council member as a "political neighborhood." The neighborhood is treated as a political entity which speaks through the

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voices of those leaders who attend council meetings regularly. Eventually, council members will select neighborhood leaders for appointment to city boards and commissions and with those appointments, real political power is injected into the neighborhood.

The 1984 Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs Policy Report Number 62 on Municipal Election Systems concluded that district systems increased citizen political activity and government participation. The report points to increased neighborhood groups after the conversion to district systems, increased attendance by council members at neighborhood association meetings, and the creation of council sessions and town hall meetings in the neighborhoods. Respondents to the report's survey indicated that it was the sense of increased citizen power and ability to make a difference that provided the motivation to participate. Nevel (1997) uses Miami as a comparison to what district electoral systems can do for neighborhood group empowerment. He states that the current at-large system in Miami, a city with diverse heterogenous neighborhoods, serves the people poorly, diluting the impact of grassroots concerns and inflating the influence of money-intensive special interest groups.

Former Phoenix City Manager, Marvin Andrews' 1993 interview described how the Phoenix conversion to districts affected the neighborhoods. City council members began having regular district or town meetings with neighborhood residents to air concerns and problems. As a result, services drastically improved with council members much more prone to spend money than to cut budgets. In fact in the first year after conversion to districts, Andrews said that the city experienced a 14-15% increase in city

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revenues that was ultimately used on improving neighborhood infrastructure. Any new street system in a district now, according to Andrews, was accompanied by additional capital improvements. Andrews' conclusion was that the Phoenix relationship with neighborhood organizations improved overall after conversion to districts.

Council mandated informational coordination.

But if district electoral systems provide a representative environment to manage community conflict, how does greater council involvement in constituency concerns, neighborhood organizations and increased initiation of casework to placate fractious neighborhoods create political linkages throughout the urban environment?

Phoenix City Manager Frank Fairbanks was asked to describe the most significant impact on the office of the city manager after Phoenix converted to a district system. His response was that the council members became more immersed in parochial constituent interests with the result that urban strategic issues were catapulted up into the offices of the city manager and the mayor.

Hamilton (1978), in his analysis of district system conversions in Dallas, San Francisco, and Indianapolis, would seem to agree with Mr. Fairbanks. With the Dallas experience, the city manager found himself with eleven council bosses, testing his skills as a policy broker and in interpersonal relations. The district system generated a new system whereby increasing constituency complaints and requests for information were forwarded from the council to the manager for staffing. The manager had to place three assistant managers in liaison roles with council members and various department heads to respond to the increased workload. Many council members became frustrated because

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they felt the city manager's power had increased since the switch to districts and that he had too much control over policy issues. The manager's response was that, if the council's participation in policy became less since districting, it is the result of council members becoming absorbed in parochial constituency interests leaving a policy leadership void now filled by the manager.

The experience of former Phoenix city manager Marvin Andrews confirms that the city manager's involvement in policy brokering increased after conversion to districts. After districting, inquiries from the public previously referred to city staff were now funneled through the council to the city manager. Andrews was required to establish an elaborate staffing plan. A fast reaction response system to council inquiries was developed with a full time assistant acting as a liaison coordinator with the council staff. Andrews transferred management assistant and intern positions from the city departments to augment each council member's staff. He assigned each deputy city manager a council member so that liaison relationships could be established (e.g. Frank Fairbanks with Mary Rose Wilcox). The city staff was required to become more familiar with neighborhood districts and their problems, because their attendance was required at district "town hall" meetings conducted by the council members. Council members in turn had greater involvement with city staff because of the response to constituency issues.

Andrews found that his time spent in integrating all players, both on the city staff and on the council, increased dramatically. His job became one of ensuring that everyone was working together. His time spent on policy issues, consensus building, and policy brokering also increased dramatically. The urban focus of all players, mayor, city

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manager, council, and department heads became oriented to the short term, reducing long range planning. However, the short term focus created a situation where Andrews and the mayor were required to work closer together on long range planning when it became apparent that the council was preoccupied with constituency issues. Andrews felt that, contrary to the council perceptions in Dallas, the power of the city manager was reduced somewhat because of the council's preeminent role in responding to concerns from the public.

The fast reaction response system implemented by Marvin Andrews in Phoenix seems to be the experience of most city managers after the council converts from at-large to district systems. Peggy Heilig and Robert J. Mundt (1984) in their study of 43 city managers found that upon conversion to districts, council member requests for information dramatically increased because of the council role switching from "trustee to ombudsman." Additional staff had to be added to deal with council communications and some managers felt that district representation began to interfere with department decision rules to benefit constituents.

The 1984 LBJ Policy Report on electoral systems also concluded that most respondents in the study indicated that the institution of districts created a need for more interaction between city staff and the council because council members became more involved in city administration after the change.

District Electoral Systems and Political Linkages

Given the preceding discussion regarding the effects of district systems on the urban environment, what can be said about new political linkages that have been created

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by district systems? Clark (1968) calls these linkages subsystem interchange mechanisms that are essential in the presence of community sector vertical and horizontal differentiation to keep outputs at high levels.

District systems increase the neighborhood focus on council members and increase the council service delivering orientation toward constituents. Neighborhood organizations through continued interaction with council members on serious problems can become recognized as "political neighborhoods" and can secure appointments on citywide boards and commissions. City council members begin to conduct town meetings in districts, and neighborhood associations increase their attendance at city council meetings. Greater amounts of money are spent to improve infrastructure in neighborhoods because of the greater neighborhood focus on the part of council members. We can conclude that:

- Strong vertical linkages are built between the council and neighborhoods that simply did not exist under at-large systems.
- Greater horizontal linkages between neighborhood associations have been built as a result of increased attendance of associations at council meetings and appointments of neighborhood leaders on citywide boards and commissions.

District systems do not inevitably lead to partisan elections, but by breaking up business/labor/media coalitions, they have in other cities increased political party slating of candidates which could lead to partisan elections. Partisan elections can create a new environment of political accountability and council member party identification that

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could enhance the mayor's leadership role and his ability to build allegiance within the council to his leadership. We can conclude that:

- New vertical linkages between the mayor and city council can result from districting. Greater cohesion (horizontal linkages) can occur between council members due to party unity.

Districting results in strategic issues being catapulted into the offices of mayor and manager which they staff as a team. The manager has become more of a policy broker since council members are more absorbed in constituent concerns as a result of districting. Department heads must maintain greater liaison with council members because of greater constituency focus and also are required to attend town meetings to learn more about districts. The manager must spend greater amounts of time on consensus building with council, mayor and department heads. From this, we can conclude that:

- Greater vertical and horizontal linkages have been forged between the city manager and the council.
- Greater vertical and horizontal linkages have resulted between department heads and the council.
- Greater horizontal linkages have been built between the mayor and city managers.
- Greater vertical linkages have been built between the department heads and neighborhood associations.

It is best at this time to review the two formulations presented by Clark (1968) earlier in this chapter:

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> The greater the horizontal and vertical differentiation within a sector of a community, the greater the differentiation between potential elites within that sector, the more decentralized the decision making structure, which without the establishment of integrative mechanisms leads to less coordination between elements within the sector and a lower level of outputs (p. 95).
>
> The more centralized the decision making structure within a sector of a community, the more predictable and the more reflective the community outputs of the values and interests of that sector of the community (p. 95).

The above political linkages created by district systems act as integrative mechanisms that counter the decentralization of decision making due to vertical and horizontal differentiation in the community and keep the level of outputs high. The potential effect of these political linkages is to increase the centralization of the decision making structure so that neighborhoods acting in concert with the council, mayor and city manager and every segment of the government acting in concert with each other can produce outputs that reflect the collective values and interests of the communities.

Summary

Before proceeding to the introduction of the research model hypotheses in Chapter Three, the discussion in this chapter regarding role conflict between manager and council, the manager's use of political rationality as a means to counter role pressure, and the increased role of the city manager in political policy and community leadership is summarized here in Figure 1.

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

Figure 1. Electoral Systems, Role Conflict and Role Legitimacy

The basic role dichotomy between council and manager structured by the reform movement that placed non-political administrative management with the manager and political policy issues with the council results in role conflict when role expectations do not match between council and manager. This role conflict brings pressures to bear on the manager's tenure and organizational integrity. The manager counters these pressures through the use of political rationality. This use of political rationality by the manager

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results in the manager increasing and developing a social engineering role as a community leader and increasing political authority through the development of an independent political constituency. The increasing use of political rationality ameliorates pressures on the manager due to role conflict, but increases the manager's political leadership role. The democratic normative debate moves further away from the council to a dialog and interchange between the manager and community groups. The manager, a non-elected official, moves further away from accountability to the elected body. A crisis in legitimacy for the managerial role occurs.

The diagram in Figure 1 begins with an interaction between type of electoral system used to elect the city council and the existence of role dichotomy between council and manager. It is this interaction that forms the basis for the first hypothesis in Chapter Three. It is a major premise of this dissertation that the type of electoral system (at-large, mixed, district) affects the degree of role dichotomy and subsequently the degree of role conflict between council and manager. If that premise is true, then major implications exist in terms of the connection between electoral system, managerial role, and role legitimacy.

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CHAPTER THREE

METHODOLOGY

The purpose of this chapter is to present the research design for this dissertation, the methods used for data collection, and the methods of analysis for the data. Prior to the discussion of the research design, a more detailed expansion of the Svara (1985) Dichotomy and Duality Model examines the contrasting roles of the manager and council. This model was briefly presented in Chapter One but will be more fully developed here. The Svara model is significant since it forms the foundation all or in part for the three research questions and corresponding hypotheses presented later in this chapter. In effect, the model is tested in this dissertation to determine how the model changes when roles, responsibilities, and relationships among mayor, council, and manager are compared in cities using district, at-large, and mixed electoral systems.

Svara Dichotomy and Duality Model

James H. Svara (1985), in a study involving interviews with mayor, council member, and managers from five North Carolina cities, found that a majority of the respondents perceived a separation or dichotomy in roles, yet 41% of the respondents saw a duality in roles, either managers involved in policy or councilors in administration. Svara builds a dichotomy/duality model involving the four governmental functions of mission, policy, administration, and management, with mission on one end of the

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continuum as the traditional exclusive realm of mayor and council and management on the other end of the continuum as the exclusive realm of the manager and his staff. Svara defines the four areas as follows: (a) mission refers to the organization's philosophy, direction, and the broad goals it sets for itself. It is the determination of what government should or should not do at the most strategic level. In city government, mission includes the scope of services provided, philosophy of taxation and spending, policy orientation, *e.g.*, growth versus quality of life, and constitutional issues to include relations with other governments; (b) policy refers to middle-range policy decisions such as spending government revenues, initiating new programs, creating new offices, and the distribution of services; (d) administration refers to the specific decisions, regulations, and practices employed to achieve policy objectives; and (d) management refers to the actions taken to support the policy and administrative functions. It includes the organization of human, material, and informational resources of the government for implementation and encompasses the specific technologies used in providing services.

Svara represents the division of responsibility between elected and administrative officials graphically by marking a line through a diagram containing the four zones from mission to management. The patterns of division that he found in his study are represented in Figure 2. The council dominates mission formulation although the manager plays an advisory role in developing proposals and analyzing trends. In policy the manager has a slightly larger space on the zone chart because of the significant amount of policy advice and policy setting by the manager and staff. Managers had a much larger role in administration yet the council is involved because of planning and

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zoning ordinances and constituent complaint processing in addition to the council's role in legislative oversight. Management is the realm of the manager with council contributions limited to suggestions and assessment through appraisal of the manager. Svara concludes that there is a dichotomy of mission and management, but policy and administration are integrated to the extent that there exists a duality in roles and responsibilities between council and manager.



Figure 2. Dichotomy/Duality Model—Council and Manager
(Heavy line—Dr. Svara's proposed model)
(Broken line—Dissertation Model based on Hypothesis One)

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This dissertation will examine how electoral systems used to elect the council (district, at-large, mixed) affect the degree of dichotomy and the degree of duality in the division of roles between council and manager across the four zones of mission, policy, administration, and management. The next section on the research design used in the study will describe how the test of the Svara dichotomy/duality model becomes the foundation for the research questions and corresponding hypothesis.

Overall Research Design

This section presents the research questions and the hypotheses to be tested in this dissertation. It defines and describes the units of analysis, the independent variables, and dependent variables. The research questions, hypothesis, and units of analysis will be described in terms of how they relate to the Svara dichotomy/duality model.

Changes in Council/Manager Roles Due to Districting

The literature review discussed the experiences of city managers in Dallas and Phoenix after the conversion to district systems in terms of increased involvement by the council in constituency issues, increased demands by the council for information from department heads, and the increased role of the city manager in developing policy issues, consensus building, and informational brokering. Specifically, after districting, the routing of inquiries from the public changed. Instead of informational demands being made directly to city staff, inquires now were routed through the council to the city manager and down to the city staff for action. Heilig and Mundt (1984) in their study of cities converting from at-large to district systems, concluded that district council members become more involved in administration to alter the decision rules to benefit

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their constituents. New political linkages are created between manager and council, department heads and council, and department heads and constituency associations because of the greater involvement by council members in constituent demands for services and information. The city manager becomes the informational broker, ensuring that these linkages are working well.

The district election of the council infuses new political leadership into the council. More and more city managers cannot achieve consensus among council members through subtle behind the scenes maneuvering but now must meet policy issues head on, spending more time in policy development with a very political and at times difficult council. The difficulty faced by the city manager in arriving at consensus among as many as eight council members all representing individual districts dramatically increases the manager's time spent on policy development. At the same time, councilors see themselves more and more in the role as political and policy leader because of the political nature of constituency representation. Councilors become policy activists and look to the manager for increased expertise in policy direction. In effect, district elections of the council brings council members closer to levels where the managers resides in policy leadership. Both council and manager become increasingly more active in policy making.

With the experience of both Dallas and Phoenix city managers, the preoccupation of the council with constituency issues elevated the city manager into a closer partnership with the mayor on long range planning or strategic mission oriented issues.

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Research Questions and Corresponding Hypotheses

From this discussion of the increased integration of council and manager roles in mission, policy, and administration due to districting comes the introduction of the first research question and hypothesis. The research question is as follows:

1. How are the roles, responsibilities, and relationships among the city manager and city council in the areas of mission, policy, administration, and management affected by the electoral method used to elect the city council?

The preceding discussion cited the greater involvement of the council in policy formulation and administration after districting. The discussion also concluded that the manager had a greater role in policy development because of the increased challenges in consensus building among district oriented council members. And greater constituency preoccupation on the part of the council increased the manager's time spent in mission oriented planning with the mayor. From this, the first hypothesis could be framed as follows:

HYPOTHESIS #1: In council-manager cities where the council is elected by district, the degree of dichotomy in roles and responsibilities between council and manager comparing mission and policy (the realm of the council) and administration and management (the realm of the manager) is less than in cities using at-large or mixed electoral systems.

Going back to Svara's diagram (Figure 2) representing the dichotomy duality model across the four role zones of mission, policy, administration, and management, the confirmation of this hypothesis would produce a diagram with a boundary line that is

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more erratic and meandering (represented with a broken line). The dichotomy is reduced because the manager's role is increased in mission and policy, but the council's role in administration and management increases because of constituency interests.

The second research question and corresponding hypothesis addresses the effect of the electoral system used to elect the council on the relationship between the manager and mayor in terms of roles and responsibilities. Svara's model reflects a dichotomy between council and manager in the mission role area since mission is the realm of the mayor and council. Yet the experience of Frank Fairbanks reflects an increasing encroachment by the city manager in the mission area after a city converts to a district system. When asked what the most significant impact on the office of city manager was after districting, he responded that the immersion of council members in parochial constituent interests resulted in urban strategic issues being catapulted into the office of the city manager and mayor.

Marvin Andrews, former city manager of Phoenix observed that after districting, the urban focus of all players, mayor, city manager, council, and department heads become oriented to the short term, reducing long range planning. Yet, like Fairbanks, Andrews felt he worked closer with the mayor on long range planning when the council's orientation changed to short term constituency issues.

From this discussion, the second research question for this dissertation is as follows:

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2. How do district electoral systems affect the relationship between the city manager and mayor in terms of roles and responsibilities in the government realm of mission planning?

In cities where the council is elected by district, the city manager's time in long range planning and strategic mission development working in a partnership with the mayor increases due to a diminished council role in mission. From this, the second hypothesis could be presented as follows:

HYPOTHESIS #2: In council-manager cities where the council is elected by district, the frequency with which the manager works with the mayor on strategic urban mission issues is higher than in cities using an at-large or mixed electoral system.

The third research question and corresponding hypothesis evaluates the relationship between the electoral system used to elect the city council and the city manager's role in policy development, community leadership, and as an informational broker. These three areas fall within the role zone of policy in Svara's model.

The effect of district systems in increasing the manager's participation in policy development has been extensively addressed earlier in this chapter and in the literature review. In part, this increase in the role of policy development on the part of the manager is tied to an increased role as an informational broker and a consensus builder among all municipal government players.

Several studies in the literature review point to the manager's increasing role as informational broker. Ehrenhalt (1990) in his study of Austin, Texas City Manager, Camille Garnett, calls the city manager the broker-in-chief among all the competing

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interests that maneuver for power in the modern city. The city manager, Ehrenhalt says is not so much a decision maker as a deal maker. Cantine (1976) in his study of the roles of urban administrators, sees the most universal and time consuming role of the urban administrator as the task of building consensus. Hale (1989) in her study of five city managers in Los Angeles County found that the role of broker accounted for 37% of the time of the managers studied. She concluded that as brokers, city managers spent most of their time negotiating among various groups and fostering communication by linking people. Green (1989) found in an ICMA study that the manager's role of negotiator in problem solving, conflict resolution, and developing compromise was the second most time consuming task for the manager.

The city managers' increasing role in community leadership also leverages an increased participation in policy development. Nalbandian (1988) observes the increasing trend in the city councils to abdicate their political leadership, surrendering the democratic normative value debate to an interaction between an increasing number of community interest groups and the city manager. Managers, being encouraged by the city council to take a more active policy role and finding themselves more and more assuming the role of community leaders, are now searching for role legitimacy. If the city manager and the administrative staff are no longer grounded in the democratic legitimacy of the council, Nalbandian sees the policy formulation role of the manager becoming rooted in the community as the direct source of legitimacy. Nalbandian (1987) sees a basic problem in a political manager exerting policy leadership without legislative oversight. He believes that the increasing numbers of neighborhood associations are the key to restoring

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legitimacy to the political role of the manager. The managerial policy initiatives directed from manager to council are legitimate if they are a response to the deliberations and expectations of neighborhood associations and other interest groups. As the council passes judgement on the manager's policy initiatives, it will be responding to the manager's interpretations of community group needs. This restores the council to its legislative oversight role.

The discussion in the literature review suggests that managers in district cities have an even stronger role in community leadership. First, Svara (1989a) suggests that managers should develop ties with a wide range of groups and organizations in the community so that the manager can directly communicate perspectives to the public at-large as the council may be less able and inclined to do so. Svara observes that if the mayor is weak, and the council is exclusively elected from districts, council members may be consumed with parochial concerns, and the manager emerges as the only government leader that is articulating city-wide policy concerns. Second, the literature review concluded from the experiences of managers in cities that converted from at-large to district systems, that new political linkages were directly built between the department heads and neighborhood associations, thereby increasing the role of the manager as a community leader who has developed an independent political constituency that unified different community groups (Ehrenhalt, 1990).

From this discussion, the third research question for this dissertation is presented as follows:

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3. How do district electoral systems affect the role of the city manager as a policy initiator, community leader, and informational broker.

In cities where the council is elected by district, new political linkages are forged as a result of increased council demands for information to meet constituency demands. These new political linkages integrate the city manager and council, department heads and council, and department heads and neighborhood associations in a much tighter communication link than before. Greater involvement by the council in constituency concerns increases the manager's role in policy initiation, community leadership, and consensus building as an informational broker-in-chief. From this, the third hypothesis can be framed as follows:

HYPOTHESIS #3: In council-manager cities where the council is elected by district, the role of the city manager as perceived by council, mayor, and the manager in policy formulation, community leadership, and informational brokering is stronger than in those cities using an at-large or mixed electoral system.

To conclude this section, the three research questions and corresponding hypotheses will test three parts of the Svara dichotomy/duality model regarding the role of the city manager in terms of the effects of districting on the extent to which the city manager role is a dichotomy when compared to council roles or a duality. The first hypothesis addresses the relationship between the manager and council roles across the four zones of mission, policy, administration, and management. The second hypothesis addresses the role of the manager with the role zone of mission. And the third hypothesis

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isolates the role zone of policy, addressing the role of the city manager in policy formulation, community leadership, and information brokering.

Units of Analysis and Research Universe

The units of analysis were briefly presented in Chapter One, but here they are expanded and directly related to the hypotheses and the Svara dichotomy/duality model. The units of analysis in this research model are defined as follows: (a) actual roles of the city manager and city council defined in terms of the four role zones of mission, policy, administration, and management used in the Svara dichotomy/duality model; (b) the actual role of the city manager in working with the mayor or strategic mission issues; (c) actual role of the city manager in policy formulation; (d) role of the city manager in policy formulation as perceived by the council and mayor; (e) actual role of the city manager in community leadership; (f) role of the city manager in community leadership as perceived by the council and mayor; (g) actual role of the city manager as an informational broker; (h) role of the city manager as an informational broker as perceived by the council and mayor.

Relating these units of analysis to the hypotheses and Svara model, the first unit of analysis corresponds to the first hypothesis and measurements here evaluate the effects of districting on the roles of manager and council across the four role zones in terms of the degree of dichotomy and duality in role performance. The second unit of analysis corresponds to the second hypothesis and the measurement evaluates the extent to which districting affects the role of the city manager in the Svara model role zone of mission. The remaining units of analysis correspond to the third hypothesis. Measurements here

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evaluate the extent to which districting affects the role of the city manager in the Svara model role zone of policy. The dependent variables presented in this chapter are directly formulated from these units of analyses.

The research "universe" for this dissertation is all council-manager cities nationwide with populations of 100,000 or more. This is a national study covering all geographic regions across the 50 states.

Dependent variables.

The dependent variables for this study are listed in Table 1. Whereas the first unit of analysis is the actual role of the manager, council, and mayor in the four role zones of mission, policy, administration, and management, the dependent variable corresponding to this unit of analysis must be defined in terms of the extent to which role involvement is different among administrators (manager) and elected officials (council and mayor). This particular dependent variable is structured by comparing the level of difference or dichotomy in role involvement by manager, council, and mayor using two role groupings taken from the Svara model. Mission and policy role zones are combined on one side (the realm of the council) and administration and management role zones are combined on the other side (the realm of the manager). The manager's involvement in mission and policy is compared to the involvement of council and mayor in mission and policy. The differential then becomes the dependent variable. The manager's involvement in administration and management is compared to the involvement of council and mayor in administration and management. Again, the differential becomes the dependent variable to be studied. This dependent variable corresponds to the first hypothesis.

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Table 1

Dependent Variables

1. Degree of difference or dichotomy in role involvement when comparing the roles of the city manager, mayor, and council in mission and policy as opposed to administration and management.
2. The frequency with which the city manager works with the mayor on strategic city mission issues
3. The actual and perceived role of the city manager (by council and mayor) in policy formulation
4. The actual and perceived role of the city manager (by council and mayor) in community leadership
5. The actual and perceived role of the city manager (by council and mayor) in informational brokering.

The second dependent variable involves the frequency with which the manager works with the mayor on strategic city mission issues. This variable corresponds to the second hypothesis and is derived from the second unit of analysis, but differs because the variable is measuring the degree of frequency of role involvement of the manager in mission issues.

The third, fourth, and fifth dependent variables correspond to the third hypothesis and the remaining units of analysis (three through eight). Each of these dependent variables includes both the actual role of the city manager in policy formulation, community leadership, and informational brokering and the manager's role in these three areas as perceived by the council members and the mayor. These three variables are formatted this way since the survey questions measuring role involvement are answered by all respondents (manager, council members, and mayor).

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Independent variables.

The independent variables for this study are listed in Table 2. The first independent variable is the primary with the remaining independent variables (two through seven) being control variables to protect the data results in terms of construct validity.

All three types of electoral systems will be used as an independent variable in this study. At-large systems elect the council with the entire city population voting for council candidates. There is no specific geographic constituency using this system. All council members represent the entire city population. With mixed electoral systems, some council members have a specific geographic constituency and some represent the entire city on an at-large basis. Variations of this electoral system select primary candidates using a district ward-based system with the final election of candidates being done on a citywide at-large basis.

Table 2

Independent Variables

1. Type of electoral system used to elect the city council (i.e., district, at-large, mixed)
2. Population size of the city (control variable)
3. Length of time in current position (control variable)
4. Length of time since the transition from an at-large electoral system to district or mixed system (control variable)
5. Partisan or non partisan political system in the city (control variable)
6. Level of ethnic and racial diversity in the city population (control variable)
7. Geographic region of the city (control variable)

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The size of the city population was chosen as a control variable for two reasons. First, cities between 10,000 and 250,000 tend to exhibit a homogeneity with conflict management in the community more feasible and controlled. With increased growth, a greater pluralism develops with more factions demanding to be heard (Sparrow, 1984). Shepard Nevel (1997) in his study of the city of Miami converting to a strong mayor, district form of government from a council-manager at-large system, observes that city size can influence the role of the city manager. Large cities, Nevel writes, often prefer to put strong popularly elected mayors in charge of city administration. A city manager might lack the political strength to mobilize the government behind community goals. The larger the city, the stronger must be the leadership., On one hand, the policy and mission roles of the city manager may be stronger in larger cities because of the factional pluralism that demands a larger leadership role regardless of type of electoral system used. On the other hand, the policy and mission roles of the city manager may be diminished by the stronger role of a popularly elected mayor (such as Pete Wilson in San Diego) that tends to overshadow the city manager, again despite the electoral system used.

The second control variable, length of time in current position was selected to ensure that a greater or lesser role of the city manager in policy and mission was not simply the result of greater experience on the part of the city manager, mayor, or council member when compared to the other municipal leaders. Again a new city manager in an environment where the mayor or majority of council members are well experienced with the community structure may exhibit a much lesser involvement in policy and mission roles. The reverse could also be said with strong manager municipal leadership scenarios.

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The third control variable, length of time between transition from at-large to a single member district or mixed system, is to ensure that the effects of districting are not being diminished by a relatively recent conversion. Political linkages referenced earlier in the literature review may not have had time to fully develop. The growth of neighborhood associations and corresponding community involvement may not have occurred to the extent that the city manager's involvement in community leadership has developed constituencies for policy formulation.

The fourth control variable is defined as to whether the city uses partisan or nonpartisan elections to elect the city council and mayor. Most cities today are nonpartisan with candidates declaring party identification but the candidates are not politically slated by a party organization. The political party in a democracy manages conflict, structures it and folds social changes into two or more broad social changes, the parties themselves. Since political parties are the agencies of interest aggregation, their elimination after the reform movement as integrative mechanisms intensifies the impact of social changes or political decisions (Lineberry & Fowler, 1967). Clark (1970) observes that the weakness of New York City's mayor, city council, and party structure create an environment where no centralized entity manages community conflict. In using this control variable, the presence of a partisan election system could create a diminished city manager presence in policy and community leadership, because the party organization could take the leadership role in managing community conflict.

The fifth control variable is the level of diversity in the city population. This variable is defined as the percentage population of each city that is non-white (i.e., Black,

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American Indian, Alaskan Eskimo, Asian Indian, Asian Pacific Islanders, and Hispanic). Boynton and Wright (1971) have indicated that the manager has the most freedom to initiate policy in areas where the public interests are not well represented in government and not well articulated in the community. The politics of traditional goods and services is well known and well defined. In the areas of economic development and social politics, the political groupings tend to be less clearly and less firmly rooted in the governing process. Where there is more political ambiguity, there can be for the manager, more opportunity for policy-innovation behavior. Cities with a higher degree of grassroots diversity and less homogeneity are more likely to have this environment of political ambiguity. This variable is to ensure that a high degree of policy innovation and community leadership on the part of the manager is not simply a function of diversity as apposed to the type of electoral system used.

The final control variable used is the geographic region. This variable is defined in terms of whether the city being studied falls within four geographic regions: West, South, Midwest, and North. This particular control variable is related to the previous one because some regions are more likely to have greater ethnic and racial diversity and less homogeneity. For example, cities in the West may be more homogeneous than cities located in the north and Midwestern regions. This variable is to ensure that a high degree of policy initiation and community leadership on the part of the manager is not simply a function of geographical region with associated levels of diversity as opposed to the type of electoral system used.

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The Data Collection Plan

Information was collected from two primary sources. The National League of Cities in Washington D.C., Manager, Information Systems provided city demographic data on a quantitative basis, and the respondent identification data for administration of the survey instrument. The demographic data supported the formulation of the independent variables, except for the third and fourth control variables which were derived from the survey instrument. The second source of data was the actual survey instrument which provided the quantitative information to complete all five dependent variables. The data collection then was organized into two phases.

Phase I—National League of Cities

After providing the National League of Cities (NLC) in Washington with the parameters for this study (i.e., all council-manager cities with populations in excess of 100,000), the NLC provided data on 105 cities that met the criteria using 1990 census data. Forty-five of the cities or 43% used an at-large electoral system, 38 or 36% used a district electoral system, and 22 or 21% used a mixed electoral system. This data provided the information for the first independent variable.

The NLC provided data on population size, whether the city used a partisan or nonpartisan election system, the percentage of the population that was non-white (ethnic/racial mix) and the geographic region of the city (North, South, Midwest, or West). This data provided all information required for the second, fifth, sixth, and seventh control independent variable.

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The NLC provided address information for a total of 892 council members, mayor, and city managers in all 105 cities. Specific information included name, title, address, and phone number. Summary data was also provided for each city indicating the form of government, total people on the council, and how many of these council members were elected at-large or by district electoral systems. This summary data became useful as a cross check to ensure that all respondent address information was available. The summary data were also useful in building a spreadsheet that tracked two separate mailing of the survey instrument to the respondents and the returned completed surveys. This was invaluable in ensuring that completed surveys were proportional and representative across city demographics. If completed surveys were not proportional across electoral system type, region, or position held (council, mayor, manager), the spread sheet provided the direction for additional mailings or phone follow-ups.

A listing of all 105 cities used in this study is contained in Appendix A of this dissertation. The descriptive data analyzing city demographics by geographic region, electoral system, and political systems (partisan or nonpartisan) are contained in Table 9 and will be discussed in Chapter Four.

Phase II—Survey Data and Survey Indices

Questions for the survey instrument were taken from two existing surveys that had been previously field tested. First, James H. Svara (1990) in his book *Official Leadership in the City, Patterns of Conflict and Cooperation*, provides data on the level of involvement by officials in government activities. He uses a survey instrument to study the level of involvement by council members, mayors, and managers in the role zones of

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mission, policy, administration, and management. His study covered responses from officials in 12 cities throughout the United States. Twenty-nine questions were lifted from this survey instrument that addressed role involvement across the four zones. Dr. Svara was contacted at the University of North Carolina and had no objection to the use of these questions in the survey instrument for this dissertation. The 29 questions and how they correspond to the four role zones of mission, policy, administration, and management are listed in Table 3.

The second existing survey instrument that was used to complete the survey for this dissertation came from the International City/County Management Association (ICMA). In the January 6, 1997 *ICMA Newsletter*, the ICMA announced the results of a spring 1996 survey administered to managers in 2,787 jurisdictions with a 47% response rate. The purpose of the survey was to capture information on how council-manager government currently functions. ICMA encouraged members to assist in analyzing survey results by requesting a copy of the survey results in hard copy and diskette. A hard copy of the survey instrument and results was obtained to assist in the completion of the survey instrument for this dissertation. Seven questions were lifted from this survey to measure the city manager's role in policy initiation, community leadership, and information brokering. These seven questions are listed in Table 4 and categorized according to the three aspects of the manager's overall role in policy.

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Table 3.

City Official Role Involvement—Svara Survey Questions

Mission	Administration
• Changing governmental institutions or revising the charter • Determining the level of taxes and fees • Determining the purpose and scope of city government • Deciding to undertake new or eliminate old services (not simple change in level) • Identifying problems, analyzing future trends for the city • Developing strategies for future development of the city	• Investigating citizen complaints • Specific decisions about allocating services • Making specific decisions that are part of larger projects, site selection, facility design • Delivering services to citizens • Evaluating programs • Setting standards for employee treatment of citizens in service delivery • Developing operating procedures for programs: definition of eligibility, application methods, award criteria, etc.
Policy	**Management**
• Budget review and approval • Specific decisions concerning planning and zoning • Deciding to participate in federal aid programs • Initiating or cancelling programs • Developing annual program goals and objectives • Determining formula for allocating services • Developing applications for federal funds	• Awarding large contracts • Determining wages and benefits for employees • Assessing organizational performance • Proposing changes in management practices or organization • Handling complaints from employees • Routine contracting and purchasing • Hiring decisions about department heads • Hiring decisions about other staff

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Table 4

Questions from ICMA Survey Instrument

Policy Initiation

1. Promote(s) interaction among policy makers to ensure that there is adequate opportunity for policy discussion and definition.
2. Support(s) the governing body by identifying community needs and initiating policy proposals
3. Play(s) a significant role in policy initiation through advice and recommendations to the governing body

Community Leadership

1. Gather(s) community input throughout the year through surveys, citizen committees, or other methods and use that information to determine community needs
2. Holding town or neighborhood-based meetings specifically to solicit citizen input to identify community needs

Informational Broker

1. Support(s) the governing body by providing them with information
2. Promote(s) team building within the governing body

The actual survey instrument used for this dissertation is contained in Appendix B. Section I is general information that captures information needed for the third and fourth independent control variables and provides conformation on the type of electoral system used and a double check against NLC data. Section II captures information on the level of involvement by the manager and elected officials in the four role zones of mission, policy, administration, and management. The 29 questions in this section were listed from the Svara questionnaire previously referenced. The information obtained from this section completes the data required for the first dependent variable on the degree of dichotomy

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between roles of the manager and elected officials. Responses are measured using a Likert Scale of one through five corresponding from very low involvement to very high involvement. Section III contains the seven questions lifted from the ICMA survey on the extent to which the manager is involved in policy initiation, community leadership, and informational brokering. The same scale of measurement is used in this section as in Section II. Data captured in this section are in support of the third, fourth, and fifth dependent variables on the actual and perceived role of the city manager in policy. All respondents answer the questions in this section. Section IV contains the six questions from Svara's questionnaire that are measuring the extent to which the manager is involved in the role of mission. This section is capturing data regarding the frequency with which the manager works with the mayor on strategic city mission issues. The questions are answered only by the city manager and the measurement scale is the same as the other sections in the survey, a one to five scale measuring very low to very high involvement. Data obtained in this section are used to complete the second dependent variable regarding the relationship between manager and mayor in the mission role.

Sample and Response

The survey instrument was mailed to 892 council members, mayors, and managers in 105 cities nationwide. The 892 potential respondents were comprised of 682 council members, 105 managers, and 105 mayors. Two follow-up mailings were done to increase the rate of return along with a telephone follow-up inquiry. A total of 357 responses were received for a 40% response rate. Each questionnaire was coded with a respondent number in the upper right hand corner for respondent accountability.

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Analysis Methods

Measures and Measurement

There are 46 questions on the survey instrument. All questions use a one to five scale with one being very low involvement to five being very high involvement. This scale is ordinal in nature. The responses to the survey were entered onto a spread sheet using an Excel database. The questions were coded Q1 through Q46. At the bottom of the last page of each survey, population data were coded as Q47 (four numeric positions), partisan or nonpartisan election systems were coded as Q48 (N or P), the diversity index was coded as a percentage non-white as Q49, and the region was coded as Q50 (N, S, M, or W). The length of time in present position was coded Q1 (number of months), the type of electoral system was coded Q2 (Al, D, or M), the length of time since the transition from at-large to a district or mixed system was coded as Q3 and Q4 (number of months). The responses to Q5 through Q46 all used the one to five Likert Scale. The current position of council member, city manager, or mayor was coded Q51 (C, MG, or MR). On the far left of the spread sheet, an identification number was entered corresponding to the respondent number on the top right corner of the first page of the survey. The measurement scales for the data are summarized in Table 5.

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Table 5.

Data Measurement Scales

Survey Data	Corresponding Independent/Dependent Variable	Measurement Scale
Q1—Length of Time in Current Position	Independent Variable 1	Interval
Q2—Type of Electoral system	Independent Variable 1	Nominal
Q3,4—Electoral system Transition Time	Independent Variable 4	Interval
Q5-Q46—Survey Role Responses	Dependent Variable 1-5	Ordinal
Q47—Population	Independent Variable 2	Interval
Q48—Partisan or Nonpartisan Elections	Independent Variable 5	Nominal
Q49—Diversity Index	Independent Variable 6	Ratio Interval
Q50—Region	Independent Variable 7	Nominal
Q51—Position	Interaction Variables	Nominal

A series of interaction variables were created to assist in organizing the data to compare responses from council members, mayor, and manager according to type of electoral system used in the respondent's city. These variables are considered independent variables and were entered into the multiple regression equation along with the independent variables listed previously in Table 2. The interaction variables are described in Table 6.

Data from the spreadsheet were entered into the SPSS Database for the computation of minimum and maximum values, the mean value and the standard

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deviation value. These formed the basis for descriptive statistics of the data, data indexes, and multiple regression applications.

Table 6.

Interaction Variables	
Interaction Variable 1	Council Members—District
Interaction Variable 2	Council Members—At-Large
Interaction Variable 3	Council Members—Mixed
Interaction Variable 4	City Manager—District
Interaction Variable 5	City Manager—At-Large
Interaction Variable 6	City Manager—Mixed
Interaction Variable 7	Mayor—District
Interaction Variable 8	Mayor—At-Large
Interaction Variable 9	Mayor—Mixed

Preparation of the data were required to test the first dependent variable, degree of role dichotomy among manager, council members, and mayor, against the independent variables using multiple regression analysis techniques. Mean scores were first calculated from Q5 through Q33 and organized by the four role zones of mission, policy, administration, and management. The data were further separated according to the interaction variables of city official and type of electoral systems used (district managers, at-large managers, etc.). Once this process was completed, the question responses were combined for mission and policy and a mean score calculated. This value was coded POM. Similarly, the question responses corresponding to administration and management

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were combined and a mean score calculated. This value was labeled MAD for purposes of the regression analysis. The difference between the mean scores for POM and MAD were calculated, and this value was coded DIFF for purposes of the regression analysis.

This method holds true to Svara's dichotomy/duality model and the research design since the first dependent variable is measuring a level of dichotomy between the elected official role realms (mission and policy) and the manager's role realm (administration and management). A lower level of role dichotomy would indicate managerial incursion into mission and policy and elected official incursion into administration and management. Further organization of the data for the remaining dependent variables was required. Responses to questions Q41 through Q46 were calculated into minimum, maximum values, mean scores, and standard deviations. The results were organized according to the interaction variables by position and type of electoral systems. The mean scores then were coded MMM (mayor, manager, mission). Responses to Q35, Q36, Q37 were calculated in a similar fashion and the mean values were coded PI (policy initiation). Responses to Q34 and Q38 were calculated and the mean values were coded IB (informational broker). Finally, the responses to Q39 and Q40 were calculated and organized in a similar fashion and the mean values were coded CL (community leadership).

The data for dependent variables DIFF, MMM, PI, CL, and IB were formatted and organized for comparison to the independent and interaction variables using multiple regression analysis techniques.

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Validity

The greatest potential threat to validity in this research design is the issue of construct validity. The concern here is with confounding or the possibility that operations which are meant to represent a cause or effect construct can be construed in terms of more than one construct. Cook and Campbell (1979) describe four measures to test out construct validity concerns: (a) assessing the "take" of the independent variable; (b) assessing whether an independent variable does not vary with measures of related but different constructs; (c) ensuring that the dependent variable plugs into the factors they are meant to measure through some form of inter-item correlation; and (d) ensuring that the dependent variable is not dominated by irrelevant factors that make it a measure of more or less than was intended.

This research design uses six control variables to ensure that the first two measures to test out construct validity concerns are met. The design is built to ensure that constructs such as city size, official experience, electoral system transition time, strength of political parties, and geographic region are not influencing the role of the city manager in mission and policy. The measurement methodology used to organize the data through the use of interaction variables satisfies the third measure. The refocusing of the data from mean score values across the four role zones of mission, policy, administration and management to actual differential mean scores (DIFF) comparing two broader data groupings (MAD and POM) ensures that the dependent variable is exactly focused on the design objective and is not dominated by irrelevant factors. The dependent variables are

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all closely related and tied to the hypotheses that they are testing. This satisfied the fourth construct validity test measure.

Survey Field Test

As was noted before, all of the questions on the survey instrument were taken from existing survey instruments that were previously used to support two separate studies of the city manager role. Additionally, the survey instrument was field tested in the city of Glendale, Arizona prior to distribution around the nation. The survey was administered to each city council member, the mayor, and the manager in the city of Glendale. Interviews were held with the city manager and one council member to obtain feedback on the clarity and utility of the survey. The city manager suggested that room be added on the back page of the survey instrument to give respondents an opportunity to make comments on the interaction between city manager and council. The council member made some minor wording changes to the questions in Section II of the survey instrument regarding involvement by city officials in mission, policy, administration and management.

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CHAPTER FOUR

DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULTS

This chapter presents the data from the 357 surveys completed by city managers, mayors, and council members in 105 cities across the nation. Section A of this chapter will provide descriptive data regarding the 105 cities themselves according to region, type of electoral system, and political system. This section will also provide patterns of responses to the survey according to regional and electoral system distribution.

Section B of this chapter is a discussion of descriptive data in terms of indexes presenting mean values and standard deviations for each of the four main sections of the survey. This includes data captured in the survey in support of the independent control variables of respondent position tenure, electoral system transition time, city size, and the city diversity index. Data will be presented on Section II of the survey in terms of indexes reflecting mean values for respondent replies indicating levels of involvement in all four of the zones in the Svara model. The results of respondent replies to Section III of the survey will be presented with mean values and standard deviations. This section of the survey is measuring city manager involvement in policy initiation, community leadership, and acting as an informational broker. This section concludes with the respondent reply indexes for Section IV of the survey regarding the city manager's frequency of interaction with the mayor on strategic mission issues. It should be emphasized here that the data

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from Section II of the survey will be used to test the first hypothesis in this dissertation, the data in Section IV of the survey are in support of the second hypothesis, and the data in Section III will be tested in support of the third hypothesis.

This chapter concludes with Section C, the results of the multivariate regression analysis for all independent and dependent variables. Three separate regression tests were completed, each one testing each of the three hypotheses in this dissertation. The discussion regarding the extent to which the regression analysis results support or do not support each of the hypotheses will be presented in the next chapter on conclusions, implications, and recommendations.

Section A: City Demographics and Patterns of Survey Returns

City Demographics

City demographics by region, electoral, and political systems are reflected in Table 7. Eighty-five percent of the cities over 100,000 in population with council-manager forms of government are in the West and South. Only 3% of the cities are in the North, reflecting the predominance there of the mayor-council form of government. The data demonstrate that in moving across the country from east to west, the frequency of use of the council-manager form of government increases in cities over 100,000 in population. Fifty-seven percent of the cities in the study use a district or mixed electoral system, but the at-large form remains the largest single form of electoral system in use at 43%. The predominance of nonpartisan elections (92%) reflects the significant lack of political cohesive power on the part of political party organizations today in municipal politics.

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Table 7.

Analyses of Descriptive Data—City Demographics by Region/Electoral System/Political System

	Number of Cities
Region	
West	54 (51%)
South	36 (34%)
Midwest	12 (11%)
North	3 (3%)
Total	105
Electoral System	
At-Large	45 (43%)
District	38 (36%)
Mixed	22 (21%)
Total	105
Political System	
Partisan	8 (8%)
Nonpartisan	97 (92%)
Total	105

Patterns of Survey Returns

The overall response rate for this survey was 40%. The percentage return rate per region is found in Table 8 and matches the 40% overall rate, with the South slightly lower than the other regions at 38%. The regional proportional return rate, with each region examined as a percentage of the whole, matches the proportional number sent out by region. For example, 47% of the total surveys were sent to western cities, and 48% of the total surveys received came from western cities. In terms of regional distribution, both the overall response rate for each region and what that percentage represents as a portion of all

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surveys received is distributed evenly. Seventy-five percent of all city managers responded, 50% of all mayors responded, and the response rate for council members was 33%.

Table 8.

Patterns of Responses to the Survey (Regional Distribution)

Sent Out					Returned			
Council	Manager	Mayor	Total	REGION	Council	Manager	Mayor	Total
311	54	54	419 (47)*	WEST (%)	104 (33)**	41 (76)	26 (17)	171 (41) (48)***
254	36	36	326 (36)*	SOUTH (%)	82 (32)**	25 (69)	17 (50)	124 (38) (35)***
91	12	12	115 (13)*	MIDWEST (%)	30 (33)**	11 (92)	8 (67)	39 (43) (14)***
26	3	3	32 (4)%	NORTH (%)	11 (42)**	2 (67)	0 (0)	13 (41) (4)***
682	105	105	892	TOTAL	227	79	51	357

*As a percentage of the total number sent out
**As a percentage of the total sent out by region by category of office (council, manager, mayor)
***As a percentage of the total number received

The patterns of responses according to electoral system distribution are contained in Table 9. The rate of return for each type of electoral system matched the overall response rate of 40%. District cities had the lowest response rate of 37%, possibly because of the larger average size of these cities. The proportional return rate for each type of electoral system matched the proportional number sent out according to electoral

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system. The return rate for council members, managers, and mayors according to each type of electoral system also matches the overall return rate according to position held. The one exception to this is the return rate for mayors from mixed cities who responded at a rate of 36% compared to the overall mayoral response rate of 50%.

Table 9.

Patterns of Responses to the Survey (Electoral System Distribution)

Sent Out					Returned			
Council	Manager	Mayor	Total		Council	Manager	Mayor	Total
239	45	45	329 (37)*	AT-LARGE (%)	85 (35)**	33 (73)**	25 (56)**	143 (43) (40)***
269	38	38	345 (39)*	DISTRICT (%)	81 (30)**	28 (74)*	18 (47)	127 (37) (36)***
174	22	22	218 (24)*	MIXED (%)	61 (35)**	18 (82)**	8 (36)**	87 (41) (24)***
682	105	105	892	TOTAL	227	79	51	357

*As a percentage of the total number sent out
**As a percentage of the total sent out by region by category of office (council, manager, mayor)
***As a percentage of the total number received

The skewed nature of rate of return percentages according to position held is of some concern in terms of acceptable response rates. According to Babbie (1990), a response rate of 50% is considered adequate, a response rate of 60% is considered good, and a response rate of 70% or more is very good. The concern here is with the response rate from council members where only one-third responded. However, Babbie (1990)

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states that these percentages are only rough guides and have no statistical basis. He continues that a demonstrated lack of response bias is more important than a high response rate. Considering the fact that the regional proportional return rate matches the proportional number sent out by region and that the same can be said for the proportional return rate by electoral system, responses are evening distributed. Responses by region and electoral system were also returned at approximately the same rate as the overall return rate of 40%. The even distributive nature of responses would indicate a lack of response bias.

Section B: Analysis of Descriptive Data and Survey Indexes

Control Variables

The data captured from Section I of the survey (general information) are displayed in Table 10. This table represents four of six control variables in the research design, the other two being geographic region and characteristics of the city's political system (partisan vs. nonpartisan). These two variables were discussed in Tables 7 and 8. Respondents to the survey had held their positions an average of five years, seven months. The length of position tenure is consistent with national trends reported by Svara (1990). He reports that managers have an average tenure of 5.4 years. Although no such averages for tenure are found for council/mayor in terms of years, Svara indicates that overall 78% of council incumbents are re-elected. The average tenure in this study of 5.6 years matches the average managerial tenure and would be indicative of council member respondents serving their third term (based on a two-year average term). The average position tenure in this study reflects a solid level of experience for respondents.

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The response rate for transition time from at-large electoral systems to district or mixed systems was disappointing. Only 28% of district respondents chose to provide information on transition time. Only 32% of mixed system respondents chose to answer the transition question. Overall, the response rate on Q3 and Q4 in Section I of the survey was 30%. Given this low rate of response and the fact that in many cases, the transition time given by respondents was an approximation, this particular independent control variable becomes highly unreliable in any regression model as a measure to protect the data results in terms of construct validity. The average transition time from the limited responses was 24 years. Given the limited and possibly inaccurate data on these two questions, transition time between electoral systems was considered for elimination as an independent control variable from the research design. Responses indicated that the cities being studied have an average population of 185,000 and that, on the average, the percentage non-white in the population is 26%. This level of diversity is considered large enough to provide a significant level of control regarding construct validity problems.

Table 10.

Analyses of Descriptive Data—Control Variables

	Mean	Minimum	Maximum	N
Respondent Position Tenure (months)	67.2	1	357	353
Transition Time At-Large to District (years)	24.2	1	98	96
Transition Time At-Large to Mixed (years)	49	1	87	72
City Population (thousands)	185.1	100	1110	105
City Diversity Index (% non-white)	25.9	4	67	105

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Frequency of Role Involvement

Data captured from Section II of the survey instrument are displayed in Tables 11, 12, 13, and 14. Section II of the survey corresponds to questions Q5 and Q33 on the survey. These 29 questions are asking respondents to report the frequency of their involvement in government activities. Specifically the questions are measuring the extent of involvement by all respondents in the four role zones of mission, policy, administration, and management. The questions and how they correspond to the four role zones are reflected in Table 4 and were discussed in Chapter Three, Methodology, in terms of source and application.

Overall responses by position across the four role zones appear in Table 11. Again, respondents are asked to rate the frequency of their role involvement using a Likert scale of 1 to 5 with 1 being very low involvement and 5 being very high involvement. The table reflects mean scores and standard deviations for each mean score. The standard deviations are all below one and indicate a low level of dispersion around the mean by all respondents. Since the standard normal distribution has a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one, the characteristics of the standard deviations all below the value one would indicate that the sample here is typical when compared to the general population (Agresti & Finlay, 1986). The low values of the standard deviations would also indicate that the mean score is typical of the sample taken. The interesting observation regarding Table 11 is that the mean values for the council and mayor across the four role zones indicates a traditional role orientation. Council members and the mayor scored themselves as moderate to high level of involvement in mission and policy, but low to

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moderate level of involvement in administration and management. However, the manager's self-assessment scored moderate to high across all four role zones. The mean scores would indicate a lower level of incursion by council/mayor into the manager's role realm of administration and management, but a high degree of incursion by the manager into the elected official realm of mission and policy.

Table 11.

Analyses of Descriptive Data—Involvement by Manager/Elected Officials in City Government Activities

	Mission		Policy		Administration		Management	
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD
Council	3.91	.5976	3.33	.5901	2.91	.7215	2.38	.6585
Manager	3.94	.3757	3.54	.4672	3.25	.6217	3.40	.5856
Mayor	3.96	.5383	3.29	.5125	2.87	.5926	2.55	.5641

The mean score indexes for council members, mayor, and manager by type of electoral system are contained in Tables 12, 13, and 14. The nature of the standard deviations in all three tables would indicate that the mean score is typical of the sample population, and that the sample population is typical of the general population. All standard deviation values are less than two-thirds of the mean values, indicating an acceptable level of dispersion of respondents about the mean.

To summarize the results in Tables 12, 13, and 14 regarding the mean indexes, the following observations can be made regarding values in different electoral systems that appear somewhat different from the mean. In Table 12, district council members rated

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themselves higher in administration than their counterparts in at-large or mixed cities. It is unknown whether this is a significant difference, but the literature review did observe that after conversion to districts, council members made more incursions into the manager's administrative role realm because of increased interaction with department heads and the manager.

Table 12.

Analyses of Descriptive Data—Involvement by Council Members in City Government Activities (by Electoral System)

	Overall		District		At-Large		Mixed	
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD
Mission	3.91	.5976	3.97	.6238	3.87	.5234	3.88	.6642
Policy	3.33	.5901	3.39	.5608	3.36	.5581	3.21	.6610
Administration	2.91	.7215	3.05	.6708	2.89	.7407	2.74	.7347
Management	2.38	.6585	2.38	.6684	2.47	.6433	2.22	.6500

In Table 13, managers from mixed electoral system cities rated themselves higher in mission role involvement than their counterparts. Again, it is not known at this time if this is a significant difference. In Table 14, the most significant observation is that mayors from district cities seemed to rate themselves lower in administration compared to their counterparts and mayors from mixed cities rated themselves much higher in the administrative role area. The difference between the administrative role orientation of mayors in district cities when compared to mayors in mixed cities could be significant,

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but comparisons between elected officials across electoral systems in terms of how they view their own role involvement is not a part of this research design.

Table 13.

Analyses of Descriptive Data—Involvement by City Managers in City Government Activities (by Electoral System)

	Overall		District		At-Large		Mixed	
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD
Mission	3.94	.4757	3.90	.4930	3.90	.4878	4.08	.4281
Policy	3.54	.4672	3.65	.5365	3.47	.4471	3.52	.4128
Administration	3.25	.6217	3.38	.6398	3.15	.6013	3.26	.6333
Management	3.40	.5856	3.51	.7288	3.32	.5286	3.38	.4379

Table 14.

Analyses of Descriptive Data—Involvement by Mayors in City Government Activities (by Electoral System)

	Overall		District		At-Large		Mixed	
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD
Mission	3.96	.5383	3.91	.4213	4.02	.6242	3.92	.5563
Policy	3.29	.5125	3.16	.4069	3.39	.5781	3.25	.5089
Administration	2.87	.5926	2.52	.4103	3.02	.5756	3.14	.6999
Management	2.55	.5641	2.40	.4251	2.59	.6450	2.75	.5352

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Analysis of indices.

To provide a summary examination of the range of values by respondents that constitute a normal probability distribution in a bell-shaped graph, the range values were computed for 90% of the respondents by position according to role zone. The positions selected for this test were council members and the city manager, since responses from mayors were similar to council members. The 95th percentile for a normal distribution is 1.645 standard deviations from the mean, so that the 95th percentile would equate to the following formula (Agresti & Finlay, 1986): mean + 1.645 (standard deviation).

The results are contained in Table 15. The formula for calculating the 95th percentile in a normal distribution produces a range that represents where 90% of the role scores fell. The delta between the lower part of the range (5%) and the upper part of the range (95%) is also indicated in the table. Values outside this range would constitute the right hand and left hand tails of the distribution. The average delta for council responses across all four role zones is 2.11. The average delta for managers is 1.77. This would indicate an acceptable level of dispersion among respondents with no more than two levels of variance by respondents between either extreme on a Likert five point scale. The responses of managers would indicate less dispersion since the deltas are smaller.

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Table 15.

Range of Respondent Role Scores: 90% Range—Normal Distribution Council and Manager

	Council	Manager
Mission	2.93 - 4.89 (1.96)*	3.16-4.72 (1.56)
Policy	2.36 - 4.30 (1.94)	2.77 - 4.31 (1.54)
Administration	1.72 - 4.10 (2.38)	2.23 - 4.27 (2.04)
Management	1.30 - 3.46 (2.16)	2.44 - 4.36 (1.92)

* Delta=90% role score range.

Role of City Manager in Policy, Community Leadership, and Informational Broker

The data from Section III of the survey instrument are contained in terms of mean indexes and standard deviations in Table 16. All respondents including city managers were asked to score the frequency with which the city manager was involved in policy making, community leadership, and acting as an informational broker. Policy questions correspond to Q35, 36, and 37 of the survey. Community leadership questions correspond to Q39 and Q40 of they survey. Informational brokering questions correspond to Q34 and Q38 of the survey. Again, all questions use a Likert scale of one to five with one being very low involvement and five being very high involvement.

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Table 16.

Analyses of Descriptive Data—Role of City Manager in Policy Making, Community Leadership, and Information Broker

	Mean	Standard Deviation	N
Promoting Interaction Among Policy Makers (PM)	4.27	.8163	348
Advice/Recommendations on Policy (PM)	3.55	.9048	348
Identifying Community Needs/Initiating Policy Proposals (PM)	3.93	.8997	348
Gathering Community Input (CL)	3.37	1.1176	347
Holding Neighborhood Meetings (CL)	2.95	1.2238	348
Promoting Team Building (IB)	3.55	1.1225	346
Providing Information (IB)	4.27	.8163	348

PM = Policy Making CL = Community Leadership IB = Information Broker

The results in Table 16 show that both the perceived and actual role of the city manager in policy making is rated high. The average mean of these three questions in 4.08. The actual and perceived role of the city manager as a community leader was rated moderate (average mean value of 3.16). The actual and perceived role of the city manager as an informational broker was rated moderate to high (average mean value of 3.68). The specific involvement by the city manager in supporting the governing body by providing them with information (Q34) was rated the highest (4.27) indicating the high to very high involvement. This question is part of the role involvement by the city manager in acting as an informational broker. The question rated the lowest was the city manager's

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involvement in holding town or neighborhood-based meetings specifically to solicit citizen input to identify community needs (Q40). The mean score on this question was 2.95 indicating low to moderate involvement. The responses regarding the city manager's role in policy making would seem to support the discussion in the literature review regarding the increasing role of the city manager in policy formulation and initiative.

The standard deviations in Table 16 are all higher than those in Tables 11 through 14. However, in this table the standard deviation is computed based on all respondents to the survey since the data here are not categorized by position and electoral system. The dispersion about the mean is higher because of the larger number of values being considered. However, the standard deviations are in most cases below the value of one and in the case of three of the response questions are only slightly over the value of one with the highest being 1.2. With reference to the characteristics of a standard normal distribution having a standard deviation of one, the results in this sample would seem to be typical of the general population.

Frequency of Managerial Role Involvement—Strategic Issues

The last section of the survey instrument (Section IV) is measuring the frequency of the city manager's involvement in working with the mayor on strategic city issues. Data captured from this survey section are portrayed in Table 17 in the form of mean indexes and standard deviations. This section of the survey was completed only by city managers using a Likert scale of one to five. The questions in Section IV correspond to Q41 through Q46 and represent the traditional role of council and mayor in the role zone

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of mission. The questions are duplicates of the mission questions contained in Section II of the survey (see Table 4).

Table 17.

Analyses of Descriptive Data—Relationship Between Manager and Mayor on Strategic City Issues

	Mean	Standard Deviation	N
Changing Government Institutions	3.00	1.2247	78
Determining Taxes/Fees	3.54	1.0653	79
Determining Purpose/Scope of City Government	3.64	1.1163	79
Starting New or Eliminating Old Services	3.70	1.0728	79
Analyzing Future Trends for City	4.01	.9327	79
Developing Strategies for Future City Development	4.04	.9037	79

The mean indexes in Table 17 increase incrementally from question to question, moving from a moderate involvement by the city manager (3.0) on Q41 to a high involvement by the city manager (4.0) on the last question, Q46. The questions are arranged on the survey from specific political issues facing elected officials to the broader issues concerning the future of the city (future trends, strategies for future development). The frequency with which the city manager works with the mayor increases as the strategic mission issues move from the more specific to the broader and more strategic in scope. Another way of stating this trend is that the frequency of city manager involvement increases as the issues move from the more immediate political decisions to the longer-

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ranged less political decisions. Overall, the average mean score across all six mission issues is moderate to high (3.66) indicating strong managerial role involvement. The standard deviations in Table 17 are higher than in Tables 11 through 14, but again the number of observations is also high with greater dispersion around the mean for each question response. However, as in Table 16, the standard deviations range from .90 to 1.22, which would indicate very little variation from a standard deviation of one, characteristic of a standard normal distribution.

Summary of Descriptive Data and Survey Indexes

Overall, mean values for council/mayor responses across the four role zones of mission, policy, administration, and management indicate a traditional role orientation. However, the manager role self-assessment scores are moderate to high across all four role zones. The mean scores indicate a lower level of incursion by council/mayor into the managerial role realm but a high degree of incursion by the manager into mission and policy role zones.

In reviewing the mean score indexes for council members, mayor, and manager by type of electoral system, the following observations are made. District council members rated themselves higher in administration than their counterparts in at-large or mixed cities. Managers from mixed electoral system cities rated themselves higher in mission role involvement than their counterparts. Mayors from district cities rated themselves lower in administration compared to their counterparts and mayors from mixed cities rated themselves much higher in the administrative role area.

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Regarding the actual and perceived role of the city manager in policy, community, leadership, and acting as an informational broker, the following conclusions are drawn from the data. All respondents rated the role of the city manager in policy making as high. The manager's involvement in community leadership overall was rated moderate (average mean value of 3.16). The actual and perceived role of the city manager as an informational broker was rated moderate to high (average mean value of 3.68).

The mean indexes for the manager's involvement in working with the mayor on strategic mission issues indicate a strong managerial role involvement of moderate to high (average value of 3.66). The mean index values indicate that the frequency of city manager involvement increases as the strategic issues move from the more immediate political decisions to the longer-ranged less political decisions.

One of the most interesting findings in the descriptive data is the higher involvement of district council members in the role of administration. This finding is consistent with the literature review that reports a much higher interaction between council member and department heads in matters of administration after conversion of a city to a district electoral system. The data infer a level of role duality that is occurring in district cities in the traditional role realm of the city manager between council and manager. Although not specifically tested in the multivariate regression analyses, the data provide directional understanding to role areas in which districting may be reducing role dichotomy.

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Section C: Multivariate Regression Analysis

This section provides the results of the multivariate regression analyses using the independent and dependent variables defined in Chapter Three of this dissertation. There are a series of three regression tests of the data presented. Each statistical analysis is in support of each of the three hypotheses presented in the research design.

Prior to presenting the results of the multivariate regression analysis, it is important to discuss certain factors regarding the use of the independent dependent variables.

The survey results demonstrated the need to remove two of the independent control variables from the research design. First, the length of time between conversion from at-large to district and at-large to mixed electoral systems was removed from the model. This is listed as the fourth independent variable shown previously in Table 2. Only 30% of the respondents chose to provide this information, and in many cases respondents indicated that their information was an approximation. This particular independent control variable becomes highly unreliable in any regression model as a means to protect the data results in terms of construct validity. Second, only eight of the 105 cities or 8% were categorized as having partisan city elections. It was hoped that the type of political system used by the city would be a good independent control variable and might reveal that strength of party organization influenced the role of city manager, council, and mayor. However, the extremely low number of cities having a strong party system made the use of this data highly unreliable in any regression model. The fifth independent variable in Table 2, partisan versus nonpartisan form of election, was removed.

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In Chapter Three, the dependent variables were defined. The first of these, listed previously in Table 1, is the degree of difference or dichotomy in role involvement when comparing the roles of the city manager, mayor, and council in the role zones of mission and policy as opposed to the role zones of administration and management. This dependent variable is coded DIFF. As was discussed in Chapter Three, the value for DIFF is the delta value of the difference between the mean value for policy and mission role involvement scores combined (POM) and the mean value for administration and management role scores combined (MAD). As an introduction to the discussion of the first series of multivariate regression tests, the descriptive data for dependent variable DIFF by respondent position and type of electoral system are displayed in Table 18. Although presented here as a way to illustrate visually how the dependent variable DIFF was calculated, the data in the table provide little understanding as to the significance of delta value differences. It is noted that the delta for managers from district cities when comparing mean responses for POM and MAD is the smallest (.3084) among all types of respondents.

Table 18.

Analyses of Descriptive Data—Dependent Variable

Role Dichotomy (By Position and Electoral System)

	Manager	Council	Mayor
District	.3084	.9302	1.0406
At-Large	.4582	.9026	.8647
Mixed	.4261	1.0723	.5585

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Relationship of Electoral System to Role Dichotomy—Regression Model One

The first multivariate regression test involves the dependent variable "Role Dichotomy." For this particular test, the responses of manager, council, and mayor regarding the extent of their role involvement in mission, policy, administration, and management are treated as independent variables along with the other independent variables previously defined in Chapter Three. Three separate regression test runs were performed, each one corresponding to each of the three types of electoral systems, at-large, mixed, and district. The results of the regression analyses are contained in Tables 19, 20, and 21. Data from each of the three tests can be compared to determine the effect of the independent variable, type of electoral system, on the degree of role dichotomy among manager, council, and mayor. For the purpose of this exercise, each regression analysis included data for the cities only using a particular type of electoral system (e.g., all at-large cities grouped together, all mixed cities grouped together, etc.)

Multiple coefficient of determination (R^2).

Typically, a standard approach to a regression test would be to see how powerful an explanation (or prediction) the regression model being tested provides. In other words, how well do all the independent variables taken together account for variations in the dependent variable? The closer the regression line to the points, the better the regression equation fits the data, and the more linear the relationship. The multiple coefficient of determination (R^2) gives the determination of the goodness of fit of a model (Lewis-Beck, 1990). But here, three separate regression analysis test runs are conducted, each isolated by type of electoral system. Therefore, the goodness of fit as reflected by the value of R^2

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within each regression test is not examined as a part of the predictive power of this regression model. Instead, comparisons are made of the statistical significance of certain independent variables affecting the dependent variable DIFF within each electoral system environment. For the purpose of this regression test series, the value of R^2 and the F-value that provides a statistical analysis for the multiple regression coefficient will not be examined, but will be discussed in regression models two and three of this chapter.

In this regression series, the independent variable, manager is held constant. The bottom portion of Tables 19, 20, and 21 isolate the significance of each of the independent variables in the equation in terms of the contribution each one makes to the regression model. In reviewing these independent variables, the examination will focus on the parameter estimate or β value, the t value, and the significance test for the t value.

Parameter estimate (β).

The parameter estimate (β) is the slope of the regression line. The slope gives the rate of change of the Y value (dependent variable) as X (independent variable) increases. Linear functions are characterized by the fact that a one unit increase in X corresponds to a change in β units in Y, no matter what the value of X. The larger the absolute value of β, the steeper the line (Agresti & Finlay, 1986). When $\beta = 0$ (null hypothesis) or $\beta = 0$ (alternative hypothesis), a confidence interval can be constructed around the slope estimate, β. Using a 95% two-tailed confidence interval, if the value of zero does not fall within this interval, the null hypothesis can be rejected and the alternative hypothesis accepted with 95% confidence. The slope estimate, β, is significantly different from zero at the .05 level. A two-tailed test provides that the hypothesis regarding the effect of X on

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Y is nondirectional. The alternative hypothesis remains true if β is either negative or positive (Lewis-Beck, 1990).

The one-tailed test is directional in nature indicating either a positive or negative slope but not providing statistical confidence intervals in either direction. The two-tailed confidence interval is more likely to capture zero, as statistical significance is easier to establish with a one-tailed interval (Lewis-Beck, 1990).

Two-tailed and one-tailed confidence intervals.

To conduct a two-tailed or one-tailed confidence interval test, a t ratio is calculated by dividing the β (parameter estimate) by the standard error of the slope, indicated in Tables 20, 21, and 22 as SE β. This equation produces the t value. If the t value is 1.96 or higher, the slope estimate β is significantly different from zero at the .05 level (95% confidence), for a two-tailed interval. If the t value is 1.64 or higher, the slope estimate β is significantly different from zero at the .05 level for a one-tailed interval. A two-tailed 95% confidence interval is the stronger test of slope significance.

To determine the degree of significance for this t ratio, a probability or P value is calculated. This is reflected in Tables 20, 21, and 22 as Sig T, and reports the degree of significance for the slope estimate. The P-value is defined to be the probability that the test statistic would occur if the null hypothesis were true. The desired P-values in social science testing are .01 (99%), .05 (95%), and .001 (99.9%). If the attained significance level of the test is .01, it can be said that there is only a 1% chance that the null hypothesis is true, thus providing 99% confidence regarding the significance of the test (Agresti & Finlay, 1986).

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Data results—regression model one.

Turning to the test results in Table 19, the independent variables, mayor and council are the only two variables that have slopes that are statistically significant. Both have t values exceeding 1.96 and the attained significance level is .001 (rounded up) with 99.9% confidence. The responses regarding role orientation of the mayor and council in at-large cities are statistically significant in how they affect the dependent variable DIFF when compared to the responses of the manager regarding role orientation. Another way to state this is that the change in the dependent variable DIFF is statistically significant for every unit increase in X when the independent variable manager is held constant.

In reviewing the results in Tables 20 and 21, it is noted that the independent variable council has a slope statistically significant at a two-tailed confidence interval with a significance level of .001 (rounded up) or 99.9%. Table 21 shows both variables for mayor and council to have slopes significant at a two-tailed confidence interval. The attained significance level for mayor is .05 (rounded up) or 95% and for council it is .001 (rounded up) or 99.9% confidence. Table 20 is the regression analysis results for mixed electoral system cities, and Table 21 contains the results for district cities.

Comparing the results for the independent variables mayor and council across all three electoral systems provides the following observations. With the exception of the independent variable "mayor," for Table 20 (mixed cities) which does not have a statistically significant slope, the β and t values for council and mayor decrease in degree of significance as the results move from at-large cities to mixed to district cities. The β value for mayor and council in at-large cities reflects a much steeper slope than the

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corresponding β values for mayor and council in district cities. The t values are higher for mayor and council in at-large cities than the corresponding t values for mayor and council in district cities.

Table 19.

Relationship of Electoral System to Role Dichotomy (At-Large)

Multiple R	0.549
R^2	0.302
Adjusted R^2	0.245
Analysis of Variance	
Regression	df = 8
Residual	98
Total	106

F = 5.290 Signif F = .0001

Variable	B	SEB	Beta	T	Sig T
(Constant)	.718	.537		1.336	.185
Population	-2.734 E -04	.000	-.131	-1.458	.148
Mayor	.845	.173	.511	4.874*	.000
Council	.710	.128	.588	5.555*	.000
Midwest	-.752	.533	-.510	-1.410	.162
West	-.599	.519	-.520	-1.153	.252
South	-.612	.522	-.503	-1.173	.244
Diversity	5.956 E-03	.004	.141	1.434	.155
Position Tenure	9.983 E-04	.001	.100	1.115	.268

Constant = Manager
* Statistically significant variables

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The change in the dependent variable DIFF is greater in at-large cities than mixed or district cities for the variable council (for every unit increase in X). The change in the dependent variable DIFF is greater in at-large cities than district cities for the variable mayor (for every unit increase in X). The conclusion can be made that the mayor and council in at-large cities see a greater difference in their roles as compared to the city manager than their counterparts in district cities. The degree of role dichotomy in district cities among manager, mayor, and council is less than in at-large cities. Correspondingly, the degree of role duality is greater in district cities as opposed to at-large cities.

To make a last observation regarding the test results in this first regression model series, there is one significant inverse relationship between independent variable "Position Tenure" and the dependent variable DIFF. In district cities, the variable "Position Tenure" has a significant negative slope, with a two-tailed confidence interval, significant at the .01 (rounded up) level or 99% confidence. The results show that the longer the job tenure for a respondent, the less important becomes the degree of difference in role orientation between mission/policy and administration/management.

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Table 20.

Relationship of Electoral System to Role Dichotomy (Mixed)

Multiple R	0.584
R^2	0.341
Adjusted R^2	0.259
Analysis of Variance	
Regression	df = 8
Residual	65
Total	93

F = 4.196 Signif F = .000

Variable	B	SEB	Beta	T	Sig T
(Constant)	.744	.288		2.582	.012
Population	8.661 E-04	.001	.153	1.4808	.144
Mayor	.139	.235	.058	.590	.557
Council	.664	.137	.552	4.846*	.000
Midwest	-.460	.241	-.354	-1.906*	.061
West	-.186	.248	-.127	-.748	.457
South	-.384	.239	-.345	-1.607	.113
Diversity	-2.099 E-03	.005	-.055	-.437	.664
Position Tenure	-1.776 E-03	.001	-.175	-1.596	.115

Constant = Manager

* Statistically significant variables

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Table 21.

Relationship of Electoral System to Role Dichotomy (District)

Multiple R	0.489
R^2	0.239
Adjusted R^2	0.184
Analysis of Variance	
Regression	df = 8
Residual	111
Total	119

F = 4.361 Signif F = .000

Variable	B	SEB	Beta	T	Sig T
(Constant)	.645	.323		1.999	.048
Population	-3.952 E-04	.001	-.066	-.782	.436
Mayor	.328	.134	.246	2.452*	.016
Council	.365	.101	.363	3.610*	.000
Midwest	-6.431 E-02	.306	-.030	-.210	.834
West	2.158 E-02	.258	.021	.084	.933
South	.119	.251	.108	.472	.638
Diversity	2.610 E-03	.004	.072	.678	.499
Position Tenure	-2.628 E-03	.001	-.266	-3.067*	.003

Constant = Manager
* Statistically significant variables

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Relationship of Electoral System to

City Manager Role—Regression Model Two

The second regression model is a series of three multivariate regression test runs, examining the effect of independent variables on the following dependent variables: (a) the actual and perceived role of the city manager in policy initiation (coded PI); (b) the actual and perceived role of the city manager in community leadership (coded CL); and (c) the actual and perceived role of the city manager as an informational broker (coded IB). For this series of tests, the responses of manager, council and mayor are isolated as separate independent variables and coded "manager," "council," and "mayor." They are placed into the regression equation along with the other independent variables defined in Chapter Three. For all three test runs, independent variable "district" is held constant, to compare the strength of the association among the independent variables corresponding to type of electoral system. The independent variable "mayor" is held constant to compare the independent variable "council" in strength of association to the independent variable "mayor," and determine degrees of difference in how council members differ from mayors in their perceptions of the city manager role.

The results of the multivariate regression analysis test run for the dependent variable "Policy Initiation" (PI) are contained in Table 22. Both the R^2 value and Adjusted R^2 value are very low. The Adjusted R^2 accounts for insignificant variables in the equation. The value indicates that taken all together collectively, the independent variables only account for or explain 3% of the variance in the dependent variable PI.

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This means that collectively, the independent variables as a whole are not a good prediction or explanation of the variance in the city manager's role as policy initiator.

F distribution.

However, to determine if the dependent variable is statistically independent of all the independent variables (the null hypothesis), a test can be preformed to see if at least one of the independent variables is related to the dependent variable. The F distribution is used for this test. The value of F is computed by using the value of R^2 divided by the number of degrees of freedom as the numerator and one minus R^2 divided by the number of observations minus the degrees of freedom plus one as the denominator. Relatively large values of F represent strong evidence against the null hypothesis. Associated with the F value is a P value that represents the probability of obtaining an F value at least as large as the observed one if the null hypothesis were true (Agresti & Finlay, 1986).

Table 22 displays an F value of 2.167 associated with this regression equation and a P value (Signif F) of .024. Rounding up the significance level to .05, it can be said with 95% confidence that the null hypothesis that all independent variables are unrelated to the dependent variable PI is not true and can be rejected.

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Table 22.

Relationship of Electoral System to City Manager Role (Policy Initiator)

Multiple R	0.238
R^2	0.057
Adjusted R^2	0.030
Analysis of Variance	
Regression	df = 9
Residual	325
Total	334

F = 2.167 Signif F = .024

Variable	B	SEB	Beta	T	Sig T
(Constant)	3.900	.171		22.749	.000
Position Tenure	4.090 E-04	.001	.028	.506	.613
Population	-3.465 E-04	.000	-.081	-1.405	.161
Diversity	1.431 E-03	.003	.025	.454	.650
At-Large	.131	.115	.082	1.137	.256
Mixed	-3.528 E-02	.128	-.056	-.276	.782
Council	-9.023 E-02	.126	-.056	-.717	.474
Manager	.517	.231	.277	2.236*	.026
Inter 4	-.221	.266	-.076	-.830	.407
Inter 5	-.430	.259	-.159	-1.661*	.098

Constant = District, Mayor
* Statistically significant variables

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Data results—dependent variable policy initiation (PI).

As shown in Table 22, there are two independent variables that are statistically significant in their relationship to the dependent variable PI, controlling for all other variables of interest. The variable "manager" has a slope that is significant at a two-tailed confidence interval with a significance level of .05 (rounded up) or 95%. The change in the dependent variable PI is greater for the variable "manager" than either variable "council" or "mayor" (for every unit increase of X). However, there is no significant difference in the effect on the dependent variable PI when comparing the strength of the association for the variables "council" and "mayor" (held constant).

The second statistically significant independent variable in terms of the relationship to the dependent variable PI is "Inter 5." This is an intervening variable and as defined in Chapter Three, consists of all responses from city managers in at-large cities only. This is an inverse relationship as shown in Table 22. The negative slope indicates that as the number of responses from at-large city managers increases in the equation (value of X), the dependent variable Y decreases. The negative slope for "Inter 5" is statistically significant at a one-tailed confidence interval with a significance level of .10 (rounded up) or 90% confidence. This is a weak association given that it is significant only at the one-tailed confidence interval and the P value for significance is 90% instead of the.01, .05, or .001 significance levels desired in most social science research. The P value gives the probability that the t value as large as the observed one would occur if the null hypothesis were true. That probability is indicated as only 10%. The slope of "Inter 5" is

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statistically significant as it relates to the dependent variable but the association is not strong.

To conclude the findings in this table, it can be said that council members do not differ significantly from mayors in their assessment of the manager's policy making role, but managers differ significantly from both the council and mayor in their rating of their role as policy initiators. There was no significant difference among the independent variables corresponding to types of electoral systems in how they affected the dependent variable PI. However, given the significant negative slope of "Inter 5," it can be said that the value of the dependent variable PI decreases as the number of responses from at-large managers increases. This means the overall assessment of the city manager by respondents as a policy initiator decreases as "Inter 5" increases. It can be said that managers in district cities rate themselves higher as policy initiators than their counterparts in at-large cities. The inverse relationship between at-large city manager responses on the policy role compared to total respondent evaluation of that managerial policy role is a significant finding for this study.

Data results—dependent variable community leadership (CL).

Table 23 contains the results of the second regression test run in this series, assessing the effect of the independent variables on the dependent variable CL (community leadership). The low Adjusted R^2 value indicates that taken together, the independent variables combined do not explain well the variance in the dependent variable which is the actual and perceived role of the city manager as a community leader. The F value is not large but the significance level for F is close to the .05 level of

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confidence indicating that at least one independent variable has a significant statistical impact on dependent variable CL.

Table 23.

Relationship of Electoral System to City Manager Role (Community Leadership)

Multiple R	0.222
R^2	0.049
Adjusted R^2	0.023
Analysis of Variance	
Regression	df = 9
Residual	324
Total	333

F = 1.860 Signif F = .057

Variable	B	SEB	Beta	T	Sig T
(Constant)	3.152	.230		13.715	.000
Position Tenure	-1.101 E-03	.001	-.057	-1.011	.313
Population	-2.975 E-04	.000	-.053	-.903	.367
Diversity	-5.705 E-03	.004	-.076	-1.358	.175
At-Large	.268	.154	.127	1.746*	.082
Mixed	.529	.172	.218	3.080*	.002
Council	1.962 E-02	.169	.009	.116	.908
Manager	-9.410 E-02	.310	-.038	-.304	.761
Inter 4	.657	.356	.169	1.847*	.066
Inter 5	.165	.346	.046	.478	.633

Constant = District, Mayor
*Statistically significant variables

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In reviewing the isolation of each of the independent variables, controlling for all other variables, there are three independent variables that have significant relationships with the dependent variable. The slope for the variable "At-Large" is statistically significant at the one-tailed confidence interval with a significance level of .10 (rounded up) or 90%. This is not a strong relationship but does indicate that respondents from at-large cities tend to rate the manager higher in community leadership than respondents in district cities. The slope for the variable "Mixed" is statistically significant at a two-tailed confidence interval with a significance level of .01 (rounded up) or 99%. This is a very strong relationship and indicates that respondents in mixed electoral system cities rate the manager higher in community leadership than those respondents in at-large and district (constant variable) cities. The variable "Inter 4" is an intervening varable and as defined in Chapter Three represents the responses from all district city managers. The slope for this variable is significant at a one-tailed confidence interval with a significance level of .10 (rounded up) or 90%. Although not a strong relationship, it shows that managers in district cities rate themselves higher in community leadership than managers in at-large cities.

Data results—dependent variable information broker (IB).

Table 24 contains the results of the third regression test run in this series assessing the impact of the independent variables on the dependent variable IB (manager's role as informational broker). The Adjusted R^2 value again is very low indicating a similar effect of all independent variables acting together in relationship to the dependent variable as was found in Tables 23 and 24. The F value and its significance level of .01 (rounded up)

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indicates a fairly strong refutation of the null hypothesis that no independent variables were significant in association with the dependent variable IB. There are two independent variables with significant relationships with the dependent variable. The variable "Population" has a negative slope significant at a one-tailed confidence interval with a significance level of .10 (rounded up) or 90%. This is an inverse relationship that is not strong, but it indicates that as the city population increases, the perception of the city manager as an information broker decreases in importance. The variable "Manager" has a slope that is significant at a one-tailed confidence interval with a significance level of .10 (rounded up) or 90%. Again, although not a strong relationship, the data indicate that city managers as a whole rate themselves higher as information brokers than do mayors (constant variable) or council members.

In reviewing the variables "Inter 4" and "Inter 5," there is no significant difference in how managers from district and at-large cities rate themselves in the role of informational broker.

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Table 24.

Relationship of Electoral System to City Manager Role (Informational Broker)

Multiple R	0.267
R^2	0.071
Adjusted R^2	0.045
Analysis of Variance	
Regression	df = 9
Residual	323
Total	332

F = 2.157 Signif F = .004

Variable	B	SEB	Beta	T	Sig T
(Constant)	3.914	.174		22.495	.000
Position Tenure	9.927 E-04	.001	.067	1.210	.227
Population	-4.168 E-04	.000	-.096	-1.672*	.095
Diversity	1.523 E-03	.003	.027	.478	.633
At-Large	.137	.117	.085	1.179	.239
Mixed	-.109	.140	-.059	-.842	.400
Council	-.145	.128	-.088	-1.136	.257
Manager	.422	.234	.222	1.799*	.073
Inter 4	-.106	.269	-.036	-.394	.694
Inter 5	-.364	.262	-.133	-1.391	.165

Constant = District, Mayor
*Statistically significant variables

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Relationship of Electoral System to City Manager

Role Interaction with Mayor—Regression Model Three.

This regression test series is related to the dependent variable defined in Chapter Three as the frequency with which the city manager works with the mayor on strategic city mission issues. This dependent variable is coded MMM. For the purpose of this regression test run, the independent variables "Manager," "Mayor," and "Council" are not used since the respondents here are all city managers (Section IV of the survey instrument found in Appendix B). The variable "District" is held constant to compare managerial responses across all three types of electoral systems.

The results of this multivariate regression test are found in Table 25. The data indicate no significant relationship between any of the independent variables in the equation and the dependent variable MMM. Overall, the R^2 value indicates that the regression model can only predict about 4% of the variance in the dependent variable when all independent variables re combined. The Adjusted R^2 value is a negative value after considering variables in the equation that are insignificant. The F value is very small and the significance level at .745 would indicate that there is little statistical confidence that the null hypothesis (all independent variables unrelated to the dependent variable) can be rejected. Of course, the regression equation indicates that the null hypothesis in this case is true.

The data would indicate that there is no significant difference in how city managers perceive their role of working strategic city mission issues with the mayor when comparing role orientation across electoral system type (district, mixed, at-large).

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Table 25.

Relationship of Electoral System to City Manager Role Interaction with Mayor (Strategic Mission Issues)

Multiple R	0.196
R^2	0.038
Adjusted R^2	-0.032
Analysis of Variance	
Regression	df = 5
Residual	68
Total	73

F = .541 Signif F = .745

Variable	B	SEB	Beta	T	Sig T
(Constant)	3.590	.417		8.615	.000
Diversity	2.285 E-03	.008	.036	.282	.779
Mixed	-5.246 E-02	.290	-0.25	-.181	.857
At-Large	-8.873 E-02	.276	-.048	-.321	.749
Position Tenure	-1.163 E-03	.002	-.091	-.725	.471
Population	6.498 E-04	.001	.132	1.031	.306

Constant = District

Section D: Summary of Data Results

Confirmation of Hypotheses

A summary of the results of the three regression models is provided in Table 26 in terms of how strongly the data results confirm the three hypotheses in this dissertation. A

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more detailed discussion of the regression test results in terms of confirming or failing to confirm the hypotheses follows in Chapter Five.

The first hypothesis is strongly confirmed. The dichotomy in role comparison between council and manager becomes greater as the data results are reviewed moving from district cities to mixed electoral system cities to at-large cities. The results of the three regression test runs are statistically strong with slopes significant at a two-tailed confidence interval and Sig T confidence levels at 99%. It can be concluded that the degree of role dichotomy between mayor/council and manager decreases as districting increases.

The second hypothesis is not confirmed. The type of electoral system used to elect the city council has no influence on how city managers perceive their role in working strategic city mission issues with the mayor.

The third hypothesis is partially confirmed for two reasons. First, managers in district cities perceived their role as policy initiators and community leaders to be stronger when compared to managers in at-large cities. However, all respondents in at-large and mixed electoral system cities rated the manager stronger in community leadership than respondents in district cities. The hypothesis states that the manager's role in policy, community leadership, and informational brokering as perceived by all respondents is stronger in district cities than at-large or mixed cities. In the case of community leadership, the hypothesis was only confirmed in part. Second, the type of electoral system made no difference in how strongly the manager is perceived as an informational broker.

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The strength of partial confirmation for the third hypothesis is directional in nature. The higher involvement by district managers in policy and community leadership when compared to at-large managers is statistically significant at a one-tailed confidence interval with a significance level of 90% confidence.

Table 26.

Summary of Data Results—Confirmation of Hypotheses

	Hypothesis Confirmed	Strength of Confirmation
H1	Yes	Strong
H2	No	
H3	Partial Confirmation	
Policy	Yes	Directional
Community Leadership	Yes	Directional
Information Broker	No	

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CHAPTER FIVE

CONCLUSIONS, IMPLICATIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This dissertation has analyzed a basic problem facing council-manager forms of government today. The increasing independent role of the city manager in council-manager government, combined with weak council leadership has created an increasing political leadership role for the city manager. The political role of the manager exacerbates role conflict with the council, creating new pressures for the manager. The manager turns to political rationality, supplanting technical rationality as a means for survival. But the exercise of political rationality as a way to cope with role conflict only creates a role legitimacy problem for the manager. The fundamental question becomes how to maintain accountability of the city manager to elected officials and democratic values.

As was discussed in Chapter Two, Deising's (1962) political rationality model effectively clarifies how city managers react to role conflict with elected officials. The manager acts as informational broker, balancing sources of pressure against each other. As a community leader, the manager assumes a social engineering role to initiate policy in the name of the greater public interest. The manager develops an independent political constituency that unifies different community groups, and enables managerial initiatives to be funneled through community groups to the council. Finally, the manager distributes

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power both internally to staff and externally to citizenry to strengthen the managerial mediator role, balancing pressures against each other.

Increasing role conflict between council and manager leads to the manager's increasing reliance on political rationality as a way to ameliorate role pressures. This use of political rationality strengthens an already prominent political role for the city manager leading to a crisis in role legitimacy.

As was presented in Chapter One, Nalbandian (1991) developed a model to counter this problem with legitimacy that centered on the manager extending his or her concept of professionalism beyond efficiency to embrace community values. If the manager correctly interprets, and correctly includes the values of the community in policy initiatives to the council, then political anchors are created in the community that provide legitimacy to the system. If the city manager and the administrative government no longer are grounded in the democratic legitimacy of the council, Nalbandian (1991) observes that they are becoming rooted in the community as the direct source of legitimacy.

But what Nalbandian has presented is still a model, an ideal, and not a proven mechanism for change. This dissertation through the research questions and corresponding hypotheses examined an electoral context for the council-manager form of government. This new electoral context for cities is the combination of the city manager with a council elected by district versus at-large electoral systems. The purpose of this dissertation is to evaluate how this electoral context can change roles, responsibilities, and relationships among council, the manager, and mayor.

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This chapter will evaluate the data results in Chapter Four in terms of how they confirm or fail to confirm the three hypotheses presented in Chapter Three. From a more long range perspective, the results will be interpreted in terms of what they portray regarding role conflict between council and manager and managerial role legitimacy. Much of this discussion will use the data to make characterizations of types of electoral systems in how they affect role conflict and ultimately role legitimacy. The data results also have implications regarding the creation of political linkages through districting. It is not the intent of this dissertation to use the data to confirm the presence of political linkages within cities that use district systems. Nor is it intended to confirm that these political linkages, as described in Chapter Two, assist in smoothing out role conflict. That would be the subject of another study. However, the data do provide some directional clues regarding political linkages that will be discussed.

Finally, this chapter will discuss the long range implications of the data results in terms of role conflict between council and manager and managerial role legitimacy. Recommendations will then be summarized at the end of this chapter.

Data Results and Hypotheses

Relationship of Electoral System to Role Dichotomy

Using the model developed by Dr. James Svara presented in Chapters One and Three, this dissertation examined how electoral systems used to elect the council (district, at-large, mixed) affected the degree of dichotomy and duality in the division of roles between council and manager.

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The basic research question being addressed here is the effect of electoral systems on the roles, responsibilities, and relationships among the city manager and city council. The discussion in the literature review cited the greater involvement of the council in policy formulation and administration after districting. The discussion also concluded that the manager had a greater role in policy development because of the increased challenges in consensus building among district oriented council members. Greater constituency preoccupation on the part of the council increased the manager's time spent in mission oriented planning with the mayor.

The first hypothesis as presented in Chapter Three was framed as follows:

HYPOTHESIS #1: In council-manager cities where the council is elected by district, the degree of dichotomy in roles and responsibilities between council and manager comparing mission and policy (the realm of the council) and administration and management (the realm of the manager) is less than in cities using at-large or mixed electoral systems.

The research design used a dependent variable (coded DIFF), which measured the degree of difference or dichotomy in role involvement when comparing council/mayor to manager. The value for DIFF is the delta value of the difference between the mean value for policy and mission role involvement scores combined (POM), and the mean value for administration and management role scores combined (MAD).

Three separate regression test runs were made, each using the respondent scores in each of the three types of electoral systems (district, at-large, mixed). The data results as presented in Chapter Four demonstrated that the change in the dependent variable DIFF is

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greater in at-large cities than mixed or district cities for the independent variable council. Council members in at-large cities saw a greater degree of difference in their roles when compared to the manager as opposed to district cities. This dichotomy in role comparison between council and manager becomes greater as the data results are reviewed moving from district cities to mixed electoral system cities to at-large cities. For mayors, the degree of dichotomy in role responses when compared to the manager is greater in at-large cities as opposed to district cities. The results of the three regression test runs are statistically strong for the responses from council and mayor as compared to the manager with slopes significant at a two-tailed confidence interval, and Sig T confidence levels at 99%.

From the above, it can be concluded that as cities increase the use of districting to elect council members, the degree of role dichotomy among mayor, council, and manager decreases significantly. The first hypothesis as presented in this dissertation is strongly confirmed.

Relationship of Electoral System to City Manager Role Interaction with Mayor

This dissertation presented the second research question as to what effect the type of electoral system used to elect the council had on the role relationship between manager and mayor in the area of mission strategic planning. As was discussed in the literature review, the Dallas and Phoenix city managers observed a preoccupation of the council members with constituency issues after districting. This reduced council long range orientation and elevated the city manager into a closer partnership with the mayor on

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strategic mission oriented issues. The second hypothesis as presented in Chapter Three is restated here:

HYPOTHESIS #2: In council-manager cities where the council is elected by district, the frequency with which the manager works with the mayor on strategic urban mission issues is higher than in cities using an at-large or mixed electoral system.

The research design for this dissertation defined a dependent variable that measured the frequency with which the city manager works with the mayor on strategic city mission issues. This dependent variable is coded MMM and represents only managerial responses. The data were derived from Section IV of the survey instrument (Appendix B), where managers were asked to rate themselves in mission planning with the mayor.

The data results from the multivariate regression test run, as presented in Chapter Four, indicated that there was no significant relationship between electoral system type and how city managers perceive their role of working strategic city mission issues with the mayor. The regression test results were strongly in support of the null hypothesis, with only a 25% confidence level that the null hypothesis could be rejected. From this it can be said that the second hypothesis as presented in this dissertation is rejected and the null hypothesis is confirmed.

Relationship of Electoral System to City Manager Role

The third research question posed by this dissertation asked what effect district electoral systems have on the role of the city manager as a policy initiator, community leader, and informational broker.

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The literature review in Chapter Two discussed the concept of political linkages. In cities where the council is elected by district, new political linkages are forged as a result of increased council demands for information to meet constituency demands. These new political linkages integrate the city manager and council, department heads and council, and department heads and neighborhood associations in a much tighter communication link that before. Greater involvement by the council in constituency concerns increases the manager's role in policy initiation, community leadership, and consensus building as an informational broker.

The third hypothesis as presented in Chapter Three is restated here:

HYPOTHESIS #3: In council-manager cities where the council is elected by district, the role of the city manager as perceived by council, mayor, and the manager in policy formulation, community leadership, and informational brokering is stronger than in those cities using an at-large or mixed electoral system.

The second regression model as presented in Chapter Four tested this hypothesis. Respondent answers to section III of the survey instrument (Appendix B) assessed the role of the city manager in policy making, community leadership, and informational brokering. All officials were asked to make this assessment including the city manager's own role assessment. The questions are summarized in Table 4 in Chapter Three. Three separate regression test runs were conducted with each dependent variable coded as follows: PI - policy initiation, CL - community leadership, and IB - informational broker. Test results are outlined in detail in Chapter Four, but are summarized in this chapter in Table 27 for discussion purposes. The table is constructed with the dependent variables

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PI, CL, and IB across the top with the t scores and significance levels that correspond to the slope β. The independent variables are listed down the side of the table, with Inter 4 being all district manager responses and Inter 5 being all at-large manager responses.

Table 27.

Summary Data Results—Regression Model Two—Relationship of Electoral System to City Manager Role

	PI		CL		IB	
	T	Sig T	T	Sig T	T	Sig T
At-Large	1.137	.256	1.746	.082	1.179	.239
Mixed	-.276	.782	3.080	.002	-.842	.400
Council	-.717	.474	.116	.908	-1.136	.257
Manager	2.236	.026	-.304	.761	1.799	.073
Inter 4	-.830	.407	1.847	.066	-.394	.694
Inter 5	-1.661	.098	.478	.633	-1.391	.165

In reviewing the results for the dependent variable "policy initiation," it can be concluded that council members do not differ from mayors in their assessment of the manager's policy making role, but managers differ significantly in their own assessment of their policy role. They rate themselves higher overall in this area than both council members and mayors. As was described in Chapter Four, this finding is a strong statistical relationship at a two-tailed confidence interval with a significance level of 95% confidence. The inverse relationship for "at-large managers" indicates that managers from district cities rate themselves higher in policy initiation than do their counterparts in at-

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large cities. This is not a strong relationship, statistically significant at a one-tailed confidence interval with a significance level of 90% confidence. However, it does confirm in a directional fashion the hypothesis.

Regarding the results for the dependent variable "community leadership," both respondents from at-large and mixed electoral system cities rated the manager higher in community leadership than their counterparts in district cities. This finding is very strong statistically for respondents from mixed electoral system cities. They rated the manager higher in community leadership than respondents from either at-large or district cities. The relationship for at-large cities is not statistically strong but is significant. As indicated in Table 27, the independent variable "district managers" shows a statistically significant relationship, although not a strong one, indicating that district managers rated themselves higher in community leadership than did at-large managers. Although the perception of the manager in at-large and mixed cities as a community leader is higher than in district cities, district managers saw themselves more involved in community leadership than at-large managers. This also confirms the hypothesis.

In reviewing the results for the dependent variable "information broker," the only statistically significant relationship is for the independent variable "manager." Although not a strong relationship, managers as a whole rated themselves higher in informational brokering than did either council members or the mayor. There was no significant difference in how district and at-large managers rated themselves as informational brokers. In this regard the hypothesis is not confirmed.

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To conclude these findings, it can be said that the third hypothesis is confirmed in terms of managers in district cities having a stronger role in policy formulation and community leadership than in at-large cities. The findings do not support this conclusion for the managerial role of informational broker. Nor do the findings support the premise in the third hypothesis that all respondents in district cities rated the manager higher in policy initiation, community leadership, and as an informational broker. This hypothesis then is partially confirmed.

Analysis of Data Results in Terms of Electoral Systems and Political Linkages

The three research questions and corresponding hypotheses tested three parts of the Svara dichotomy/duality model, in terms of the effects of districting on the manager's role. The first hypothesis addressed the manager/council role relationship in terms of degree of role dichotomy or duality. The second hypothesis addressed the managerial role in terms of mission involvement. The third hypothesis isolated the role zone of policy, examining the effect of districting on the manager's involvement in policy initiation, community leadership, and acting as informational broker. The extent to which the three hypotheses were confirmed was previously discussed.

This section provides a discussion on how the data results can provide new insights into the direct relationship between the type of electoral system used to elect the city council and the role of the city manager. It also discusses what the data results imply regarding the creation of political linkages between all urban centers of power in cities that elect their councils by district.

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Electoral Systems

The Svara model.

The significant finding regarding the data results in this dissertation is the proportional decrease in role dichotomy between council and manager as districting increases. This dissertation made no attempt to measure the extent to which the role dichotomy diminished in each role zone of mission, policy, administration, and management, isolating each role zone independently. Nor was any attempt made to measure encroachment or duality isolating each role zone independently. However, if role dichotomy between manager, council and mayor decreases as districting increases, then role duality is occurring. Managers are encroaching into mission and policy, and council/mayor are encroaching into administration and management. The degree of encroachment by the manager into the council realm of mission and policy was measured in hypotheses two and three. The implication of the decrease in role dichotomy as districting increases will be further explored later in this chapter. The encroachment of the manager into mission and policy as measured by the data results offers several insights.

Manager role—policy initiation, information brokering, community leadership.

Overall, managers rated themselves higher in policy initiation and informational brokering than other respondents, regardless of type of electoral system used to elect the council. But managers overall did not significantly rate themselves higher in community leadership than other respondents. The type of electoral system used in a city made a difference significantly in the areas of policy initiation and community leadership but not in the area of informational brokering. District managers saw their involvement in policy

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initiation and community leadership significantly higher than their counterparts in at-large cities.

Manager role—informational broker.

An interesting finding in this dissertation is provided in the regression test results with dependent variable "information broker." These results were shown in Table 25. There is an inverse relationship between city population and the dependent variable "information broker." Although not a strong relationship, it is statistically significant and indicates that as city population increases, the perception of the city manager as an informational broker decreases in importance. Larger cities have more points of access to information needed by the community than smaller cities. Smaller cities also have a greater degree of homogeneity, with larger cities having greater pluralism with more factions demanding to be heard (Sparrow, 1984). The findings of this dissertation were that managers, regardless of electoral systems, rated themselves higher as an informational broker than other respondents. The literature review cited an ICMA study that concluded that the manager's role as negotiator in problem solving, conflict resolution and developing compromise was the second most time consuming task. A possible explanation for district managers not seeing their information brokering role greater than at-large or mixed city managers is that managers as a whole are already involved in this role to such a high degree that electoral system type does not make a significant difference. Another possible explanation is that districting normally occurs in cities of greater population size than those using at-large systems. The greater points of

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access to information combined with greater numbers of pluralistic factions diminishes the role of the city manager as the primary broker in chief for informational demands.

Manager role—community leadership.

The findings regarding the role of the city manager in community leadership are interesting from a number of perspectives. First, community leadership was the only role involvement where managers did not differ as a whole from the other respondents, regardless of electoral system type. However, district city managers saw a much higher involvement in community leadership than at-large city manages. Within the same set of findings, respondents from at-large cities rated the manager higher in community leadership than respondents in district cities. Respondents in mixed electoral system cities rated the manager higher in community leadership than respondents in either district or at-large cities. These findings seem to present a confusing and contradictory picture of the role of the city manager in community leadership. However, the key to understanding these findings is the premise that in this area of role involvement, role dichotomy has been diminished and smoothed out.

Nalbandian (1988) cites the increasing trend within the city council to abdicate their political leadership. Councils surrender the democratic normative value debate to an interaction between an increasing number of community interest groups and the city manager. Managers, being encouraged by the city council to take a more active policy and community leadership role are searching for role legitimacy. If the city manager and the administrative staff are no longer grounded in the democratic legitimacy of the council, Nalbandian sees the policy formulation role of the manager becoming rooted in the

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community as the direct source of legitimacy. Nalbandian is observing a trend across all cities in councils surrendering their political community leadership to the city manager. The literature review referenced a dramatic reduction in councilors that see the manager as strictly an administrative leader. There is a trend among council members to embrace policy leader as the appropriate role for the city manager.

If managers in all cities are not rating themselves higher in community leadership than other respondents, a possible explanation is that all government officials see the city manager's involvement in community leadership as an appropriate role. If respondents in at-large cities see a greater involvement on the part of the city manager in community leadership than respondents in district cities, then the level of political leadership abdication by the council may be higher than in district cities.

Council election by district creates a council highly representative in nature. Council members become affiliated with their district, pursue parochial political interests and increasingly see policy as their responsibility. In terms of role theory discussed in the literature review, the connection between electoral method and role perception can clearly be seen. More and more councilors perceive that other incumbents in other positions surrounding them expect the council member to be a political and policy leader. Acting on these expectations, councilors in district cities become policy activists and consequently more tied to community groups in the process of developing policy. District elections of the council begin to bring council members closer to levels where the manager resides in policy and community leadership. Both council and manager become increasingly more involved in policy formulation and political leadership. The degree to

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which the council surrenders the democratic normative value debate to the interaction between manager and community groups is diminished in district cities. This is because the increased role of council members in policy activism is leveraged by an increased council role in political community activism. The findings of this dissertation regarding decreased role dichotomy among manager, council, and mayor as districting increases can confirm the above premise. Decreased role dichotomy can be interpreted to mean that in district cities, both council and manager have increased community leadership roles. Therefore, the perception of the manager as a pre-eminent community leader would be diminished, since the council's involvement in political community activism has significantly increased.

Role dichotomy in the area of community leadership may have been lessened overall in all cities since the manager does not rate his or her role significantly different from the perception of other government officials. Role dichotomy as described above is even further diminished in district cities since the council's involvement is increased in both community and policy leadership. Yet district managers still rate their community leadership role higher than counterparts in at-large cities. The greater perception on the part of the council of the manager as a community leader in at-large cities should not be interpreted as the manager in at-large cities having a greater community leadership role. It should be interpreted that at-large councilors have a more diminished role in community leadership than their counterparts in district cities.

Council members in district cities may have increased political community leadership roles, but those roles may be confined to parochial district advocacy issues.

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Svara (1989a) observes that if the mayor is weak, and the council exclusively elected from districts, the manager may emerge as the only government leader articulating policy concerns from a global municipal perspective. The literature review concluded that managers in cities that converted from at-large to district systems saw their roles as community leaders increase (Ehrenhalt, 1990). This resulted primarily from new political linkages that were directly built between the department heads and neighborhood associations.

Manager role—policy initiation.

In this study, managers rated themselves higher in policy initiation overall when compared to other respondents regardless of electoral system type. District managers rated themselves higher in the policy role than their counterparts in at-large cities. Districting increases both the council's community and policy activism. But it also increases involvement with the administrative matters of the city because of the increased council role as ombudsman. Managers perceive that district elections tend to being more conflict into council deliberations, increasing the likelihood of contradictory or conflicting policy direction from the council. Policy activism is increased in the council but in a segmented fashion, with parochial concerns giving the manager mixed or unclear signals regarding policy directions (Whitaker & Jenne, 1995). The manager in the process of achieving consensus, becomes much more involved in policy formulation than before. This increased role involvement may derive from being the sole city official that can formulate policy from a global municipal view versus a constituency view.

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Managerial role—mission.

One of the surprising results from the regression test data was that electoral system type had no significant relationship to the frequency with which the manager worked with the mayor on strategic mission issues. A review again of the mean scores as described in Table 18, Chapter Four may offer some insights. The questions for managers on Section IV of the Survey Instrument (Appendix B) are arranged from the more specific political issues facing elected officials to the broader less political issues facing the future of the city. The results in Table 18 show that the frequency of city manager involvement increases incrementally as the issue moves from the more immediate political decisions to the longer-ranged less political decisions. Overall, the average mean score across all six involvement areas averages 3.66 indicating strong managerial involvement. One theory regarding the lack of a significant relationship could be tied to the higher frequency of managerial involvement in the less political broader ranged issues. The premise of the second hypothesis was that in district cities, the increased involvement of council members in constituency issues would drive the manager into a partnership with the mayor. Strategic mission issues formerly worked between mayor and council would switch to a partnership between mayor and manager because of council focus on the more immediate constituency issues. If the multivariate regression test would have focused on the more immediate politically-based issues then the results might have shown a significant relationship to electoral system type. These issues may be more traditionally worked closely between mayor and council. In district cities, these issues may convert in a stronger fashion to a manager/mayor partnership where the manager is working these

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issues in a new role with the mayor. The test results may have been diluted by the last two issues, analyzing future trends and developing strategies for future city development. These last two issues are less political in nature and may have always fit with a role partnership between mayor and manager.

Political Linkages and Role Dichotomy

This dissertation has confirmed that as districting increases in cities, the level of role dichotomy between manager, mayor, and council decreases and, by inference, the level of role duality increases. As role dichotomy deceases, the potential for role conflict between manager and council decreases as well. The key to understanding how districting diminishes role dichotomy can be found in the concept of political linkages. This concept was discussed at length at the end of Chapter Two in terms of Terry Clark's (1968) model of subsystem interchange mechanisms. These organizational mechanisms act as integrative components to create informal centralization and control community sector vertical and horizontal differentiation that can cause disintegration. The concept of political linkages is briefly reviewed here again.

Political linkages and managing urban conflict.

Clark (1968) indicates that community subsystem integration can be generated from three sources: the government bureaucracy (council, mayor, manager); the political party; and neighborhood voluntary organizations. The involvement of SPOs to generate subsystem integration in the municipal environment is unlikely today. This dissertation is not examining the growth of neighborhood associations. This discussion will center on the third source proposed by Clark in the form of the council, mayor, and manager.

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As an introduction to the discussion regarding political linkages and role dichotomy, a model is presented here based on Clark's concept of community subsystem integration. This model is based on the concept of managing political conflict through the creation of political linkages. The political conflict interchange between the community and a city council elected by district creates the political linkages. These political linkages among the community, council, the manager, and the manager's staff ultimately become essential components in the reduction of role dichotomy and role conflict. The model presented here is illustrated in Figure 3.



Figure 3. Urban Conflict, Council Involvement, and Political Linkages

Clark (1994) provides an explanation as to why structural differentiation promotes organized groups. Structural hierarchy, social hierarchical differences, and race promote the increase of organized groups. The interaction of these groups with hierarchy sparks conflict and ideological differences among leaders. Clark's two concepts of hierarchy and

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class politics work together to generate conflict in the form of groups that are demanding government action to meet some perceived distributive or social inequality. As community activists become more demanding and militant, government agencies, often with little understanding of how class politics and race define community needs, respond by defensively reinforcing bureaucratic norms of behavior. This in turn increases the alienation of community activists (Pecorella, 1994). Conflict from organized groups is managed through the involvement of council members elected by district with specific constituencies. Their involvement generates a need for information from the city manager that creates political linkages throughout the entire urban environment.

In Chapter Two, the experience of former Phoenix city manager Marvin Andrews after districting best illustrates the model. After districting, inquiries from the public previously referred to city staff were now funneled through the council to the city manager. A fast reaction response system was developed to council inquiries. This system took the form of liaison staff transferred from manager to council, deputy city manager assignment to council needs one-on-one, and mandated city staff attendance at district town hall meetings sponsored by council members.

Other studies, such as the one conducted by Heilig and Mundt (1984) in the study of 43 city managers after conversion to districts, confirm that Marvin Andrews experience was not unique. Council demands for information from the manager increased dramatically because of the council role switching from "trustee to ombudsman." Additional staff had to be added to deal with council communications and some managers

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felt that district representation began to interfere with department decision rule making because of constituency advocacy.

The 1984 *LBJ Policy Report* also documents the tendency on the part of council members to increase their role in municipal administration after districting. The study concluded that most respondents indicated that districting created a need for more interaction between city staff and council because council members became more involved in city administration after the change.

The political linkages created by districting can be summarized as follows:

- Strong vertical linkages are built between the council and neighborhoods that simply did not exist under at-large systems. City council members begin to conduct town meetings in districts and neighborhood associations increase their attendance at city council meetings.
- Greater vertical and horizontal linkages are forged between the city manager and the council. The manager must spend greater amounts of time on consensus building with council, mayor, and department heads. This is a result of the informational apparatus built by the manager to react to council needs for information.
- Greater vertical and horizontal linkages are built between department heads and the council. Department heads must maintain greater liaison with council members because of greater constituency focus. They also are required to attend town meetings to learn more about district community needs.
- Greater vertical linkages, therefore, are created between the department heads and neighborhood associations.

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Political Linkages and Role Conflict

This dissertation has concluded that role dichotomy decreases as districting increases. The role of both council and manager is increased in policy formulation and community leadership. The role of the council is increased in city administration. Political linkages created by district systems do much to reduce role conflict between manager and council. Essentially this is because of greater political leadership on the part of the council in policy development as a direct result of their new constituency orientation. The consensus that city managers found possible to achieve in at-large cities among council members using political rationality techniques of balancing power among all players is not so easy to establish in district cities. The result is that more and more city managers must squarely battle policy issues head on. They spend more time in the policy arena working with a very political and difficult council environment.

The district election of the council has infused new political leadership into the council. The increased representative orientation of the council due to district election has made policy role expectation more visible to councilors than ever before. They become more aware that all municipal players expect policy leadership to come from their new representative role. The city manager, because of expertise, information, and public interest orientation, also sees expectation from others that he or she should be a policy leader. The difficulty faced by the city manager in gaining consensus from five of six council members, all representing a district, increases the time spent by the manager on policy development. The council member begins to expect the manager to be active in the policy realm for several reasons. First, the new council representative policy role

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increases sensitivity to policy leadership. Second, the manager is already in place as a policy leader and the council cannot fail to see that fact. Third, the council member needs the manager's experience and expertise for policy direction to increase their own political influence and popularity in their district.

Political linkages created by districting reduce role conflict. Neal Gross, Ward Mason, and Alexander McEachern state that "A role is a set of expectations...a set of evaluative standards applied to an incumbent of a particular position" (p. 60). Society is conceived as a system of positions. With each position comes an associated set of expectations concerning appropriate behavior. These expectations form a behavioral model providing the occupant of the position a value system to adjust and direct their own behavior. If occupants conform to expectations, they allow others to anticipate their behaviors and enable interacting individuals to function in a collective manner (Loveridge, 1971). If occupants fail to conform to role expectations, conflict is the result. Political linkages have brought council and manager to a position where role expectations on both sides begin to come closer together and role conflict diminishes.

Implications—Political Linkages and Role Legitimacy

In the previous section, the discussion centered on how political linkages created by districting smoothed out the role orientation of all governmental players and reduced role conflict. In this section, the implications of this reduction of role conflict will be examined in terms of one of the greatest problems facing council-manager governments today—the crisis of legitimacy for the managerial role. Protasel (1989) sees districting as an essential means to restoring legitimacy to the manager. Districting reverses the trend of

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political leadership moving away from the elected officials to the manager outside the constitutional structure of the charter government.

Going back to the "Statement of Problem" in Chapter One, role conflict between council and manager abounds in the council-manager form of government bringing pressures on the manager's tenure and organizational integrity. The manager assimilates these pressures by supplanting technical rationality with political rationality. The manager develops a social engineering role as a community leader, increases political authority through the development of an independent political constituency, and distributes power internally to staff and externally to citizens to strengthen the managerial role as mediator. The increasing use of political rationality successfully counters pressures placed on the manager by the role conflict but increases the manager's political leadership and political role. A problem is created in terms of the democratic normative debate being moved outside the council to a dialog and interchange between the manager and community groups. The manager, a non-elected official moves further away from accountability to the elected body and closer to representing a citizenry that did not have a choice in managerial selection. A crisis occurs in legitimacy for the managerial role.

Nalbandian (1991) suggested a model to ameliorate the effects of this legitimacy crisis. This model simply acknowledges the democratic process moving outside the council. If managers anchor their policy initiatives in fundamental community values, then the council's reaction to managerial initiatives will restore the proper legislative oversight role to the council. They will be reacting not to managerial initiatives but to the results of a community value dialogue.

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The fundamental problem remains that the normal democratic process is reversed. Community groups should articulate needs in terms of resource distribution and social equity directly to the council. The council should then act on these needs, enter into the normative value debate with community groups and politically activate those needs in the form of active policy leadership. Political policy leadership on the part of the council should then generate closer ties between manager, staff, and the community to further develop and execute policy initiatives. Instead, the manager is gathering community input, conducting the value debate with organized groups, and forwarding policy ideas to the council for legislative action. What Nalbandian recommends as a solution to managerial role legitimacy is valid but dependent on how well the manager correctly interprets and correctly includes the values of the community in policy initiatives to the council.

The flow chart in Figure 4 is a continuation of the political linkages diagram in Figure 3. It portrays how political linkages can reduce role conflict and ultimately restore managerial role legitimacy.

The results of the data analysis in this dissertation have demonstrated reduced role dichotomy among manager, mayor, and council in district cities. The discussion in this chapter has centered on how political linkages created by districting reduce role conflict by activating a new sense of political leadership and policy activism within the council. The council demands for information result in the manager and governmental staff setting up information brokering mechanisms to respond to council needs. These mechanisms increase the manager's time spent in community leadership and policy formulation. The

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growth of community political groups that occurs after districting increases the time of the council and manager in the citizen value needs debate. But as Figure 4 illustrates, the increase in managerial role in community leadership and policy formulation is a direct result of the increased political and policy activism role in the council.

The reduced role conflict diminishes the role pressure on the manager and reduces the exercise of political rationality as a way to assimilate the threats of the pressures brought to bear by the role conflict. The use of political rationality by the manager in today's municipal environment is never completely eliminated. The municipal environment of today is too complex and fragmented with political factions to practice technical rationality alone as a means to realistically govern and manage political conflict. The more limited use of political rationality on the part of the manager brings his or her role as a political leader into a more balanced position. The political role of the manager becomes a response to council-mandated informational coordination. It becomes less of an independent political role with an independent citizen constituency for the manager. If the manager increases in role orientation as a community leader and activist, it is now legitimized in a partnership with the council generated by constituency needs in a more representative and democratic municipal environment.

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

Figure 4. Political Linkages, Role Conflict, and Role Legitimacy

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Conclusions and Recommendations

This dissertation has suggested that a new electoral context that changes roles, responsibilities, and relationships among council, manager, and mayor can do much to address a basic problem in council-manager cities today. That problem is the shift of political leadership from council to manager with the manager attempting to establish role legitimacy through political rationality and community constituency. This new electoral context is the interaction of a city manager with a council elected by district as opposed to at-large electoral systems. As of 1991, 59% of all council-manager cities selected all of their council members using an at-large electoral system (Whitaker & Jenne, 1995). This section of the chapter draws some final conclusions from the research study in this dissertation and offers some recommendations for areas of further study.

Conclusions

The new electoral context mentioned above changes roles, responsibilities, and relationships between manager and elected officials to the extent that three enhancements to governance result: (a) role dichotomy and ultimately role conflict between manager and council is reduced; (b) the community normative value debate is moved into the council through constituency district representation injecting political leadership into the council and, thereby, increasing council policy activism; and (c) restoring legitimacy to the role of the city manager through political linkages created by districting. These political linkages increase the manager's role in community leadership and policy formulation through council informational demands and not through the manager's exercise of political rationality in response to role conflict.

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Again, the two formulations presented by Clark (1968) in Chapter Two of this dissertation are reviewed:

> The greater the horizontal and vertical differentiation within a sector of a community, the greater the differentiation between potential elites within that sector, the more decentralized the decision-making structure, which without the establishment of integrative mechanisms leads to less coordination between elements within the sector and a lower level of outputs (p. 95).
>
> The more centralized the decision-making structure within a sector of a community, the more predictable and the more reflective the community outputs of the values and interests of that sector of the community (p. 95).

The political linkages created by districting act as integrative mechanisms that result in informal centralization. This informal centralization increases the actualization of community outputs representative of community values. Constituency inquiries focused on council members energize these political linkages. They are created between the community and council and between council/mayor and manager. They connect back to the neighborhood through linkages between manager and community associations.

The Strong Party Organization (SPO) at one time produced informal centralization in an environment of fragmentation. But the SPO is waning in the United States. The combination of city council district electoral systems with the city manager provides the alternative to the SPO to counter political fragmentation. Conflict rises from the community to the council. The council, in its effort to manage the conflict, saturates the administrative government under the city manager with demands for information and

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action. In the process, all actors within the neighborhoods, elected government, and administrative government are pulled together, establishing communication linkages where none had existed before.

Miranda (1994) indicated that any organization that is electorally stable and centralized is predicted to successfully regulate interest group demands and provide fiscal control. A council elected by district combined with the city manager provides a centralized stability that a strong mayor government with a district elected council cannot provide. Strong mayors will often use interest groups to form their own fragmented coalitions. The city manager provides a centralized stability to balance the electoral side of government that a strong mayor cannot provide. The combination of a council elected by district with the city manager provides the degree of stability and centralization necessary to provide informal centralization.

State constitutions normally are designed for flexibility to grant cities charter forms of government that allow the city to organize a government structure that is deemed most suitable by the electorate. Home rule municipal charter government preserves American's love of political freedom through a designed emphasis on leadership by elected officials versus a "Prussian" style bureaucracy found in many European cities. What started with electoral representation evolved into politics and political parties. These parties served the role of cutting across class and economic lines linking groups both vertically and horizontally for policy formulation. Bureaucratic administrative arrangements chinked in just enough here and there to cope with a growing complex society (Stillman, 1991), Reformers in the early twentieth century attempted to reverse this "chinking in" process.

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Their goal was to run government as a business with just enough politics chinked in here and there to provide some semblance of democratic freedom.

District electoral systems are a beginning in repoliticizing American cities and bringing urban environments back in line with flexible constitutional federalism that focused on political freedom. The reformed urban triangle of the bureaucratic agency machine, business elites, and the middle class should be replaced by a new coalition linking the city council, neighborhood associations, interest groups, and the city manager. This new contemporary urban political machine forged with political linkages integrating all players in the municipal environment would do much to improve the future of America's cities.

Recommendations for Further Study

Three areas of study warrant mention for further research. This dissertation touched on these areas, made inferences regarding direction, but did not provide tested data for confirmation of formulated hypotheses. First, a comparison should be done of cities across electoral system type to verify the existence of political linkages among neighborhoods, council, manager, mayor, and managerial staff. This study would do much to provide a better understanding of how districting reduces role conflict and adds legitimacy to the managerial role. Second, as an extension of this study, definition of the council role in terms of policy, administration and management, comparing across types of electoral systems should be tested. This would provide a more precise verification to the conclusion that if role dichotomy is reduced between council and manager, then role duality between council and manager is increased in district cities. Finally, more research

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should be conducted into why neighborhood associations increase and proliferate in cities that convert from at-large to district systems. The political linkages between the community and council start the process of moving political leadership from the manager back to the council. This dynamic of neighborhood association growth after districting needs further analytical research to better define the nature of these critical political linkages.

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APPENDIX A

LISTING OF 105 CITIES USED IN THIS STUDY

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Listing of 105 Cities Used in this Study

Abilene , Texas
Alexandria, Virginia
Amarillo, Texas
Anaheim, California
Ann Arbor, Michigan
Arlington, Texas
Aurora, Colorado
Austin, Texas
Bakersfield, California
Beaumont, Texas
Berkeley, California
Charlotte, North Carolina
Chesapeake, Virginia
Chula Vista, California
Cincinnati, Ohio
Colorado Springs, Colorado
Concord, California
Corpus Christi, Texas
Dallas, Texas
Dayton, Ohio
Des Moines, Iowa
Durham, North Carolina
Escondido, California
Eugene, Oregon
Fort Lauderdale, Florida
Fort Worth, Texas
Fremont, California
Fresno, California
Fullerton, California
Garden Grove, California
Garland, Texas
Glendale, Arizona
Glendale, California
Grand Rapids, Michigan
Greensboro, North Carolina
Hampton, Virginia
Hartford, Connecticut
Hayward, California
Hollywood, Florida
Huntington Beach, California
Independence, Missouri
Irvine, California
Irving, Texas
Kansas City, Missouri
Lakewood, Colorado
Laredo, Texas
Las Vegas, Nevada
Little Rock, Arkansas
Long Beach, California
Lowell, Massachusetts
Lubbock, Texas
Mesa, Arizona
Mesquite, Texas
Miami, Florida
Modesto, California
Moreno Valley, California
Newport News, Virginia
Norfolk, Virginia
Oakland, California
Oceanside, California
Oklahoma City, Oklahoma
Ontario, California
Orange, California
Overland Park, Kansas
Oxnard, California
Pasadena, California
Peoria, Illinois
Phoenix, Arizona
Plano, Texas
Pomona, California
Portsmouth, Virginia
Raleigh, North Carolina
Rancho Cucamonga, California
Reno, Nevada
Richmond, Virginia
Riverside, California
Sacramento, California
Salem, Oregon
Salinas, California
San Antonio, Texas
San Diego, California
San Jose, California
Santa Ana, California
Santa Clarita, California
Santa Rosa, California
Savannah, Georgia
Scottsdale, Arizona
Simi Valley, California
Spokane, Washington
Springfield, Missouri
Sterling Heights, Michigan
Stockton, California
Sunnyvale, California
Tacoma, Washington
Tallahassee, Florida
Tempe, Arizona
Thousand Oaks, California
Torrance, California
Tucson, Arizona
Vallejo, California
Virginia Beach, Virginia
Waco, Texas
Wichita, Kansas
Winston-Salem, North Carolina
Worcester, Massachusetts

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APPENDIX B

SURVEY INSTRUMENT

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QUESTIONNAIRE

Electoral Systems and The Role of The City Manager

I. GENERAL INFORMATION

1. How long have you served in your present position? _____

2. How is the City Council elected? ☐At Large ☐District ☐Mixed

3. If your City Council is now elected using a district system, what month and year did this electoral system go into place? _____

4. If your City Council is now elected using a mixed district/at large system, what month and year did this electoral system go into place? _____

II. INVOLVEMENT BY MANAGER/ELECTED OFFICIALS IN CITY GOVERNMENT ACTIVITIES

Using the following index, circle the number that describes your actual involvement in the city government activities listed in questions 1-29.

LEVEL OF INVOLVEMENT INDEX
(Definitions are for questions 1-29 ONLY)

1.— **Very Low: Not Involved**
Handled entirely by someone else, who may report on what has been done.

2. — **Low: Minimum review or reaction appropriate to situation**
Examples would be giving a routine okay to someone else's recommendations, providing the opportunity to react as a courtesy or making comments.

3. — **Moderate: Advising or reviewing**
Examples include making suggestions, reviewing recommendations, seeking information or clarification, ratifying proposals.4

4. — **High: Leading, guiding or pressuring**
Examples are initiating; making proposals; advocating, promoting or opposing; carefully reviewing and revising a proposal.

5. — **Very High: Handle entirely**
No one else directly involved but others may be informed of actions taken.

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CITY GOVERNMENT ACTIVITIES

	Very Low	Low	Moderate	High	Very High
1. Identifying problems or developing problems as issues, analyzing future trends for the city	1	2	3	4	5
2. Developing annual program goals and objectives	1	2	3	4	5
3. Hiring decisions about department heads	1	2	3	4	5
4. Hiring decisions about other staff	1	2	3	4	5
5. Specific decisions about planning and zoning	1	2	3	4	5
6. Deciding to undertake new or eliminate old services (not simple change in level)	1	2	3	4	5
7. Delivering services to citizens	1	2	3	4	5
8. Developing strategies for future development of the city	1	2	3	4	5
9. Developing formula for allocating services.	1	2	3	4	5
10. Specific decisions about allocating services	1	2	3	4	5
11. Formulating the proposed budget	1	2	3	4	5
12. Investigating citizens complaints	1	2	3	4	5
13. Making specific decisions that are part of larger projects, site selection, facility design	1	2	3	4	5
14. Awarding large contracts	1	2	3	4	5
15. Routine contracting and purchasing	1	2	3	4	5
16. Changing governmental institutions or revising the charter	1	2	3	4	5
17. Determining the level of taxes and fees	1	2	3	4	5
18. Assessing organizational performance	1	2	3	4	5
19. Deciding to participate in federal aid programs	1	2	3	4	5
20. Developing applications for federal funds	1	2	3	4	5
21. Initiating or canceling programs	1	2	3	4	5
22. Developing operating procedures for programs: definition of eligibility, application methods, award criteria, etc.	1	2	3	4	5

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City Government Activities (*continued*)	Very Low	Low	Moderate	High	Very High
23. Evaluating programs	1	2	3	4	5
24. Determining the purpose and scope of city government	1	2	3	4	5
25. Budget review and approval	1	2	3	4	5
26. Proposing changes in management practices or organization	1	2	3	4	5
27. Determining wages and benefits for employees	1	2	3	4	5
28. Handling complaints from employees	1	2	3	4	5
29. Setting standards for employee treatment of citizens in service delivery	1	2	3	4	5

III. ROLE OF CITY MANAGER IN POLICY MAKING AND COMMUNITY LEADERSHIP

A. FOR CITY MANAGERS (*Circle the number that describes the frequency with which you*):

B. FOR MAYOR AND CITY COUNCIL MEMBERS (*Circle the number that describes your perception of the frequency with which the city manager*):

	Very Low	Low	Moderate	High	Very High
1. Support(s) the governing body by providing them with information.	1	2	3	4	5
2. Promote(s) interaction among policy makers to ensure that there is adequate opportunity for policy discussion and definition.	1	2	3	4	5
3. Support(s) the governing body by identifying community needs and initiating policy proposals.	1	2	3	4	5
4. Play(s) a significant role in policy initiation through advice and recommendations to the governing body.	1	2	3	4	5
5. Promote(s) team building within the governing body.	1	2	3	4	5
6. Gather(s) community input throughout the year through surveys, citizen committees or other methods and use that information to determine community needs.	1	2	3	4	5
7. Hold(s) town or neighborhood-based meetings specifically to solicit citizen input to identify community needs.	1	2	3	4	5

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IV. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MANAGER AND MAYOR ON STRATEGIC CITY MISSION ISSUES

FOR CITY MANAGER ONLY (*Circle the number that describes the frequency with which you work directly with the Mayor on*):

	Very Low	Low	Moderate	High	Very High
1. Changing governmental institutions or revising the charter	1	2	3	4	5
2. Determining the level of taxes and fees	1	2	3	4	5
3. Determining the purpose and scope of city government	1	2	3	4	5
4. Deciding to undertake new or eliminate old services (*not simple change in level*)	1	2	3	4	5
5. Identifying problems, analyzing future trends for the city	1	2	3	4	5
6. Developing strategies for future development of the city	1	2	3	4	5

Additional comments are appreciated concerning factors that may affect the role of the City Manager in terms of interaction with the Council.

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

THANK YOU FOR YOUR COOPERATION

John Y. Cleveland
1710 S. Gilbert Rd., #2025
Mesa, AZ 85204
(602) 262-6026

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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

John Young Cleveland was born in Washington, D.C. on October 1, 1947. He received a Bachelor of Arts degree in 1969 from Butler University in Indianapolis, Indiana majoring in history and political science. He was commissioned as an officer in the United States Air Force where he became a professional military officer for a period of 24 years. He retired as a Lieutenant Colonel after a successful career highlighted by a four-year assignment at Headquarters Pacific Air Force in Hawaii where he was selected as Personnel Manager of the Year for 1985. His last assignment in the military was as Director of Personnel at Williams Air Force Base, Arizona. In 1976, he earned a Master of Public Administration degree from the University of North Dakota. In 1985, he graduated from the United States Air Force Air War College at Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. After his retirement from the military, he joined the city of Phoenix Equal Opportunity Department. He is now an Equal Opportunity Specialist assisting minority, women, and small business enterprises in obtaining contracts with the city of Phoenix. He was accepted into the doctoral program at Arizona State University, School of Public Affairs and graduated in May 2000.

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